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Action Intentions and the Puzzle of Non-Willed Behaviour 
James Colton 
It feels intuitive that our actions are intentional, but there is considerable debate 
about whether (and how) humans control their behaviour. Ideomotor models of action 
argue that action intentions have a fundamentally perceptual format. In these views, 
actions are not only controlled by anticipating – imagining – their intended perceptual 
consequences but are also initiated when this “action effect” activation is sufficiently 
strong. Yet, this latter initiating function of action effect activation has not yet been 
tested directly. 
In Experiments 1-4, participants mentally rehearsed a movement sequence and 
were unexpectedly presented with salient visual cues that were either compatible or 
incompatible with their currently imagined action. As predicted, the combined activity 
from imagery and perception was sufficient to trigger non-willed action slips, even 
when participants were asked to withhold responses. The experiments provided the first 
direct evidence that forming an action intention may involve nothing more than evoking 
a strong enough mental image of the perceptual effect one wishes to achieve until a 
motor threshold is reached and the corresponding action is initiated. Experiments 5-6 
showed that anticipated action effects attain this initiating role when they are treated as 
potential future goal states, rather than the current state of the sensorimotor system. 
Finally, Experiment 7 provided evidence that the tendency to produce action slips is 
positively associated with individual differences in ideomotor suggestibility. 
These findings reveal how people are able to interact so effortlessly with the 
world by specifying lightly constraining action goals which mediate the translation of 
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sensory input into motor output - allowing the environment to trigger actions which 
correspond with the goal. In addition, these findings suggest that action slips are a 
product of the same processes that guide voluntary actions. That is, perceptual input can 
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1. Chapter 1: The Puzzle of Non-Willed Action 
1.1. Overview 
Many people will have experienced the frustration of putting their car keys in the 
fridge while leaving a jug of milk out on the kitchen worktop. Or the embarrassment of 
answering “Yes” when asked by an aeroplane steward if one would like the chicken or 
the fish. As 19th-century Psychologist William James (1890) noted, “Who is there that 
has never wound up his watch on taking off his waistcoat in the daytime, or taken his 
latch-key out on arriving at the doorstep of a friend?” Freud (1914) studied these strange 
deviations from typical behaviour which he referred to as “Fehlleistungen” (or “faulty 
actions” in English) in “The Psychopathology of Everyday Life”. Freud’s writings gave 
rise to the phrase “Freudian slip” which is commonly used to describe errors of speech, 
memory or action which, according to Freud, reveal one’s unconscious desires and 
innermost feelings. In the modern age, the phrase “action slip” was deployed as a catch-
all term to describe these kinds of instances of unusual behaviour (Reason, 1984). 
However, the precise origin of action slips and their broader relevance to the 
mechanisms which guide voluntary action have not since received a great deal of 
empirical attention. 
There are three things of note with respect to this anomalous behaviour. First, 
action slips are, mercifully, rare in one’s everyday life, but are common in the sense that 
most people will have had such experiences at some point in their lives (Reason, 1984). 
Second, action slips are not random events but tend to reflect the impact of 
environmental cues or one’s inner train of thought (e.g. if one incorrectly anticipated a 
yes/no question from the aforementioned aeroplane steward). Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, action slips are often referred to as being “unintentional” and yet, 
objectively, the erroneous behaviour must be self-generated. Accordingly, the incentive 
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for studying these kinds of slips of action control is that, far from being random events, 
they are in all likelihood borne of the same processes which guide all human behaviour. 
As such, the nature of our mistakes and the situations in which they occur can provide 
unique insights into the origins of our intentions and the underlying mechanisms of 
volitional action. Indeed, if action slips do represent a curious by-product of processes 
involved in generating voluntary actions, then it is important to explore how they can be 
accommodated by modern theories of action control. This line of thinking motivated the 
question at the centre of this thesis: how is it that people can produce behaviour if it is 
not, in some sense, willed?  
Willed action is one of the biggest puzzles in psychology: do humans will their 
actions, or do they just follow previously established stimulus-response associations, or 
respond to affordances offered by the environment (e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 1998)? While a 
long tradition of psychological research, starting with behaviourism (Hull, 1943), has 
denied the possibility of voluntary action, or at least exempted it from rigorous 
psychological enquiry, a parallel tradition has made it a central topic. Ideomotor 
theories of action argue that people do have voluntary control over their actions, and 
that these action intentions have a fundamentally perceptual format (Hommel, 2009; 
Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; James, 1890; Kunde, Elsner, & 
Kiesel, 2007; Pacherie & Haggard, 2010; Prinz, 1997; Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010). 
Ideomotor models claim that the processes which serve action, imagery and perception 
are functionally intertwined because they share a common language – that of 
perceptually-coded internal representations – or “action effects” (e.g. Common Coding 
theory, Prinz, 1990, 1997; van der Wel, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2013). To initiate an 
action, these models argue, humans simply bring to mind (e.g. via imagery) the desired 
action effects. In other words, they anticipate how the action would look, feel and 
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sound, and how it would affect the environment. Automatic motor processes then make 
this imagined action reality.  
Ideomotor models – and more recently those based on predictive processing (e.g. 
Active Inference, Adams, Shipp, & Friston, 2013; and Predictive Coding, Clark, 2013) 
– argue that perceptual control of action is possible because people, through a lifetime 
of interactions, form bi-directional associations between their motor behaviours and the 
sensory input that typically follows. They learn, for example, that tensing a specific 
muscle group will pull one’s hand to the left, or that pressing a brake pedal will slow a 
car (Turella et al., 2016). As these sensorimotor associations are formed, willed 
behaviour becomes possible (James, 1890): one merely needs to think of (i.e. imagine) 
the sensory consequences one wants to achieve, and via the now established 
associations, the relevant motor behaviours are elicited. After sufficient practice, these 
acts of motor imagery become so effective at triggering the corresponding behaviours 
that the sophisticated motor processes, which produce them, operate largely outside of 
awareness. That is, we simply imagine our hand moving, and it does.  
Importantly, ideomotor models assume that the internal perceptual representations 
which can be activated in a top-down manner during voluntary action (i.e. in order to 
achieve or advance towards some internally specified goal), can also be activated, 
bottom-up, by perceptual input. This could be achieved in two ways. On one hand, 
perceptual input could act as a retrieval cue for the action effects that one typically 
activates in response to such a stimulus. For example, when one encounters brake lights 
in a queue of traffic, this stimulus almost reflexively causes a press of the brake pedal to 
slow the car and avoid a collision. On the other hand, perceptual input could also drive 
action directly if, for example, the input corresponds with an action image that one 
could generate oneself. Indeed, the tendency for people to imitate other people’s actions 
is a striking illustration of the potential for actions one observes to directly influence 
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one’s ongoing behaviour when they strongly correspond with actions in one’s motor 
repertoire (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Tentatively, this suggests that action slips might 
result from one’s train of thought (i.e. mental imagery) or cues in the environment (i.e. 
perceptual input) inadvertently triggering an inappropriate action. In both cases, 
however, the resulting action slip is mediated by the activation of an internal 
representation of the action outcome. However, prior to considering models of action 
control in more detail, it is useful to first consider in more detail how closely this 
proposal maps onto the way in which action slips present in everyday life. 
 
1.1.1 Mundane Errors of Action Control 
Reason (1984) coined the term “action slips” to describe the variety of accidental 
errors of action control that people produce and conducted a study to explore their 
frequency and form. Action slips are not well suited to laboratory study, given that they 
are rare events, so participants were asked to keep a diary of their behaviour and record 
any aberrant behaviour over a seven day period. Reason (1984) developed a taxonomy 
with four distinct classes of action slip, distinguished by their behavioural 
characteristics, (a) Repetition, wherein actions in the intended sequence were repeated 
unnecessarily; (b) Wrong Object(s), where the intended actions were executed but 
directed at inappropriate objects; (c) Omission, where intended actions were left out of a 
particular action sequence; and (d) Intrusion, where novel unintended actions became 
incorporated into one’s ongoing behaviour. Participants reported instances such as, “As 
I approached the turnstile on my way out of the library, I pulled my wallet out of my 
pocket as if to pay, although no money was required” (p. 544) and “I intended to close 
the window because it was cold, but closed the cupboard instead” (p.545).  
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Of course, the taxonomic labels (derived by factor analysis of questionnaire data) 
were not intended to represent an exhaustive or mutually exclusive description of action 
slips, but this study nevertheless provided many interesting cases which are useful to 
consider in the context of modern models of motor control. To illustrate, a typical tea 
making error provides such an example. A good cup of tea provides an ideal start to the 
day for many people and the task of preparing a brew involves a familiar ritual. Boil the 
kettle, place the teabag in the cup, pour boiling water onto the teabag and brew for 3-5 
minutes, before removing the tea bag and adding the milk (“How to Make a Proper 
Brew,” 2019). However, on a particularly absent-minded morning, one might find 
oneself reaching for the milk jug, rather than the freshly boiled kettle, and pouring cold 
milk rather than hot water onto the teabag - ruining the day before it has even begun. 
But what might have caused this unusual error to occur?  
For one, both the kettle and the milk jug are of a similar size, have a handle which 
affords a similar grasping action and, indeed, both are necessary for a proper cup of tea. 
For another, one might have just noticed that the milk was about to run out, 
inadvertently initiating a reaching and grasping towards the milk instead of adding milk 
to a mental shopping list. These observations highlight the role that cues in the 
environment (i.e. object affordances) and one’s inner train of thought (i.e. mental 
imagery) may play in the generation of action slips. That is, such action slips may be 
caused by, (1) poorly specified or monitored goals; (2) one’s goals simply being 
disrupted by salient information in the environment, or; (3) some combination of the 
two. In fact, many of the cases described by Reason (1984), indicated that both internal 
imagery and external sensory information contribute to the generation of action slips.  
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1.1.2 Esoteric Errors of Action Control 
In the previous section, an unfortunate tea making error was used to illustrate 
some of the potential origins of the kinds of action slips many people will experience in 
everyday life. However, as noted earlier, these kinds of everyday action slips have not 
received a great deal of empirical attention, because they are rare events which appear 
to occur spontaneously. This presents a challenge for an empirical enquiry into the 
origin of action slips. As a result, it is useful to consider research concerning other 
instances of unusual behaviour which share the characteristic sense of involuntariness 
that accompanies everyday action slips. Classical ideomotor phenomena such as 
hypnosis, water dowsing, magic swinging pendula and the use of an Ouija board for 
contacting the dead have a long history in Psychological science (Stock & Stock, 2004). 
They stand as another test case of a similar kind of non-willed behaviour to the action 
slips described earlier, but that can be more readily reproduced in laboratory conditions.  
For example, when subjected to hypnosis, some people appear in thrall to their 
hypnotist’s suggestions, as if at that moment they exert no control over their own 
behaviour. The striking aspect of hypnotic behaviour is not just that the subject moves 
in accordance with the hypnotist's instructions; it is the subject’s belief that they were 
not the causal agents of their actions and the apparent conviction with which this belief 
is held. Another example is provided by Chevreul’s (1833) magic swinging pendulum, 
wherein superstitious individuals claim that the motion of a pendulum held over the 
belly of a pregnant woman can be used to determine the sex of her unborn child 
(Wegner, Ansfield, & Pilloff, 1998). Responsive individuals report the sense that 
supernatural forces, rather than their own actions, compel the pendulum to oscillate. 
Taken together, ideomotor phenomena serve as remarkable examples of how it is 
possible to blur the causal relationship between our intentions and our behaviour, even 
in the absence of any underlying clinical diagnosis. For the present purposes, ideomotor 
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phenomena are considered as particularly unusual manifestations of the same processes 
which give rise to action slips. One element common to each of these examples, that 
draws clear parallels with the action slips described by James (1890), Freud (1914) and 
Reason (1984), is that people commonly report that their behaviour is unintentional or 
somehow non-willed. Indeed, with both action slips and classical ideomotor 
phenomena, one’s behaviour feels subjectively non-willed in spite of the fact that, 
objectively, it must be self-generated1. Ideomotor principles were initially applied to 
debunking these supposedly paranormal phenomena which have now become 
interesting case studies in modern Psychology. As such, research concerning ideomotor 
phenomena can provide an important empirical insight into the interplay between 
internal and external processes in the generation of non-willed action slips. 
Consider the example of Chevreul’s pendulum. Chevreul (1833) was the first to 
demonstrate that the pendulum movements were eliminated if the subject's arm was 
supported, and the subject’s movements were constrained. He argued that this finding 
indicated that the motion of the pendulum was, in fact, caused by tiny, imperceptible 
movements of the subject’s arm and postural sway, rather than supernatural forces. 
Chevreul (1833) proposed that vivid mental imagery and one's expectations about the 
anticipated motion of the pendulum bob are the true causes of the movement. In other 
words, the individual holding the pendulum has an expectation of the sex of the 
mother’s unborn baby, and the motion of the pendulum is merely a subconscious 
expression of that belief. In the modern age, this phenomenon was the subject of a 
formal empirical enquiry conducted by Easton and Shor (1975, 1976, 1977). In these 
experiments, individuals were specifically instructed to remain still, focus their attention 
                                                 
1 As an interesting historical aside, the name “Ouija” is actually a trademark of Hasbro games who 
created the familiar planchette and board (McRobbie, 2013). Bizarrely, it was originally marketed as both 
a mysterious oracle capable of delivering prophesies from the netherworld and wholesome family 
entertainment. However, in order to be granted a patent, Hasbro had to prove that their Ouija board 
worked as described. The Chief Patent Officer insisted upon a demonstration and demanded the board be 
used to spell his name, apparently unknown to its creators. During the subsequent séance, the planchette 
accurately spelt out his name and, visibly shaken, he awarded Hasbro a US Patent. 
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on the pendulum bob and to vividly imagine it swinging from side to side while 
recording apparatus captured the magnitude and direction of the oscillation. This 
research demonstrated that the magnitude of swing was enhanced when external 
rhythmic oscillating audio-visual stimuli (e.g. a light which flashes in time with the 
natural swing of the pendulum) that corresponded with the motion were present, 
compared to when they were absent (Easton & Shor, 1975). Furthermore, the pendulum 
swing was reduced when participants view of the pendulum bob was obstructed, 
compared to when it was visible (Easton & Shor, 1977).  
Notwithstanding an influence of the occult, the above-reviewed research on 
ideomotor phenomena suggests that merely imagining what the movement of a distal 
object (i.e. the pendulum bob) might look and feel like is sufficient to generate the 
behaviour through arm, wrist and postural sway like a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Furthermore, the fact that eliminating visual feedback of participants’ own movements 
reduced the effect highlights the importance of perceptual feedback to reinforcing the 
mental image which gives rise to the movement. Just as Chevreul (1833) proposed, 
people do not intend to swing the pendulum, merely to imagine it, but by summoning 
this perceptual mental image they also inadvertently, and automatically, activate the 
associated motor behaviour to a small degree.  
While the paradigm used by Eason and Shor (1975, 1976, 1977) provides 
important insights, it is not well suited to determine the precise contribution of internal 
and external processes to the generation of action slips because the movements of the 
pendulum appear over a protracted period of time (30 seconds). Indeed, if one wanted to 
test whether imagery and perceptual input, in the right circumstances, could conspire to 
cause action slips, then the earliest stage of physical action production – the moment of 
movement onset - is most relevant to this question. Perhaps a better way to address this 
question would be to design a procedure that could reliably elicit discrete non-willed 
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action slips (e.g. sudden movements) and to manipulate the circumstances which 
immediately preceded the moment of action initiation. This way, one might more easily 
isolate the factors which contribute to this behaviour. For example, if one were to 
vividly imagine a specific movement and then suddenly perceived a salient cue in the 
environment that corresponded with the same action, would one execute the movement?  
 
1.2. The Perceptual Format of Action Intentions 
At this point, it is useful to discuss in more detail how modern theories of motor 
control conceive of the process of action generation. As part of a renewed interest in the 
mechanisms of volitional action control, ideomotor principles have been refined and 
elaborated in a number of related theories, but there is an apparent consensus with 
respect to the idea that action and perception are inextricably linked. This idea, first 
proposed by classical ideomotor theorists such as Carpenter (1852) and James (1890), 
has been formalised in modern ideomotor accounts (e.g. Theory of Event Coding, 
Hommel, 2009; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001), extended by 
computational modelling approaches to action cognition (e.g. Forward/Inverse Models, 
Wolpert, 1997; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000) and, most recently, recast in terms of 
Bayesian predictive processing (e.g. Active Inference, Adams, Shipp, & Friston, 2013; 
and Predictive Coding, Clark, 2013). These modern perspectives on motor control 
(henceforth referred to, rather crudely, as “ideomotor models”) overlap in three 
important respects. First, action control is fundamentally anticipatory (that is, 
predictive) in nature. Second, actions are initiated by anticipating (i.e. imagining, 
predicting or otherwise “activating”) their associated perceptual consequences. Third, 
this anticipatory mental image (or prediction) has a role in generating action (Shin et al., 
2010). If these core assumptions are taken seriously, then forming an intention to act is 
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nothing more than forming a sufficiently strong anticipatory mental image of the effects 
of possible actions. In this view, action slips could occur because cues in the 
environment or one’s mental imagery activates the mental representation of an 
unsuitable perceptual outcome - inadvertently driving a strongly associated, but 
inappropriate, behaviour.  
Common Coding theory (Greenwald, 1970; Knoblich & Prinz, 2005; Prinz, 1990, 
1997) provides a useful framework for understanding how and why action generation 
may be vulnerable to corruption by inappropriate imagery and perceptual input. In this 
view, the mechanisms of action, perception and mental imagery are functionally 
intertwined because action control relies on a set of internal representations coded in 
fundamentally perceptual terms, commonly referred to as “action effects”. Importantly, 
action effects can be activated either endogenously (e.g. through imagery) or 
exogenously (e.g. through visual input). As noted above, actions are initiated when the 
corresponding action effect representation becomes sufficiently activated by 
endogenous and exogenous processes (Shin et al., 2010). Rather than necessarily 
representing a specific behaviour, these internal representations correspond with the 
distal perceptual effects that these actions cause in the environment (Hommel, 2009; 
van der Wel et al., 2013). For example, when one observes an action (or otherwise 
perceives action-related information, e.g. the sound of footsteps is closely associated 
with walking), the sensory input induces activity in the same internal representation (i.e. 
action effect) that must be activated endogenously to produce the corresponding 
behaviour. To illustrate, imagine two experienced pianists taking turns to play a 
sequence of alternating notes with the thumb (e.g. an E note) and middle finger (e.g. a C 
note). In the Common Coding view, the same action effects that are activated by 
endogenous processes to produce the alternating pattern are also activated by exogenous 
perceptual input when one hears the characteristic sound of the notes produced by the 
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partner (i.e. the distal perceptual consequences of each movement). In this way, 
perceptual input can be used as a retrieval cue for (or indeed activate directly) the 
corresponding motor commands and can guide the production of appropriate actions.  
One important consequence of the notion that perception, imagery and action rely 
on a common language of perceptually coded representations (i.e. action effects), is that 
these processes should interact with one another and, sometimes, in a counterproductive 
manner – producing action slips. For example, if a given perceptual input was strongly 
associated with a specific action (e.g. a piano tone and the finger movement required to 
produce it), then the presentation of such a stimulus may suffice to trigger an 
unintended action slip in a reflexive, stimulus-driven fashion. In addition, if one 
encountered a salient stimulus which strongly activated an action effect that happened to 
be incompatible with a planned action (and its corresponding action effects), then one 
might expect that this would interfere with the smooth production of the intended 
behaviour.  
These ideas were directly confirmed in a study which recruited skilled pianists, 
due to their considerable prior experience of linking their finger movements on a piano 
with the desired perceptual effects (i.e. the movements required to generate specific 
notes). The participants were asked to play one of four two-note sequences as implied 
by the visual musical notation (Drost, Rieger, Brass, Gunter, & Prinz, 2005). Crucially, 
task-irrelevant piano notes were presented simultaneously with the onset of the 
imperative stimulus which was either congruent or incongruent with the action 
demanded by the musical notation. The data showed that the pianists’ responses were 
slower and less accurate when the auditory information (e.g. an E note), and the 
associated motor response (e.g. thumb press), was incongruent with the planned action 
(e.g. a middle finger press to produce a C note), than when it was congruent. 
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Importantly, the authors noted that participants were prone to occasionally executing the 
action which corresponded with the auditory stimulus (i.e. the piano note) rather than 
the imperative visual stimulus (i.e. the musical notation), as required by the task. The 
findings of Drost et al. (2005) suggest that perceiving incompatible action effects does 
indeed interfere with the production of intentional actions and, sometimes, results in the 
production of erroneous behaviour, similar to the action slips described previously.  
An important limitation of the above study (and others like it) is that it does not 
allow one to conclude whether the incongruent auditory tone truly initiated the action 
slip (or “induced” as the authors claimed) because participants certainly intended to 
produce an action at stimulus onset (i.e. to play one of four musical notes), but they 
were led by the environment to respond erroneously. Yet, if action effects activated by 
endogenous (e.g. via top-down imagery) and exogenous means (e.g. via bottom-up 
perceptual input) can influence how we act, then the activation of action effects may 
also determine whether we act at all if they are activated strongly enough. Indeed, in a 
recent review of contemporary ideomotor theory (Shin et al., 2010, p. 943) it was 
explicitly stated that “Any activation of the effect image, either endogenously or 
exogenously, will trigger the corresponding action.” In other words, these views assume 
that activating an action effect does not only specify the form of a forthcoming action 
but also provides the necessary impetus for its initiation – effectively representing the 
intention to act itself. In this way, action slips may simply be a product of salient 
perceptual input combining with broadly compatible imagery. If imagery and perceptual 
input combined to inadvertently (and strongly) activate an inappropriate action effect, 
the corresponding response may be initiated in defiance of one’s goals. 
Strikingly, research has largely ignored the intentional or initiating role of action 
effect activation. Instead, research has focussed primarily on the contribution of action 
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effects to selecting or shaping the execution of planned actions. Accordingly, there is a 
wealth of evidence to demonstrate that people produce faster and more accurate 
responses when people are primed, just prior to execution, with the “proximal” effects 
of planned actions (e.g. a hand posture, or movement of a body part, see Bach, 
Peatfield, & Tipper, 2007; Hommel, 1995; Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001). For 
example, Brass and colleagues (2001) asked participants to hold their right index finger 
2cm off the table and to execute either a lift or a tapping movement at the onset of the 
imperative stimulus. Crucially, the imperative stimulus consisted of a visual depiction 
of a lifting or tapping index finger movement which was either compatible or 
incompatible with the planned response. The data revealed evidence of faster responses 
when participants encountered compatible, rather than incompatible, movements 
(sometimes referred to as the “Brass effect”).  
In addition, similar compatibility effects have also been reported for participants 
who were presented, prior to execution, with abstract stimuli which, in an earlier phase 
of the experiment, were contingent upon to-be-executed action (e.g. “distal” action 
effects in the environment, such as a light turning on or a tone playing, Elsner & 
Hommel, 2001). Moreover, similar compatibility effects are even evident when the 
action’s effects are not directly perceived, but merely anticipated and because they 
happen to share perceptual features with the required response (e.g. response effect 
compatibility, Keller & Koch, 2006; Kunde, 2001; Kunde, Koch, & Hoffmann, 2004; 
for review, see Badets, Koch, & Philipp, 2016). For example, Kunde et al., (2004) 
demonstrated that people initiate responses of varying intensity (e.g. soft key press) 
faster and more accurately when they are contingently followed by auditory tones of 
corresponding intensity (e.g. a soft tone) relative to a tone of a different intensity (e.g. a 
hard tone). Importantly, a follow-up experiment (Experiment 2; Kunde et al., 2004) 
specifically tested whether response-effect compatibility affects the initiation of 
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prepared responses. In this task, participants were informed about the response they 
would have to execute, prior to the onset of the imperative stimulus and task-irrelevant 
auditory stimulus. The data revealed a strong influence of response-effect compatibility 
on response times, in spite of the fact that participants had already decided which 
response to execute and were simply waiting for a go-cue. This finding, in particular, 
provides suggestive evidence that action effects can even influence the very early stages 
of action generation. However, although this research suggests that activated action 
effects may contribute to the initiation of a planned action, it is not clear whether the 
activation of action effects alone can suffice to initiate the corresponding response (i.e. 
in the absence of a prior intention to act).  
Further support for the role of action effect representations in action initiation is 
provided by neuroimaging studies which show that action planning involves activation 
in lower-level perceptual regions that represent the specific outcome one wants to 
produce (Kühn, Keizer, Rombouts, & Hommel, 2011; van Steenbergen et al., 2017; 
Zimmermann et al., 2017; Zimmermann, Verhagen, de Lange, & Toni, 2016). In one 
such study, participants were asked to prepare either manual or facial actions while they 
underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; Kühn et al., 2011). This 
study aimed to assess the extent to which action preparation was mediated by activity in 
cortical areas which are specifically recruited when processing the perceptual effects of 
each class of action. The data revealed that preparation of manual actions was 
associated with both heightened activity in the hand-related areas of the motor cortex 
and the extrastriate body area (EBA; a region known to process visual information 
about body parts). In contrast, preparation of facial actions selectively recruited face-
related areas of the motor cortex and the fusiform face area (FFA; a region implicated in 
facial perception). Together, these results provide important evidence that preparing an 
action involves the anticipation of the associated perceptual consequences, as assumed 
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by ideomotor models. Yet, while the aforementioned studies provide converging 
evidence that action effects contribute to the selection of an action against alternatives 
or shape its kinematics (e.g. Bach, Griffiths, Weigelt, & Tipper, 2010) they do not test 
the central assumption of ideomotor models: that the activation of an action’s perceptual 
effects is tantamount to forming an intention to act. That is, the activation of an action’s 
effects by endogenous imagery or exogenous perceptual input does not only determine 
which action is selected or how it is executed but whether it is executed at all. The 
experiments presented in the present thesis aim to test this idea empirically.  
 
1.3. The Interplay of Endogenous and Exogenous Processes In Action 
In the previous section, evidence was presented which characterised the intention 
to act as a product of the activation of perceptual action effect representations (i.e. 
“mental images”). This activation, which drives motor behaviour, can be brought about 
by endogenous (e.g. imagery) and exogenous means (e.g. action observation). However, 
if action effects can be activated by top-down imagery and bottom-up perceptual input 
and are also involved in action initiation, can these sources of activation really be 
considered functionally equivalent or are they implicated in generating different types 
of action?  
Intuitively, the notion that endogenous and exogenous processes may drive 
different kinds of action has parallels with a proposal made by James (1890) that 
purposeful, goal-directed actions are distinct from simple reflexive responses to 
environmental stimuli. This conceptualisation still resonates with modern ideomotor 
theories of action control which define human behaviour according to two 
interdependent and often overlapping purposes; (a) intention-driven actions which serve 
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to influence the environment as a result of internal desires and motivations, and; (b) 
stimulus-driven actions which serve accommodate environmental demands in light of 
exogenous events (Herwig, Prinz, & Waszak, 2007; Waszak, Cardoso-Leite, & Hughes, 
2012). On this account, stimulus-driven actions are largely driven by exogenous 
processes and are assumed to be the product of simple stimulus-response associations 
acquired through experience. These stimulus-response associations serve to bind the 
motor representation of a specific action with the conditions (i.e. specific exogenous 
sensory input) under which it must be initiated (e.g. “red light – brake” when driving a 
car). In contrast, intention-driven actions are assumed to be largely the product of 
endogenous processes (e.g. action imagery) and mediated by action effect 
representations which bind actions in one’s motor repertoire to their typical perceptual 
consequences. In this view, intention-driven actions are initiated by strongly activating 
the action effects which correspond with the desired behaviour which, in turn, 
automatically evokes the corresponding motor program and initiates the desired act. 
Support for this categorical distinction between different sources of action comes 
from neuroimaging research which has identified several distinct cortical circuits which 
are specifically recruited during the execution of intention-driven (i.e. “voluntary”) and 
stimulus-driven (i.e. reflexive) behaviour (Dum & Strick, 2002). The circuits that 
contribute to the generation of action converge on the Primary Motor Cortex (M1) 
which, in turn, transmits motor commands, via the spinal cord, towards the relevant 
effector – initiating action (for reviews, see Haggard, 2008, 2019). Broadly speaking, 
M1 receives input from two major cortical circuits implicated in action generation. One 
circuit is preferentially recruited during voluntary action preparation and involves the 
supplementary motor area (SMA) and the pre-supplementary motor area (preSMA) 
which, in turn, receives projections from the basal ganglia and prefrontal cortex (PFC; 
Picard & Strick, 1996). A second important circuit is specifically implicated in the 
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sensory guidance of actions which are predominantly stimulus-driven. Information from 
the early sensory cortices is projected to the parietal cortex and, further, to the pre-motor 
cortex before engaging M1 (Rizzolatti, Luppino, & Matelli, 1998). This circuit is 
implicated in the use of online sensory input to guide object-oriented actions. Haggard 
(2008) proposed that although both of these pathways contribute to the generation of 
volitional actions, they may implement fundamentally different decisions. For example, 
when the environment demands an immediate response (e.g. the appearance of an 
oncoming car when crossing the road) the parietal circuit may be involved in deciding 
between action alternatives based on environmental constraints (e.g. jumping right, 
towards the pavement, or left, towards oncoming traffic). In contrast, less immediate 
and more deliberative actions (e.g. whether to visit a shop on the other side of the road 
to buy some milk) may be largely planned and initiated by the frontal circuit. However, 
these circuits do not operate independently and their apparent functional specialism 
should not be taken to imply that a given action will either be entirely endogenously 
formed (via the frontal route) or exogenously triggered (via the parietal route). In other 
words, although this research implies the existence of separate circuits that are 
responsible for producing different kinds of action, they may only appear distinct 
because they receive different types of input (i.e. signals arising from endogenous or 
exogenous sources). It is possible, therefore, that endogenous and exogenous 
information (processed in separate circuits) is integrated – via a common set of action 
effect representations – prior to engaging the motor system and initiating action. 
Indeed, it is important to note that although the two categories of action (and the 
cortical circuits recruited in each case) are often defined in opposition to one another, 
this is partly due to convenience. A classical reflex, such as a highly stereotyped 
withdrawal response in reaction to a painful stimulus, stands as a convenient example of 
a stimulus-driven act in its most basic form. In contrast, it is harder to define what 
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constitutes a purely intention-driven action that emerges as the product of some internal 
deliberative process (Brass & Haggard, 2008). Instead, actions are said to be intention-
driven if they exhibit a degree of stimulus-independence (i.e. they are not immediately 
triggered by an external stimulus). As Haggard (2008) noted, these categories of action 
should not necessarily be taken to represent a dichotomy, but rather a continuum with 
degrees of intentional oversight. Of course, the notion of a continuum in human 
behavioural control demands intermediate examples which share features of both 
intentional, internally generated actions and reflexive responses. The action slips 
described at the start of this chapter provide just such an example of behaviour which 
appears to be neither wholly intention- nor stimulus-driven. Indeed, the unusual 
subjective feeling associated with producing action slips may arise because one has 
internally generated an appropriate action goal which is then diverted towards an 
inappropriate outcome by cues in the environment - conflicting with the initial goal.  
To illustrate, consider the tea making error described earlier in which one 
absentmindedly pours a mugful of cold milk, rather than hot water onto the teabag. 
Endogenously forming an action goal (e.g. make a cup of tea) may have led to the 
activation of a set of action effect codes which describe potential actions, necessary for 
making tea, in an intention-driven (i.e. internally generated) manner. This suggestion is 
similar to Hommel’s (2009) concept of “event files” for voluntary action which 
comprise sets of broadly relevant action effects bound to specific contexts in which they 
are typically required in the Theory of Event Coding. In this way, the endogenous 
retrieval of the relevant action effects may allow the environment to trigger the 
appropriate reaching and grasping actions. However, in this case, attending to the milk 
jug (and the actions it affords) inadvertently drives the activation of an appropriate 
action effect (e.g. a reach and grasp towards a tea-relevant object with a handle), but at 
an inappropriate moment (e.g. pouring milk into the mug before the hot water). The 
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conceptualisation inherently, and deliberately, proposes that the moment of action 
initiation is simply a product of the activity of a corresponding action effect 
representation. In this way, action effects which become sufficiently activated by 
endogenous and exogenous means, do not only define the form of a forthcoming action 
but may be able to directly trigger its initiation. This proposal has not yet been tested 
directly and motivates all the experiments which follow.  
It is important to note that this idea clashes with the received wisdom that action 
generation involves a number of distinct computational steps which might preclude the 
ideomotor interpretation of the role of action effects in action initiation. In classical 
stage theory, the process of voluntary action generation is conceived of as comprising a 
number of distinct stages or serial set of decisions, such as action selection, initiation 
and execution (Sanders, 1980). More recent research has retained these labels, 
principally for pragmatic reasons, but emphasises that each “stage” is assumed to reflect 
a different time point in a unitary process of action generation (Hommel, 1997). 
Typically, the action selection stage reflects the earliest stages of response production in 
which the intended act is chosen; action initiation refers to the phase immediately 
preceding the production of the overt response and action execution refers to the actual 
motor output (Kunde et al., 2004). Nevertheless, ideomotor models emphasise the 
contribution that the dynamic interaction of internal processing and external stimulation 
makes to activating action effects and initiating actions – an idea which appears to be at 
odds with the notion of discrete stages in action generation.  
The dynamic nature of action control processes is, perhaps, more readily 
accommodated by more recent accounts of action generation which cast the process of 
action initiation in terms of an integration-to-bounds mechanism (Churchland, Kiani, & 
Shadlen, 2008; Murakami, Vicente, Costa, & Mainen, 2014; Schurger, Mylopoulos, & 
Rosenthal, 2016; Schurger, Sitt, & Dehaene, 2012; Schurger & Uithol, 2015). These 
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accounts describe a process in which evidence is accumulated in favour of action 
alternatives until a motor threshold is reached and the corresponding action is initiated. 
This research was inspired by the pioneering work of Benjamin Libet and colleagues, 
who asked participants to make spontaneous button presses while undergoing 
electroencephalography (EEG) and to report the moment at which they had intended to 
move (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). This research indicated that a build-up of 
cortical signals (referred to as the readiness potential) reliably preceded participant’s 
conscious awareness of their intention to act by some 300ms. This finding created 
incredible controversy because it was taken as evidence that the preparation of a 
supposedly voluntary action preceded one’s conscious awareness of the intention to 
move – implying the feeling of intentionality is an effect, rather than a cause of 
voluntary action. However, more recent work has cast doubt on this interpretation and 
suggests that a significant proportion of the readiness potential may be attributable to 
the natural ebb and flow of background neuronal noise, rather than the outcome of some 
internal pre-conscious decision to initiate movement. For example, Schurger, Sitt, & 
Dehaene (2012) repeated Libet’s task, with the additional instruction that the task would 
occasionally be interrupted by an auditory “click”, at which point participants were 
required to press the button as soon as possible. The data revealed that the shortest 
response times followed instances in which background neural activity was arbitrarily 
high. This suggests that the moment of action initiation can be considered a threshold-
crossing neural event following a period of “evidence accumulation” in favour of 
candidate action driven by endogenous and exogenous processes. Crucially, if the 
assumptions of ideomotor models are taken seriously, then the evidence accumulated by 
such mechanisms is nothing more than the activation of multimodal action effect codes: 
how vividly the desired action outcome is represented. In this view, an imagined action 
becomes overt behaviour if the perceptually-coded action effects become sufficiently 
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active and surpass the motor threshold. That is, the precise nature and timing of the 
actions people produce may be determined by nothing more than the moment a strongly 
activated action effect representation crosses the threshold for execution. 
Supportive evidence in favour of the equivalence of action effect anticipation and 
action initiation comes from a body of research that demonstrates the considerable 
neural overlap between action imagery and action execution. Neuroimaging studies 
suggest that action imagery and action execution give rise to similar patterns of brain 
activity, even if the activity of these neuronal ensembles is significantly less intense 
during imagery (Kraeutner, Gionfriddo, Bardouille, & Boe, 2014). Similarly, it is well 
established that action imagery is associated with increased muscle activity (as recorded 
by electromyogram, EMG) in muscles specific to the imagined movement relative to 
baseline (Jacobson, 1930). Moreover, the magnitude and rhythm of the EMG activity 
have been shown to be proportional to the imagined effort and timing of the moment 
(Shaw, 1940; as cited in Jeannerod & Decety, 1995). Taken together, these findings 
suggest that the neural processes recruited when one engages in action imagery (e.g. by 
evoking action effect representations) are intimately associated with generating actions, 
just as one would expect if action effect anticipation was sufficient to drive and initiate 
actions. It is important to note however that none of these studies shows that fully 
formed actions can actually be initiated through imagery. Instead, action imagery 
typically results in a subliminal motoric activation of the corresponding muscles, which 
is only detectable if amplified by stimulation via TMS (e.g. Vargas et al., 2004). 
One might argue that the classical ideomotor phenomena, such as Chevreul’s 
(1833) magic swinging pendulum also provides support for the role of action effects in 
action initiation. In this case, participants experience movements that they did not 
consciously intend to produce (and therefore attribute to supernatural causes), but which 
nevertheless reflect their perceptual expectations of what will happen (Chevreul, 1833; 
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Easton & Shor, 1975, 1976, 1977). However, such effects are typically small and fall far 
below the threshold for formed responses, even if amplified by these “magic” devices. 
Indeed, other researchers have argued that motor imagery mainly affects the planning of 
the action, specifying its form prior to execution (Bach, Allami, Tucker, & Ellis, 2014; 
Caldara et al., 2004) and that different processes energise and release the action 
(Tecuapetla, Jin, Lima, & Costa, 2016). Others have argued that the effects of 
ideomotor cues (e.g. movement observation, Brass et al., 2001) on action execution 
reflect interference rather than facilitation effects (Ramsey, Cumming, Eastough, & 
Edwards, 2010) and would therefore – per definition – only be able to prevent, not 
cause, action. In light of this open question, the experiments in the present thesis aim to 
test the contribution of action effect representations, activated by imagery and 
perceptual input, to the initiation of non-willed action slips. In other words, the 
forthcoming experiments aim to test whether the combined activation of an action’s 
effects through imagery and external stimulation can become strong enough to elicit 
action when none was intended, effectively inserting an intention to act. 
 
1.4. Overview of the Thesis 
This thesis began by asking the question, how is it that people can produce 
apparently “non-willed” action? Ideomotor theories of action control claim that imagery 
and perception are tightly linked processes, mediated by activity in perceptually coded 
action effect representations. Importantly, there is converging evidence that implicates 
the activation of action effects in the initiation of actions. While there is a wealth of 
evidence to demonstrate a role for action effects in the selection and guidance of 
actions, no research has specifically tested whether action effect representations can 
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serve a truly generative purpose – creating spontaneous action de novo - regardless of 
one’s broader goals. The experiments in this thesis specifically test this proposal. 
Specifically, these experiments aim to test the hypothesis that a mental image (i.e. 
action effect image) can initiate the corresponding action when it becomes sufficiently 
activated by a combination of top-down imagery and bottom-up perceptual input. 
Importantly, the mental image should be translated into overt movement, even if one 
had not previously intended to execute the action. 
To that end, a novel experimental paradigm was designed in an effort to induce 
non-willed behaviour, or “action slips” (Chapter 2, Experiments 1-3). The predictions 
regarding the form that these action slips should take and the frequency with which they 
should occur are motivated by ideomotor models and related theories (Hommel, 2009; 
Hommel et al., 2001; James, 1890; Kunde et al., 2007; Pacherie & Haggard, 2010; 
Prinz, 1997; Shin et al., 2010). Participants rehearsed a finger tapping sequence using 
mental imagery in time with an auditory beat but were asked to withhold responding 
(Chapter 2-4). A pair of virtual hands was presented onscreen from an egocentric 
perspective which corresponded with the position and orientation of the participants' 
hands. Ostensibly, the virtual hands were used to indicate the correct finger tapping 
sequence at the start of each trial. However, crucially, the index fingers of the virtual 
hands occasionally made highly salient (but task-irrelevant) movements that were either 
congruent or incongruent with the participant’s imagined movement (e.g. similar to the 
observed finger movements used by Brass et al., 2001). If (exogenous) visual 
stimulation and (endogenous) imagery combine to activate the same action effect 
representation, then congruent stimulation should be, in some trials, enough to induce 
non-willed finger tap (i.e. an action slip) in spite of a specific instruction to remain still.  
After gaining proof of concept for this novel design (Chapter 2, Experiments 1-3) 
the procedure was redesigned to allow a more fine-grained analysis and to test more 
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detailed predictions about the nature of the mechanism which gives rise to action slips 
(Chapter 3, Experiment 4). Specifically, the design used in Experiments 3 was adapted 
to record continuous pressure data in Experiment 4. This made it possible to capture 
extremely small movements and to rule out an alternative explanation (simple motoric 
rehearsal) for the findings of Chapter 2 (Experiments 1-3). Further, Experiment 4 added 
a neutral baseline condition which made it possible to determine whether perceptual 
input (i.e. the salient movement cues), when combined with congruent mental imagery, 
primarily facilitates or inhibits the generation of action slips.  
Chapter 4 (Experiments 5 and 6) applied a version of the task used in Chapter 3 
(Experiment 4) which was modified to incorporate a body ownership illusion. Some 
participants were assigned to a heightened ownership group, wherein their left/right 
finger movements elicited corresponding movements from the virtual (onscreen) hands 
at the start of each trial. This design was intended to increase the extent to which 
participants in the heightened group mapped their own left/right index finger 
movements onto the movements of the onscreen fingers (i.e. to increase “ownership” of 
the virtual hands). Visual feedback of the participant’s own hands was also manipulated 
in Chapter 4. These experiments aimed to test whether ownership and the 
presence/absence of visual feedback for participant’s own movements would affect the 
tendency for observed movements to activate the motor system. 
Chapter 5 (Experiment 7) tested the relationship between individual differences in 
responsiveness to a hypnotic screening procedure and the participant's prior 
performances in Chapter 4 (Experiments 5 and 6). That is, Experiment 7 aimed to test 
whether one’s propensity to produce action slips is related to individual differences in 
ideomotor suggestibility – the motor component of hypnotic suggestibility (Woody, 
Barnier, & McConkey, 2005). 
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Finally, Chapter 6 (General Discussion) summarises the results of Chapters 2-5 
(Experiments 1-7) and integrates them into a model of intentional action. Together, the 
findings suggest that action slips are indeed a curious by-product of the mechanisms by 
which voluntary actions are generated. In addition, the results provide direct, 
behavioural evidence for some of the most fundamental features of ideomotor models of 
action control. These findings demonstrate the utility of using non-willed action slips as 
















2. Chapter 2: The Relationship Between Action Intentions and 
Internal Representations in Volitional Action Control 
2.1. Overview 
This chapter is based on Colton, Bach, Whalley and Mitchell (2018a), “ Intention 
insertion: activating an action’s perceptual consequences is sufficient to induce non-
willed motor behaviour”, published in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. 
As part of this publication, all data, materials and an R script which reproduces 
the analyses and plots in Experiment 3 (i.e. the main experiment in the published 
article) were made available online with the Open Science Framework (Colton, Bach, 
Whalley, & Mitchell, 2018b). Each experiment in the forthcoming chapter uses this 
same analytical approach. 
 
2.1.1. Introduction 
The experiments in Chapter 2 were designed to test, for the first time, the 
assumption of ideomotor models that action intentions are essentially action effect 
representations that are activated strongly enough. As reviewed in the introductory 
chapter (Chapter 1), there is ample evidence that activated action effects shape the form 
and the timing of responses. For example, people produce faster and more accurate 
finger movements if they are primed, just prior to execution, with a visual depiction of a 
corresponding, than non-corresponding action (Brass et al., 2001; Brass, Bekkering, 
Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000). Such studies have provided direct evidence that actions 
are a manifestation of the same “common codes” (Knoblich & Prinz, 2005; Prinz, 1990, 
1997) that also guide imagery and perception of stimuli of the environment. However, a 
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central assumption of ideomotor models – the activation of this action effect image is 
sufficient to initiate the corresponding action (i.e. in the absence of a prior intention to 
act) – has remained untested.  
The studies described in Chapter 2 tested whether it was possible to elicit non-
willed action slips by presenting participants with highly salient, unexpected action cues 
(i.e. a sudden observed movement) during a mental imagery task – even if they were 
instructed to actively withhold all movement – and essentially “insert” an intention to 
act into the participant’s motor system. This idea relies on the assumption of ideomotor 
models that perception, action, and imagery operate on the same or commensurable 
representations which have a fundamentally perceptual format (i.e. action effects) and 
can therefore summate (Berends, Wolkorte, Ijzerman, & Van Putten, 2013; Hommel et 
al., 2001; Kunde et al., 2004; Prinz, 1997; Vogt et al., 2013; Waszak et al., 2012). 
Consider a task in which participants are instructed to mentally rehearse – but not 
execute – a simple motor action, such as a left or right finger movement. Under the 
assumption of ideomotor models, presenting participants with the perceptual 
consequences of their imagined actions, both newly learned (e.g. task-irrelevant tones; 
Elsner & Hommel, 2001) and those acquired during previous action experience (e.g. an 
observed finger movement; Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001), should exert an 
additional bottom-up effect on activity already induced in a top-down manner by motor 
imagery. If the process of generating a strong mental image of a bodily movement can 
be considered equivalent with forming an action intention, then the combined influence 
of imagery and perception on the activity of shared action effect codes should 
occasionally pass the threshold required for execution, triggering responses even if none 
were intended (i.e. effectively inserting an intention to act). Importantly, the likelihood 
that presenting movement cues during imagery should elicit a non-willed act should 
emerge as a function of the dimensional overlap (i.e. shared perceptual features) 
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between the action effect codes activated by the observed and imagined action (Kunde 
et al., 2004). For example, perceiving a left index finger movement should be more 
likely to elicit action slips if the participants simultaneously imagined a left, rather than 
right finger movement. Therefore, non-willed action slips should be more likely to 
follow instances when the observed and imagined actions match than when they do not. 
At this stage, it is important to emphasise how non-willed behaviour was 
operationalised in the following studies and how “action slips” in the current context 
can be distinguished from the kinds of errors of action control that have been widely 
reported in the literature. Classical stimulus-response-compatibility paradigms 
employed in ideomotor research (e.g. Brass et al., 2001) often require participants to 
execute a response at the onset of an imperative stimulus. Participants occasionally 
respond in error (i.e. they produce an alternative, incorrect response) when faced with a 
stimulus which is incompatible with their planned action. However, these error 
responses cannot be considered truly non-willed since participants certainly intended to 
execute a response from a small set of alternatives but were led by an experimental 
manipulation to select an incorrect action. This kind of manipulation, therefore, merely 
induces an error in action selection, not in action initiation per se. If participants had a 
broad goal of executing finger movements in response to, for example, any observed 
movement then such a prospective intention to act may be responsible, in some sense, 
for initiating the subsequent, if erroneous, action (Brass & Haggard, 2008). Instead, in 
Experiment 1, participants took part in an imagery task and were asked to withhold any 
physical responses until a pre-specified imperative stimulus appeared. As such, any 
responses that are collected prior to the true imperative stimulus can be considered 




2.2. Experiment 1: Eliciting Non-Willed Action Slips During Imagery 
With Newly Learned and Previously Established Action Effect 
Associations 
 
In his attempt to develop a taxonomy of accidental behaviour, Reason (1984) 
noted that slips of action control (hereafter, “action slips”) are not well suited to 
laboratory study, given that they are naturally, and necessarily, rare. In light of this, 
Experiment 1 was designed with the aim of providing the maximal conditions for an 
action slip to emerge in laboratory conditions. While the taxonomic labels derived by 
Reason (1984) were not intended to be exhaustive or mutually exclusive, Experiment 1 
specifically intended to elicit so-called “intrusive” action slips, wherein novel 
unintended actions become incorporated into one’s ongoing behaviour. That is, 
Experiment 1 tested whether it was possible to effectively insert an intention to act (i.e. 
an action slip) by presenting intrusive movement cues during an imagery task.  
Experiment 1 consisted of two parts. The first part followed the logic of Elsner 
and Hommel (2001), in which stimuli (e.g. tones) that reliably follow a motor response 
(e.g. a finger movement) become integrated with the action effect representation of the 
action, and can then – after training – prime the corresponding behaviour. In the first 
part of Experiment 1 (hereafter, the “association training task”) was similarly designed 
to forge associations between abstract stimuli (e.g. colours and tones) and specific 
finger movements, which could then be used to elicit non-willed action slips in the 
subsequent imagery task. In each trial, participants responded to specific coloured visual 
stimuli with either left or right index finger presses according to a fixed mapping (e.g. 
yellow – left index, blue – right index). When participants produced the correct 
response, specific auditory tones that corresponded with the participants’ keypresses 
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were played via headphones (e.g. a left index press produced a “buzz” sound and a right 
index produced a “chirp”). Hence, the association training task was designed to 
encourage the formation of novel action effect associations between the motor 
representations of the executed responses (e.g. left/right index finger movements) and 
the sensory representations of the imperative visual (e.g. colours) stimuli and the 
auditory stimuli (e.g. tones) that reliably followed specific actions: the action’s 
consequences. According to ideomotor models (e.g. Elsner & Hommel, 2001), when 
participants encounter the colours and tones in the subsequent imagery task, the 
corresponding motor representation should also be activated as a result of these newly 
formed associations. 
In the second part of Experiment 1 (hereafter, “intention insertion task”), 
participants rehearsed sequences of left and right index finger taps by imagining what 
the movements would look and feel like if they were physically executing them in time 
with an auditory metronome beat. In one third of trials, participants encountered a 
surprising audio-visual action cue, which either matched the currently imagined action 
in the sequence (e.g. seeing the same finger depressed, along with the associated colour 
and tone) or mismatched the imagined action (e.g. a different finger being depressed, 
with the associated colour and tone). Participants were instructed to ignore these images 
and withhold any responses until a pre-specified imperative stimulus appeared. 
However, research suggests that activity induced by imagining a specific movement and 
suddenly encountering a visual depiction of a matching action (along with the strongly 
associated auditory and visual action effects) should nevertheless summate (see Kunde 
et al., 2004) and, sometimes, trigger involuntary action, when their activation becomes 
super-threshold. Instances in which participants respond accidentally following the 
onset of a sudden action cue (e.g. an observed movement and associated colour and 
tone) are referred to as action slips (mirroring the language used by Reason, 1984).  
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Crucially, manipulating the compatibility of imagined and perceived movements 
allows involuntary movements that may result from the premature release of pre-
planned actions due to a startle response (P. Brown et al., 1991; Maslovat, Chua, & 
Hodges, 2013) to be distinguished from those that genuinely result from the summation 
of action effect codes. If the involuntary movements produced by participants are 
merely caused by the surprise of encountering an unexpected stimulus, then the 
likelihood of producing an action slip will not be affected by the compatibility between 
imagined and observed movements. Thus, when imagining a left finger key press, the 
likelihood of an incidental execution of this action should be just as high if participants 
are exposed the sensory cues associated with this left key press and a right key press. 
In contrast, under ideomotor assumptions, action slips should be more likely when 
the imagined action and observed movements are congruent (such that the action effect 
codes overlap and can summate) than when they are incongruent (when such an 
addition is not possible), as predicted by ideomotor models. Furthermore, if this is the 
case, then action slips should primarily reflect the imagined action (e.g. a left index 
movement) and not the alternative response (e.g. a right finger movement) when the 
imagined and observed actions are congruent (e.g. simultaneously imagining and 
observing left index finger movements). In contrast, if participants imagine, for 
example, a left movement, then they should be more likely to produce the alternative, 
non-imagined action slip (i.e. a right response) when they observe a right (i.e. 





A total of 43 participants were tested, of whom 18 were male and 25 female (6 
Left-handed; Age in years: M=27.3, SD=12.5). The sample consisted of both 
undergraduate psychology students from the University of Plymouth (course 
requirement) and members of the university’s paid participation pool (remunerated £4). 
 
2.2.1.2. Materials and Equipment 
The experiment was conducted in a dark, soundproof room. Participants were 
asked to wear over-ear headphones for the presentation of auditory stimuli and then 
seated in front of a 19” LED computer monitor (Resolution: 1900x1200; Refresh rate: 
60Hz). The experiment was designed using E-Prime Professional (SP2.0) and responses 
were collected with a standard computer keyboard. Participants were asked to place 
their left and right index fingers over the ‘W’ and ‘O’ keys respectively for the duration 
of the experiment. Auditory stimuli consisted of three tones; a 200ms 440Hz tone which 
served as our metronome beat, along with a 200ms “chirp” and 200ms “buzz” (i.e. 
trained action effects) created with the tone generator in Audacity (panned hard 
left/right according to the laterality of the associated response).  
In the association training task, yellow and blue full-screen colours signalled the 
response participants needed to execute. In the intention insertion task, additional visual 
stimuli consisted of an image of two virtual egocentric hands with artificial ‘shadows’ 
as if viewed from above (each with a visual angle of approximately 16 ° vertically and 
14° horizontally). The virtual hands were either presented with the fingers in a neutral 
position, left index finger depressed or right index finger depressed. In the latter two 
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cases, the shadow was made to converge with the tip of the index finger in each case to 
give an illusion of apparent downward and upwards motion (i.e. a keypress) when 
displayed in quick succession with the typical hand stimuli. 
 
2.2.1.3. Procedure: Association Training Task 
The association training task consisted of 150 trials in which participants were 
obliged to execute either a left or right index finger keypress according to the colour of 
the imperative stimulus (Figure 1). In each trial, a black fixation cross was presented on 
a white screen for 500ms followed by a blank screen for 100ms and then a visual 
imperative stimulus. The stimulus consisted of a full-screen colour change which 
appeared for 400ms followed by a blank screen of 600ms, creating an overall response 
window of 1000ms.  
 
Figure 1. A schematic representation of the association training task of Experiment 1. 
Participants were presented with one of two colours (Blue/Yellow) and obliged to 
respond with a Left/Right finger keypress. When the participant registered their 
response, a lateralised (i.e. panned hard left or right) “buzz” or “chirp” tone was 
presented to the corresponding ear via headphones. After 150 trials, the participant will 
have learned to associate colour-tone pairs with specific movements. 
Half of the participants were given instructions that presentation of a yellow 
stimulus required a right key press, whereas a blue screen required a left key press and 
vice versa for the second half of participants. In addition, a response to a yellow 
stimulus always produced a “buzz” tone and a blue stimulus always produced a “chirp” 
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tone. These colour-tone pairings were identical for all participants. Feedback about 
response accuracy and time was then displayed for 500ms after each trail. An inter-trial 
interval of 500ms separated the feedback from the subsequent trial.  
 
2.2.1.4. Procedure: Intention Insertion Task 
The intention insertion task consisted of four blocks of 24 trials. In each trial, 
participants were first instructed about the particular rhythm they had to imagine. An 
image of a pair of virtual hands was presented, from an egocentric perspective, and 
participants heard a slow, steady metronome beat (440Hz tone presented at 800ms 
interval). An arrow moved, in time with the metronome beat, between the left or right 
index fingers, indicating a simple four-beat finger tapping sequence (Figure 2). For any 
given trial, participants could encounter one of six different finger-tapping patterns 
which consisted of all possible permutations of a four-beat sequence involving two left 
and two right index finger movements. Participants were asked to imagine tapping 
along with this sequence and memorise it in this manner.  
After four beats the arrow disappeared, but the metronome continued playing. 
Participants were instructed to continue to mentally rehearse the finger tapping 
sequence in time with the metronome while refraining from overt movement. The 
virtual hands remained onscreen in neutral position along with a central fixation cross 
that flashed in time with the metronome beat, providing an audio-visual representation 
of tempo, and drawing participants’ attention to a point equidistant between the hands. 
After a variable duration of 5-8 beats, the word “Go!” appeared for 2000ms and 
participants were asked to perform the keypress they happened to be imagining at that 
point (accurate responses indicate task compliance). Participants were explicitly 
instructed to refrain from overt movement before this imperative stimulus appeared. It 
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was emphasized to even refrain from moving when surprising visual stimuli would 
appear during the imagination phase. 
 
Figure 2. A schematic representation of a 5-beat compatible cued trial from Experiment 
1. The depicted sequence is Left – Right – Left – Right – indicated by the arrows shown 
in the learning phase. In the imagination phase, a Right index finger cue (screen colour, 
deviant tone and observed finger movement) falls on beat 4. The cue was presented 
when the participant imagined a Right response and so this was compatible with the 
concurrent imagined response. The presence or absence of an action slip (keypress) in 
the 800ms inter-beat period following cue onset was the outcome variable. Participants 
were told to focus on their imagery and refrain from overt movement until presentation 
of the true imperative stimulus, “Go!” 
The crucial manipulation was that in eight of the 24 trials in each block, 
unexpected action cues appeared at the onset of one of the metronome beats (on either 
beat 6, 7 or 8). The action cues consisted of images of the left or right index fingers 
moving downwards and back to a neutral position, mirroring what participants would 
see if they actually carried out a finger tap themselves. The finger movement was 
presented in tandem with the colour-tone pair that had been previously associated with 
that specific action (i.e. the screen colour that preceded the action, and the lateralised 
tone that followed the action in the association training task). The action cues were 
either compatible or incompatible with the finger movement that participants 
concurrently imagined using (if the participant correctly followed the tapping 
sequence). Within these 32 cued trials, all combinations of cue compatibility 
(compatible/incompatible), cued finger (left/right), trial length (5, 6, 7 and 8 beats) and 
cue placement in the sequence (1 or 2 beats prior to sequence end) occurred once and 
were therefore fully counterbalanced.  
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Prior to the main task, participants completed a short practice of eight trials in 
which feedback was provided and incorrect responses were repeated. Participants were 
given the option of repeating the practice if required. The experimenter monitored 
participants’ performance in this practice session. He emphasized that participants’ 
ability to imagine – not execute – the movements was being tested. He instructed them 
not to move their fingers in the imagery interval and intervened if this instruction was 
not followed. He also unobtrusively remained in the room during the experiment proper 
in order to intervene if active finger movements were detected.  
 
2.2.2. Results 
To assess whether participants engaged appropriately with the intention insertion 
task, the percentage of correct responses to the true imperative stimulus (i.e. when 
"Go!" appeared and participants executed the currently imagined action) during trials 
which did not contain visual action cues was scrutinised for each participant. The 
subsequent analysis depends on the assumption that participants imagined the correct 
movements during each trial in order to accurately determine whether the action cues 
were congruent or incongruent with the participants’ imagery. This assumption is less 
likely to hold for those participants who scored poorly, especially if they were 
responding with near-chance accuracy (i.e. ~50%) which would indicate very low 
engagement with the task. As a result, conservative criteria were set and only those 
participants with accuracy rates within one standard deviation of the group mean 
(M=83.9%; SD=15.3%; M-SD=68.6%) were considered, leading to the removal of 8 
participants’ data (leaving N = 35 participants). Exclusion of these participants did not 
affect the results but did make it safer to assume that the remaining participants engaged 
properly with the task. 
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First, to check whether participants followed the instruction to refrain from 
actively moving their fingers in the imagery intervals, the number of imagined and non-
imagined action slips on non-cued trials were compared (i.e. trials in which no action 
effect cues were presented). If participants pressed the keys during imagery, then one 
would expect to see a higher proportion of keypresses which reflected the imagined 
movement, relative to the non-imagined movement. In the absence of visual stimuli, 
accidental button presses were exceedingly rare and occurred on only .3% of beat 
intervals. These non-cued slips were roughly equally distributed between button presses 
with the imagined and non-imagined finger, providing little evidence that participants 
were consistently using finger movements to rehearse the imagined pattern (66 
imagined vs. 47 non-imagined slips across all participants, χ2 = 3.19, p = .074). 
The data were analysed using generalised linear mixed-effects regression, 
GLMER, using the glmer() function of the lme4 package (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & 
Walker, 2015) in R Version 3.4.2 (R Core team, 2017). This approach was taken 
because action slips which followed action cues were rare, meaning that the resulting 
data were zero-inflated (i.e. there were a lot of observations in which no responses were 
registered) and were not normally distributed. Therefore, the data were not well suited 
to more traditional statistical methods (e.g. analysis of variance) and could be better 
accommodated by specifying a suitable statistical model using GLMER. When 
modelling binary responses with GLMER, null hypothesis significance testing is 
implemented by comparing a full model and a reduced model without the fixed effect of 
interest with a likelihood ratio test (hereafter, LRT). The resulting chi-square test 
statistic is analogous to the F-statistic in conventional models. The estimates given by 
the GLMER model are reported along with a bootstrapped 95% confidence interval 
based on 1000 simulations. All categorical predictors were effect coded and when 
referring to model parameters the first letter is capitalised for ease of comprehension. 
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The analysis proceeded in three steps. The first step of the analysis tested whether 
the surprising visual stimuli induced non-willed key presses (i.e. action slips) in the 
imagery phase. To do this, each 800ms interval between metronome beats (or, in the 
model, Beat) was treated as a discrete event in which an action slip could have occurred 
or not (coded one or zero respectively). The model included fixed effects of Cue 
Presence (2 levels: Yes/No) and Trial (1-96, logged and mean centred) and a random 
intercept for each Participant and each Beat. In addition, the effect of Cue Presence, 
Trial and their interaction were allowed to vary within Participant by including random 
slopes for these terms. Such an approach is roughly analogous to a repeated measures 
one-way ANOVA with the factor Cue Presence. 
As predicted, the presence of unexpected cues significantly increased the 
probability of action slips, LRT: χ2 (1) = 31.17, p < .001; GLMER estimate: β = 2.98, 
95% CI = [2.22, 3.58]. Predicted probabilities derived from repeated simulation of the 
model reveal that there was a 9.23% [4.06, 19.2] chance of an action slip following the 
onset of a cue, but only .27% [.12, .59] when no cue was present. In addition, there was 
a significant main effect of Trial, indicating participants became less likely to 
accidentally press a key as the experiment progressed, LRT: χ2 (1) = 38.33, p < .001; 
GLMER estimate: β = -.31, 95% CI = [-.55, .03]. Finally, Cue Presence and Trial 
interacted, LRT: χ2 (1) = 17.75, p < .001; GLMER estimate: β = -1.12, 95% CI = [-1.69, 
-.67], indicating that action cues became less effective at eliciting action slips over the 
course of the experiment. 
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Figure 3. A box plot of the observed frequency of general action slips according to the 
class of action cue which preceded them in Experiment 1. The observed frequencies are 
broken down by Perception-Imagery Compatibility with a thick black bar to represent 
the median, a box showing the interquartile range and whiskers to indicate maxima and 
minima. 
The second step tested whether action slips would generally be elicited by cues 
that match the currently imagined finger keypress, not by those that mismatched. Visual 
inspection of the observed frequencies of action slips recorded in response to each class 
of action cue (Figure 3) suggests that action slips were more likely when the observed 
finger press and the imagined finger press were identical (i.e. congruent, M= 20.2%) 
compared to when they were different (i.e. incongruent, M= 15.7%). A smaller dataset 
was constructed which only consisted of observations which followed the onset of 
surprising action cues (i.e. each participant contributed 32 observations), and dummy 
variables encoded whether the cue was compatible or incompatible with the currently 
imagined response. The model included fixed effects of Perception-Imagery 
Compatibility (2 levels: Compatible/Incompatible) and Cue Order within the trial series 
(ranked 1st to 32nd, log-transformed and mean centred) and a random intercept for each 
Participant. In addition, random slopes for Perception-Imagery Compatibility, Cue 
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Order and their interaction, were added which allowed each participant to vary in their 
general response bias.  
 
Figure 4. A combination plot indicating the predicted probability of general action slips 
according to the class of action cue which preceded them across Experiment 1. The 
upper panel shows a plot of the predicted probabilities, derived by simulation, that cue 
onset would elicit a general action slip (i.e. any response) according to Perception-
Imagery Compatibility and Cue Order. The lower panel shows a difference plot (i.e. 
Compatible - Incompatible) in which the shaded area shows a 95% confidence interval 
derived by simulation. 
The analysis revealed a significant main effect of Cue Order, LRT: χ2 (1) = 35.74, 
p < .001; GLMER estimate: β = -1.65, 95% CI = [-2.19, -1.26], reflecting the fact that 
action slips were most likely in the early stages of the experiment and became less 
frequent as it progressed (Figure 4). Importantly, as predicted, there was a main effect 
of Perception-Imagery Compatibility, LRT: χ2 (1) = 4.49, p = .034; GLMER estimate: β 
= .4, 95% CI = [.05, .86]. This indicates that action slips were significantly more likely 
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when participants encountered action cues that were compatible (e.g. right index), rather 
than incompatible (e.g. left index), with their currently imagined movement (e.g. right 
index). Finally, tests revealed no evidence of an interaction between Perception-Imagery 
Compatibility and Cue Order (LRT: χ2 (1) = 2.54, p = .11; GLMER estimate: β = .25, 
95% CI = [-.1, .64). 
 
Figure 5. A plot of the predicted probabilities of specific action slips, derived by 
simulation, according to the class of action cue which preceded them in Experiment 1. 
A stacked bar plot indicates the predicted proportion of specific action slips (i.e. either 
the imagined action or alternative action) made according to Perception-Imagery 
Compatibility. 
Finally, the third step if the analysis tested the hypothesis that the specific action 
slips captured by Experiment 1 should primarily reflect the currently imagined key 
press. In addition, it was predicted that participants should execute the alternative action 
at a higher rate in response to incompatible cues than compatible cues. A new dataset 
was created which consisted of only observations in which an action slip occurred. In 
addition, a new outcome variable was added to indicate whether the participant had 
executed the imagined or alternative action (coded one and zero respectively). The 
model included fixed effects of Perception-Imagery Compatibility, Cue Order and their 
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interaction along with a random intercept for each Participant. In addition, a random 
slope for Perception-Imagery Compatibility was specified. The test revealed a 
significant main effect of Perception-Imagery Compatibility, LRT: χ2 (1) = 10.56, p 
=.001; GLMER estimate: β = 3.23, 95% CI = [1.48, 14.1]. Predicted probabilities, 
derived by simulation, reveal that there was a 99.9% [62.5, 100] chance that participants 
would execute the imagined response when faced with a compatible cue, but only an 
84.3% [74, 91] chance in response to an incompatible cue (Figure 5). Importantly, 
confidence intervals for compatible cues, in particular, did not overlap with chance (i.e. 
50%), showing that participants were generally more likely to produce the currently 
imagined response compared to the alternative response. Cue Order (LRT: χ2 (1) = .09, 
p = .76; GLMER estimate: β = -.14, 95% CI = [-4.74, 2.67]) and the interaction between 
Perception-Imagery Compatibility and Cue Order (LRT: χ2 (1) = .02, p = .9; GLMER 
estimate: β = -.06, 95% CI = [-4.6, 2.78]) did not affect the type of action slip produced. 
 
2.2.3. Discussion 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to create optimal conditions to test whether it was 
possible to elicit a non-willed action slip by presenting unexpected perceptual action 
cues during an imagery task. In particular, Experiment 1 aimed to determine whether 
the compatibility between an imagined and observed movement would modulate the 
probability that a general action slip would emerge, in accordance with predictions 
derived from Common Coding theory (Prinz, 1990, 1997). Additionally, the experiment 
explored the nature of the specific action slips which were captured, under the 
assumption that participants should be more likely to execute the alternative response 
during incompatible trials (i.e. participants accidentally imitated the response primed by 
the observed movement cue). The results suggest that perceptual cues can indeed elicit 
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general action slips from participants in spite of an explicitly stated task goal to 
withhold responding. In addition, the data revealed that general action slips were more 
likely following compatible, rather than incompatible trials, as predicted by ideomotor 
models (e.g. Theory of Event Coding, Hommel, 2009). Furthermore, although 
participants tended to execute their currently imagined response, they were more likely 
to produce the non-imagined response if they encountered an incompatible cue (which, 
under our definition, corresponded with the non-imagined response).  
The present findings are consistent with the idea that both general and specific 
action slips emerge as a function of the same ideomotor principles that have been shown 
to guide voluntary action. Within the ideomotor framework, motor imagery can be 
characterised as a sub-threshold activation of shared internal representations (i.e. action 
effects) implicated in the mechanisms of action and perception. In this way, it was 
predicted that action slips should be more likely in the presence of a movement cue than 
when no cues were present. Indeed, there was an order of magnitude difference in 
frequency of actions slips in trials in which such cues were present compared to trials 
without action cues. Such a low proportion of responses in no-cue trials is hardly 
surprising given that participants were specifically instructed to refrain from movement 
during imagery. It suggests that participants had no trouble adhering to this rule when 
no cues were present. In addition, the marked decline in action slips across Experiment 
1 suggests that participants learned to inhibit their urge to respond to the onscreen 
movement. 
Importantly, Experiment 1 revealed that action slips were most likely when the 
perceived action cues (i.e. colours, sounds and pictures of hands) were compatible with 
the participant’s concurrent mental image. That is, action slips emerged as a function of 
the degree of dimensional overlap between the internal representations of the observed 
and imagined movements (Kunde et al., 2004). It was predicted that this should occur 
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because the process of imagining, for example, a left finger movement, involves 
activating the same action effect codes which are required to execute the overt act, only 
to a subthreshold level (i.e. activating internal representations referring to “left”, 
“down” and “index finger”). The specific action effect representation of a left finger 
movement would also be activated by the perceived movement cues on compatible trials 
(i.e. observed left finger movement along with newly associated screen colour and 
tone), but not incompatible trials. Therefore, when the observed movement cue matched 
the imagined response on compatible trials, activity in shared action effects was more 
likely to exceed the threshold for an overt response due to greater conceptual similarity, 
as predicted by ideomotor models. 
However, it must be noted that even incompatible cues elicited action slips. This 
is, perhaps, not surprising since there remains a great deal of conceptual similarity 
between the imagined and perceived events on these incompatible trials. For example, 
an incompatible cue still strongly implies a downward movement which shares spatial 
features with the imagined downward keypress. Furthermore, it seems likely that there 
may also have been a very general effect of encountering a surprising visual stimulus on 
the initial action slips produced by each participant (e.g. a general release from 
inhibition, or “startle” effect, Maslovat et al., 2013). Recall that there was little 
difference in the probability of producing a general action slip to either kind of cue at 
the beginning of the experiment (Figure 4).  
A related finding was that the specific action slips made by participants were also 
modulated by the compatibility between the observed and imagined movements. While 
participants typically executed the motor responses they were currently imagining, they 
sometimes responded with the alternative finger, specifically if the observed action cue 
corresponded with this alternative action. This was predicted on the basis that 
observation of an incompatible cue would induce activity in the action effect codes that 
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served the alternative response, competing with the endogenously activated action 
effects that serve the imagined response. If participants had simply been compelled to 
respond out of sheer surprise by an unexpected movement cue (e,g, Maslovat et al., 
2013), then they should have only executed the imagined response in both conditions 
(i.e. there would be no compatibility effect). It is possible that participants may have 
made errors in tracking the sequence, in that they imagined an incorrect movement 
when the cue was presented. However, this cannot account for the fact that the vast 
majority of these non-imagined action slips were observed in the presence of action 
cues which corresponded with the imagery-incompatible action. If participants were 
prone to making errors in tracking the sequence, the ratio of imagined to non-imagined 
action slips would have been the same in both conditions. 
It was predicted that action slips should be rare if participants engaged properly 
with the task and truly tried to inhibit their overt movement until the onset of the 
predefined imperative stimulus. Thus, the experiment sought to create the maximal 
conditions for such an action slip to occur by placing participants in an ambiguous 
situation in which movement was explicitly prohibited but strongly implied. To this end, 
the association training task taught participants an abstract association between colour-
tone pairs and specific responses (i.e. action effect association). These trained 
associations were then exploited in conjunction with an unexpected visual depiction of 
the corresponding movement in the intention insertion task. However, this creates an 
inherent problem for a straightforward interpretation of these data, because participants 
could have been making a form of perseverative error. That is, participants initially 
learnt that the onscreen colours represented an imperative to act. For example, some 
participants were taught that yellow stimuli required a left index finger response and 
blue stimuli a right fingered response. Participants may, therefore, have continued to 
respond according to this previously learned stimulus-response contingency during the 
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intention insertion task. In order to address this issue, a new sample of participants was 
tested (Experiment 2) using the same procedure as Experiment 1, only without the 
association training task.  
2.3. Experiment 2: Eliciting Non-Willed Action Slips During Imagery 
Without Trained Associations 
Experiment 1 created the maximal conditions by which one might induce an 
action slips under laboratory conditions. However, now that the compatibility effect 
between action cues and imagery had been established, some of the unnecessary 
complexity in the design was stripped away to allow more specific claims to be made 
about the relationship between the activity of internal sensorimotor representations and 
action intentions. The data collected in Experiment 1 were consistent with the idea that 
it is possible to elicit a specific, non-willed action slip when the activity induced by 
endogenous imagery combines activity induced by exogenous action cues. Although the 
distribution of action slips was as predicted in Experiment 1, it was not possible to rule 
out that some of the responses could have been caused by a simple perseverative error. 
That is, a carry-over from the instructions given in the association training task in which 
participants learnt that coloured stimuli required responses. Under this view, it is the 
previously established (but erroneously applied) stimulus-response rule which initiated 
the action, rather than the observed movement. In order to exclude this possibility, 
Experiment 2 subjected a fresh sample of participants to the same intention insertion 
task as Experiment 1 but omitted the preceding association training task.  
As well as ruling out the effects of perseveration, Experiment 2 aims to evaluate 
the contribution of the training phase and determine whether it was necessary to 
establish such an explicit link between abstract stimuli (i.e. colour-tone pairs) and 
specific responses in order to induce action slips. A lifetime of first-person experience 
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of visually guided hand movement means that observation of a first-person action – 
seeing one’s own fingers being depressed when making such a movement in the present 
case – should inherently represent a potent action cue and that the activity induced by 
action observation may be driving this effect alone. As in Experiment 1, the action cues 
still consisted of a visual depiction of congruent and incongruent finger movements 
presented with colour-tone pairs, but participants no longer learned an explicit 
association between them prior to the intention insertion task. The flashes of colour and 
distracting tone merely served to increase the salience of cue onset in this experiment 
(e.g. a movement of the left or right virtual finger). If Experiment 2 demonstrates the 
same compatibility effect between observed and imaged movements (i.e. replicating 
Experiment 1), then this would provide more direct evidence for the role of action effect 




Thirty-two participants took part in the experiment (25 female; 5 Left-handed; 
Age in years: M=23.2, SD=4.9), recruited from the Plymouth University’s paid 
participation pool (remunerated £4). The study was approved by Plymouth University’s 
ethics committee.  
 
2.3.1.2. Materials and Apparatus 
The design employed the same set of audio and visual stimuli as were used in 
Experiment 1. While participants were not explicitly taught to associate abstract Colour-
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Tone Pairs with specific movements, the mapping was consistent within participants 
(e.g. participants either received a yellow: left, blue: right mapping or the opposite, 
counterbalanced) because the intention insertion task was unaltered from Experiment 1. 
As in Experiment 1, all factors were fully counterbalanced. 
 
2.3.1.3. Procedure 
This experiment used the same intention insertion task that was presented to 
participants in Experiment 1 but omitted the prior association training task. The protocol 
for delivering the intention insertion task was identical in all respects. 
 
2.3.2. Results 
As in Experiment 1, the percentage of correct responses at the end of each trial 
(when the “Go!” stimulus was presented, and participants were required to respond) was 
used to assess whether participants correctly imagined the instructed movements at each 
point in the sequence. Only participants with accuracy rates within one standard 
deviation of the group mean (M=87.9.1%; SD=10.5%; M-SD=77.5%) were considered, 
leading to the removal of 6 participants (leaving N = 26 participants). 
As in Experiment 1, the first step was to check whether participants followed the 
instruction to refrain from actively moving their fingers in the imagery intervals by 
comparing the number of slips on non-cued trials. In the absence of visual stimuli, 
accidental button presses were rare and occurred on only .2% of beat intervals. As in 
Experiment 1, the non-cued action slips were roughly equally distributed between 
button presses with the imagined and non-imagined finger. Accordingly, the test of non-
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cued action slips provided no evidence that participants were using finger movements to 
rehearse the imagined pattern (32 imagined vs. 26 non-imagined slips across all 
participants, χ2 = .62, p = .43). 
The remaining data were analysed using generalised linear mixed-effects 
regression, GLMER, using the glmer() function of the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) 
in R Version 3.4.2 environment (R Core team, 2017). As in Experiment 1, the analysis 
proceeded in three steps. The first step was to test whether the surprising visual stimuli 
would induce unintended key presses (i.e. action slips) in the imagination phase of the 
intention insertion task. The model included a fixed effect for Cue Presence (2 levels: 
Yes/No) and Trial (1-96, logged and mean centred) and a random intercept for each 
Participant and each Beat. In addition, the effect of Cue Presence, Trial and their 
interaction were allowed to vary within Participant by including a random slope for 
these terms. As in Experiment 1, the unexpected action cues increased the probability of 
action slips, LRT: χ2 (1) = 30.1, p < .001; GLMER estimate: β = 3.15, 95% CI = [2.28, 
3.87]. Predicted probabilities derived from repeated simulation of the model suggest 
that there was a 6.85% [3.02, 15.6] chance of an action slip when a cue was present, but 
only .18% [.08, .47] when no cue was present. Furthermore, the analysis indicated that 
there was a significant main effect of Cue Order, LRT: χ2 (1) = 20.5, p < .001; GLMER 
estimate: β = -.25, 95% CI = [-.5, .27], and a significant interaction with Cue Presence, 
LRT: χ2 (1) = 12.5, p < .001; GLMER estimate: β = -1.03, 95% CI = [-1.67, -.66]. This 
suggests that participants became less likely to make any responses (i.e. whether 
following cued or non-cued metronome beats) as the experiment progressed, but that 
there was a more pronounced decline with respect to trials in which an action cue 
appeared than non-cued trials.  
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Figure 6. A box plot of the observed frequency of general action slips according to the 
class of action cue which preceded them in Experiment 2. The observed frequencies are 
broken down by Perception-Imagery Compatibility with a thick black bar to represent 
the median, a box showing the interquartile range and whiskers to indicate maxima and 
minima. 
The second step of the analysis was to test the prediction that, in general, action 
slips were elicited by cues that matched the currently imagined finger keypress, not by 
those that mismatched. A smaller dataset was constructed which consisted only of 
intervals in which cues were present (i.e. each participant contributed 32 observations). 
The observed frequency of action slips recorded in response to each class of action cue 
(Figure 6) suggests that action slips were more likely when the observed finger press 
and the imagined finger press were identical (i.e. congruent, M= 16.6%) compared to 
when they were different (i.e. incongruent, M= 9.9%). The model included fixed effects 
for Perception-Imagery Compatibility (2 levels: Compatible/Incompatible), Cue Order 
(1st to 32nd, logged and mean centred), Colour-Tone Pair (2 levels: Blue/Yellow) and all 
interactions between these three variables. In addition, the model included a random 
intercept for each Participant with random slopes for Perception-Imagery Compatibility, 
Cue Order, Colour-Tone Pair and all interactions. This specification allowed each effect 
to vary within-participants.  
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Figure 7. A combination plot indicating the predicted probability of general action slips 
according to the class of action cue which preceded them across Experiment 2. The 
upper panel shows a plot of the predicted probabilities, derived by simulation, that cue 
onset would elicit a general action slip (i.e. any response) according to Perception-
Imagery Compatibility and Cue Order. The lower panel shows a difference plot (i.e. 
Compatible - Incompatible) in which the shaded area shows a 95% confidence interval 
derived by simulation. 
As in Experiment 1, there was a main effect of Perception-Imagery Compatibility, 
LRT: χ2 (1) = 4.91, p = .027; GLMER estimate: β = -.83, 95% CI = [.21, 3.99], which 
suggests that action slips were most likely, in general, in the compatible condition 
where the observed finger press and the imagined finger press were identical (Figure 7). 
There was also a main effect of Cue Order, LRT: χ2 (1) = 7.6, p = .006; GLMER 
estimate: β = -1.53, 95% CI = [-2.99, -.67], which indicated that action slips became 
less likely as the experiment progressed. However, the analysis provided no evidence of 
an interaction between Perception-Imagery Compatibility and Cue Order (LRT: χ2 (1) = 
.19, p = .663; GLMER estimate: β = -.17, 95% CI = [-1.18, 1.06]). Tests of the 
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remaining parameters revealed no evidence of a main effect of Colour-Tone Pair (LRT: 
χ2 (1) = 1.53, p = .215; GLMER estimate: β = .51, 95% CI = [-.39, 3.81]). Furthermore, 
there was no evidence of an interaction between Perception-Imagery Compatibility and 
Colour-Tone Pair (LRT: χ2 (1) = 2.04, p = .152; GLMER estimate: β = -.6, 95% CI = [-
3.35, .15]), Cue Order and Colour-Tone Pair (LRT: χ2 (1) = .24, p = .625; GLMER 
estimate: β = -.19, 95% CI = [-1.44, .86]). or a three-way interaction between 
Perception-Imagery Compatibility, Colour-Tone Pair, Cue Order (LRT: χ2 (1) = .002, p 
= .965; GLMER estimate: β = -.01, 95% CI = [-1.17, 1.13]). 
Finally, the third step of the analysis tested the hypothesis that participants should 
produce the alternative (i.e. non-imagined) action slip at a higher rate when faced with 
an incompatible cue than a compatible cue. A new dataset was created which consisted 
of only observations in which an action slip occurred and a new outcome variable was 
created to indicate whether the participant had executed the imagined or alternative 
action (coded one and zero respectively). The model included a fixed effect of 
Perception-Imagery Compatibility and Cue Order. In addition, the model fitted a 
random intercept for each Participant and a random slope for Perception-Imagery 
Compatibility. The Colour-Tone Pair term was omitted from the model because of 
convergence issues with GLMER due to over parameterisation.  
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Figure 8. A plot of the predicted probabilities of specific action slips, derived by 
simulation, according to the class of action cue which preceded them in Experiment 2. 
A stacked bar plot indicates the predicted proportion of specific action slips (i.e. either 
the imagined action or alternative action) made according to Perception-Imagery 
Compatibility. 
Figure 8 shows how the estimated proportion of action slips which reflected either 
the participant’s imagined movement or the non-imagined movement was influenced by 
each kind of action cue. Visual inspection indicates that participants were more likely to 
produce the imagined response following the onset of both compatible and incompatible 
cues, as in Experiment 1. In addition, it appears that participants were more likely to 
produce the alternative (i.e. non-imagined) action slip if they observed a movement that 
corresponded with the currently non-imagined finger (i.e. an incongruent action cue), 
rather than the imagined finger (i.e. a congruent cue). Accordingly, the test revealed a 
significant main effect of Perception-Imagery Compatibility, LRT: χ2 (1) = 9.52, p = 
.002; GLMER estimate: β = 2.64, 95% CI = [1.62, 22.2], indicating that non-imagined 
action slips were more likely following incompatible cues than compatible cues, as 
predicted. Moreover, the analysis revealed a significant interaction between Perception-
Imagery Compatibility and Cue Order, LRT: χ2 (1) = 5.14, p = .023; GLMER estimate: 
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β = 1.12, 95% CI = [-.13, 11.3], indicating that the compatibility effect grew more 
pronounced as the experiment progressed. 
 
2.3.3. Discussion 
Experiment 2 provided further evidence that a combination of imagined and 
observed action effects is sufficient to induce non-willed behaviour, even though 
participants are actively trying to withhold it. These data replicate the effects that were 
observed in Experiment 1, despite the fact that participants were no longer trained to 
associate an abstract set of stimuli (i.e. colours and tone) with specific responses. This 
finding rules out that the action slips captured by the intention insertion task could have 
emerged as a form of perseverative error, caused by participants learning, in an earlier 
training phase, that the onset of coloured stimuli required them to press a key.  
In addition, the results demonstrate that well-established and strongly associated 
perceptual consequences of our acts (i.e. visual feedback typically associated with first-
person action observation) can summate with activity already induced endogenously via 
imagery and can, sometimes, produce non-willed behaviour. However, the stimuli in 
Experiment 2 retained a number of incidental features that preclude a straightforward 
account of the actions slips which were observed. In particular, the intention insertion 
task used the same set of stimuli as Experiment 1, which combined virtual finger 
movements with different colours and lateralised tones (a relic of the omitted 
association training task, Experiment 1) and were retained for continuity’s sake. As a 
result, it is not possible to firmly conclude whether the action slips were caused by the 
onscreen movement or the laterality of the auditory tone because these elements are 
confounded in the current design (i.e. left virtual finger movements were always paired 
with left-panned tones). Indeed, it is possible that the compatibility effect could be 
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driven by either or both of these elements. In order to allow for a more specific 
conclusion about the origin of the action slips observed, a new sample of participants 
was tested (Experiment 3), which applied the same intention insertion task as 
Experiment 2, but with simpler stimuli. This is because the influence of action 
observation (i.e. the finger movements) on subsequent action slips, rather than 
lateralised tones, are of most interest to the present inquiry.  
 
 
2.4. Experiment 3: Eliciting Non-Willed Action Slips During Imagery 
with Action Observation 
Experiment 2 replicated the effects that were observed in Experiment 1, and in so 
doing, provided more direct evidence for the notion that activating an actions perceptual 
consequences, by endogenous (i.e. imagery) and exogenous means (i.e. action 
observation), can effectively generate the corresponding action. However, the action 
cues presented to participants in Experiment 2 contained a number of elements (e.g. 
finger movements presented with lateralised tones and blue/yellow colour flashes) 
which complicate this interpretation. Indeed, it is impossible to disentangle the 
influence of an observed movement from the auditory tones on participants’ imagery in 
Experiments 1 and 2, because the action cues were always lateralised (i.e. panned hard 
left/right in the headphones) according to the observed action (i.e. observed left 
movement – tone played to left ear). In order to allow a more specific interpretation of 
the effect of an observed movement on mental imagery, a new sample of participants 
was tested with the same procedure as Experiment 2, but with simplified stimuli. In 
Experiment 3, visual depictions of finger movement appeared in tandem with a uniform 
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yellow background colour change and centrally-panned tone (i.e. presented to both ears 
by headphones) to increase the salience of the cues, but without influencing the 
compatibility effect. If Experiment 3 still provides evidence that action slips are 
modulated by the compatibility between the imagined and observed movements (i.e. 
replicating Experiments 1 and 2), then this would provide the most direct evidence yet 





Thirty-two participants took part in the experiment (21 female; 5 Left-handed; 
Age in years: M=22.1, SD=3.5), recruited from the Plymouth University’s paid 
participation pool (remunerated £4). The study was approved by Plymouth University’s 
ethics committee.  
2.4.1.2. Procedure 
This iteration of the intention insertion task was identical to the one used in 
Experiment 2 with the exception that the task-irrelevant perceptual features of the action 
cues were now more uniform. Action cues (i.e. left or right finger movements) were 
presented with uniform yellow backgrounds and tones panned centrally (Figure 9).  
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Figure 9. Typical and unexpected movement cues displayed during Imagination Phase 
of Experiment 3. The image “No Cue” is a pair of hands on a white background and in a 
neutral position with a central fixation cross. Participants saw this image for the bulk of 
their trials because action cues were rare. The left and right movement cues were 
accompanied with a yellow background and centrally-panned effect tone and when 




As in Experiments 1 and 2, conservative criteria were set and only participants 
with accuracy rates within one standard deviation of the group mean were considered 
(M=84.3%; SD=15.9%; M-SD=68.5%), leading to the removal of 4 participants (leaving 
N = 28). Exclusion of these participants does not affect the results. All principal effects 
of interest remain significant even when these participants are included. 
First, to check whether participants followed the instruction to refrain from 
actively moving their fingers in the imagery intervals, the number of imagined and non-
imagined slips on non-cued trials were compared. In the absence of salient visual 
stimuli, accidental button presses were rare and occurred on only .1% of beat intervals. 
The test revealed that non-cued action slips were roughly equally distributed between 
button presses with the imagined and non-imagined finger and provided no evidence 
that participants used finger movements to rehearse the imagined pattern (14 imagined 
vs. 10 non-imagined slips across all participants, χ2 = .667, p = .414). 
      Left Cue     Right Cue         No Cue 
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The data were analysed using the same approach as Experiments 1 and 2 and an R 
script which details this specific analysis was published with the Open Science 
Framework (Colton et al., 2018b). As with previous experiments, the first step of the 
analysis was to test whether the surprising visual stimuli would induce unintended key 
presses (i.e. action slips) in the imagination phase of the intention insertion task. The 
model included fixed effects of Cue Presence (2 levels: Yes/No) and Trial (1-96, logged 
and mean centred) and a random intercept for each Participant and each Beat. In 
addition, the effect of Cue Presence, Trial and their interaction were allowed to vary 
within Participant by including random slopes for these terms. As predicted, and as in 
Experiments 1 and 2, the presence of unexpected cues significantly increased the 
probability of action slips, LRT: χ2 (1) = 56.94, p < .001; GLMER estimate: β = 4.2, 
95% CI = [3.55, 5.26]. Predicted probabilities derived from repeated simulation of the 
model revealed that there was an 8.57% [3.89, 18.03] chance of an action slip following 
the onset of a cue, but only .09% [.03, .22] when no cue was present. In addition, Cue 
Presence and Trial interacted, LRT: χ2 (1) = 8.63, p = .003; GLMER estimate: β = -.79, 
95% CI = [-1.46, -.34], indicating that cues became less effective at eliciting action slips 
over the course of the experiment. The analysis provided no evidence of a main effect of 
Trial (LRT: χ2 (1) = 2.32, p = .128; GLMER estimate: β = -.46, 95% CI = [-.88, .11]) on 
the probability of producing an action slip. 
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Figure 10. A box plot of the observed frequency of general action slips according to the 
class of action cue which preceded them in Experiment 3. The observed frequencies are 
broken down by Perception-Imagery Compatibility with a thick black bar to represent 
the median, a box showing the interquartile range and whiskers to indicate maxima and 
minima. 
The second step of the analysis tested whether, in general, action slips would 
primarily be elicited by cues that match the currently imagined finger keypress (i.e. 
compatible cues), not by those that mismatched (i.e. incompatible cues). The model 
included fixed effects of Perception-Imagery Compatibility (2 levels: 
Compatible/Incompatible) and Cue Order within the trial series (ranked 1st to 32nd, log-
transformed and mean centred) and a random intercept for each Participant. In addition, 
random slopes for Perception-Imagery Compatibility, Cue Order and their interaction 
were added, which allowed each participant to vary in their general response bias. The 
observed frequency of action slips recorded in response to each type of action cue 
(Figure 10) suggests that action slips were more likely when the observed finger press 
and the imagined finger press were identical (i.e. congruent, M= 17.4%) compared to 
when they were different (i.e. incongruent, M= 10.3%). The analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of Cue Order, LRT: χ2 (1) = 44.43, p < .001; GLMER estimate: β 
= -1.36, 95% CI = [-1.79, -1.12], reflecting the fact that action slips were most likely in 
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the early stages of the experiment and became less frequent as it progressed. 
Importantly, as in Experiments 1 and 2, there was a main effect of Perception-Imagery 
Compatibility, LRT: χ2 (1) = 7.59, p = .006; GLMER estimate: β = .54, 95% CI = [.22, 
1.07] confirming that action slips were more likely when observed finger press and the 
imagined finger press were identical compared to when they were different. In addition, 
Perception-Imagery Compatibility and Cue Order interacted, LRT: χ2 (1) = 5.59, p = 
.018; GLMER estimate: β = .34, 95% CI = [.07, .76]. Figure 11 suggests that this is 
because action slip frequency was roughly equivalent in the compatible and 
incompatible conditions early in the session (when the number of action slips across 
both conditions was high). However, the consistent difference between the compatible 
and incompatible conditions appears to have emerged later in the session when 




Figure 11. A combination plot indicating the predicted probability of general action 
slips according to the class of action cue which preceded them across Experiment 3. The 
upper panel shows a plot of the predicted probabilities, derived by simulation, that cue 
onset would elicit a general action slip (i.e. any response) according to Perception-
Imagery Compatibility and Cue Order. The lower panel shows a difference plot (i.e. 
Compatible - Incompatible) in which the shaded area shows a 95% confidence interval 
derived by simulation. 
The third step of the analysis tested the hypothesis that participants’ specific 
action slips should generally reflect the currently imagined finger movement and that 
the alternative action would primarily be elicited by an incompatible cue. The model 
included fixed effects of Perception-Imagery Compatibility, Cue Order and their 
interaction along with a random intercept for each Participant. In addition, a random 
slope for Perception-Imagery Compatibility was specified. Figure 12 shows how the 
estimated proportion of action slips which reflected either participants’ imagined 
movement or the non-imagined movement is influenced by each kind of action cue. 
Visual inspection indicated that participants were more likely to produce the imagined 
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response following the onset of both compatible and incompatible cues. As in 
Experiments 1 and 2, participants appeared to be more likely to produce the alternative 
(i.e. non-imagined) action slip if they observed a movement that corresponded with the 
currently non-imagined finger (i.e. an incongruent action cue), rather than the imagined 
finger (i.e. a congruent cue).  
 
Figure 12. A plot of the predicted probabilities of specific action slips, derived by 
simulation, according to the class of action cue which preceded them in Experiment 3. 
A stacked bar plot indicates the predicted proportion of specific action slips (i.e. either 
the imagined action or alternative action) made according to Perception-Imagery 
Compatibility. 
Accordingly, the analysis revealed a significant main effect of Perception-Imagery 
Compatibility, LRT: χ2 (1) = 19.01, p <.001; GLMER estimate: β = 5.73, 95% CI = 
[3.81, 16.19] and fitted values have been plotted in Figure 12. Predicted probabilities, 
derived by simulation, reveal that there was a 100% [93.83, 100] chance that 
participants would execute the imagined response when faced with a compatible cue, 
but only a 65.57% [49, 79.2] chance in response to an incompatible cue. Importantly, 
confidence intervals for compatible cues, in particular, did not overlap with chance (i.e. 
50%), showing that participants were much more likely to produce the currently 
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imagined response compared to the alternative response in the compatible condition. 
Finally, the analysis revealed no evidence that either Cue Order (LRT: χ2 (1) = 1.38, p = 
.241; GLMER estimate: β = -1.64, 95% CI = [-8.4, -.1]), or the interaction between 
Perception-Imagery Compatibility and Cue Order (LRT: χ2 (1) = .85, p = .356; GLMER 




Experiment 3 represents the simplest iteration of the intention insertion task so far 
and, despite removing several elements that could have contributed to the effect (e.g. 
association training task and lateralised tones), the outcomes of all principle 
comparisons were identical to those of Experiments 1 and 2. These data provide the 
most direct support yet (in this thesis) for the hypothesis that increasing activity in 
internal action effect representations is analogous with forming an intention to act. 
Importantly, Experiment 3 demonstrates that this effect is primarily driven by first-
person observation of the associated proximal action effects (i.e. visual depiction of a 
downwards index finger movement) rather than the laterality of the tones (Experiment 
2) or an explicitly trained association (Experiment 1).  
 
2.5. General Discussion 
In Experiments 1-3, participants were asked to imagine – but not execute – 
sequences of finger movements, and were then unexpectedly presented with visual 
images of those actions being executed at some point during the imagination phase. It 
was predicted that, if forming an action intention is equivalent to activating the relevant 
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action effect codes, as implied by ideomotor models, then the summed activation of 
these codes through imagery and perception may suffice to push them super-threshold, 
causing participants to sometimes execute even movements that they were asked to 
withhold. Such effects would go beyond prior work showing that observing (or 
imagining) actions modulates selection or executing planned actions – speeding up 
responses to congruent cues or inducing subtle changes in associated muscle activity – 
and confirm a long-held but untested assumption of ideomotor models: that activating 
an action’s effects is equivalent to inducing a motor intention that leads to the initiation 
of overt action when activated strongly enough. 
Consistent with these predictions, the combined influence of top-down imagery 
and bottom-up perceptual input was sufficient to effectively initiate non-willed button 
presses (i.e. action slips). This effect was strongest when the observed and imagined 
actions were identical and was weaker when they were different. This rules out the 
possibility that the action slips were merely "startle responses" or the release of 
prepared actions triggered by surprising stimuli (P. Brown et al., 1991; Maslovat et al., 
2013) because this should have occurred equally for compatible and incompatible 
stimuli. Instead, it is consistent with the hypothesized summation of action effect codes, 
which can happen only if imagined and observed action effects are compatible, but not 
if they are incompatible. The data, therefore, show, for the first time, that activating an 
action’s perceptual consequences does not only support action planning or selection (see 
Keller & Koch, 2006, for an application to similar finger sequences as used here), but – 
in line with ideomotor models – is equivalent to forming an action intention, which 
when strong enough, suffices to trigger the action itself.  
Two further aspects of our results confirm this interpretation. First, the effect of 
perception-imagery summation became clearer as the experiment progressed. 
Experiments 1-3 indicated that, at the beginning of the intention insertion task, 
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participants responded at similar rates following the onset of both kinds of action cue 
(i.e. compatible and incompatible). However, across the entire task, action slips were 
consistently more likely when the observed and imagined action were identical than 
when they were different. This finding rules out that action slips reflect mere startle 
responses or a release of pre-planned responses. Second, in both experiments, the 
presentation of action effects primarily caused participants to execute the currently 
imagined action, compared to the alternative finger press. As predicted, the frequency 
with which the alternative (non-imagined) action was executed only increased when 
imagined and presented action effects were not identical, and the visual action cue, 
therefore, activated the currently non-imagined action. This suggests that two 
simultaneously activated actions intentions – one derived from imagery and one from 
observation – summate, such that both can trigger involuntary responses independently, 
albeit less frequently than if both plans are identical and do not compete (Hommel, 
2009; Hommel et al., 2001).  
In order to test whether it was possible to induce non-willed action slips in a 
laboratory setting, Chapter 2 began by creating the maximal conditions for an action 
slip to occur (Experiment 1). This was achieved by training abstract associations 
between the sensory representations activated by abstract stimuli (i.e. colours and tones) 
and the motor representation of the corresponding responses. The subsequent 
experiments gradually simplified the design by removing the association training task 
(Experiments 2-3) and then simplifying the action cues (i.e. virtual movements 
accompanied by a uniform yellow flash of colour and “buzz” tone; Experiment 3). 
Importantly, the principal effect of interest - the compatibility effect between an 
observed movement and participant’s imagery on the probability of producing an action 
slip – was reliably replicated in each version of the intention insertion task (Experiments 
1-3). However, one interesting observation is that the compatibility effect exhibited in 
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the specific action slips analyses appeared to be stronger without the association 
training task (Experiment 2 and 3) than with it (Experiment 1). Tentatively, and perhaps 
unsurprisingly, this suggests that well established sensorimotor associations between an 
observed movement and its typical visual outcome (i.e. acquired through a lifetime of 
experience observing one’s own actions) were more effective at triggering the 
corresponding action than the trained associations (i.e. colours and tones). In fact, the 
association training task, if anything, obscured the effect. Perhaps the colours and tones 
created a simpler response contingency (i.e. a flash of colour demands a response) and 
simply made participants more likely to respond when they encountered any coloured 
stimulus.  
Previous work has characterised action initiation as an integration-to-bounds 
mechanism, which accumulates evidence for appropriate actions and executes the most 
suitable one if a threshold is reached, irrespective of whether this evidence results from 
the evaluation of imperative task cues or from internal decisions about whether to act or 
to wait (Churchland et al., 2008; Murakami et al., 2014). Once an action has surpassed 
the threshold, it triggers an “avalanche” of motor processes, supported by deep brain 
structures such as the basal ganglia, which facilitate fluent execution. The data from 
Experiments 1-3 are entirely consistent with this view but reveals that activated action 
effects – either through imagery or action observation – can push this activity super-
threshold without additional processing. The data, therefore, provide direct evidence for 
the notion that forming an action intention may be identical to activating – imagining – 
the action’s perceptual consequences, which is executed when the activation becomes 
strong enough (Prinz, 1997; Shin et al., 2010). These findings go beyond prior research 
that has shown only that motor imagery (Ramsey et al., 2010), action observation (e.g. 
Bach, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2011; Bach et al., 2007; Brass et al., 2001) and learned action 
effect associations (Elsner & Hommel, 2001) can modulate the selection, speed and 
67 
accuracy of already planned responses, but which has left open whether action effect 
activation suffices to initiate actions independently.  
At this stage, the nature of the mechanism by which action observation induces 
motor responses from participants remains an open question. On the one hand, an 
observed action may trigger the imagined response by exerting an additional (i.e. 
additive) effect on activity in action effect codes already activated by imagery until the 
imagined response is activated so strongly that it is inadvertently executed (i.e. 
effectively inserting an intention to act). On the other hand, it is also possible that either 
the visual or the imagery-based action effects act by removing inhibition from one 
particular action (e.g. Rieger, Dahm, & Koch, 2017), in line with James’ dictum (1890) 
that a mental idea of an action will lead to overt execution, as long as it is “not kept 
from so doing by an antagonistic representation present simultaneously to the mind”. 
However, ideomotor models are agnostic about these two possibilities.  
On a conceptual level, both are equivalent, as both summation of activation and 
removal of inhibition have a net positive effect in bringing activation closer to the 
threshold for execution and inducing overt behaviour. Indeed, an intention not to act has 
been shown to be similarly controlled by mental images of non-action (e.g. Kühn, 
Elsner, Prinz, & Brass, 2009; Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, & Brass, 2014), and 
both inhibiting and excitatory roles have been attributed to complementary basal 
ganglia-prefrontal circuits for action execution (for a recent review, see Calabresi, 
Picconi, Tozzi, Ghiglieri, & Di Filippo, 2014). However, while Experiments 1-3 were 
not designed to resolve this issue, they may provide tentative support for an 
“energizing” role of action effect activation. 
If the visual action cues primarily act through removing inhibition, then they 
should have induced action slips only for the currently imagined action; removing 
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inhibition should not cause a fully-fledged button press of the non-imagined finger. 
However, this was not the case. In Experiments 1-3, even the currently non-imagined 
action was executed - albeit less frequently than the imagined response - if it was so 
cued by the respective visual action cue, providing some evidence for an additive, 
“energizing” influence of action effect activation on action initiation. In order to more 
thoroughly evaluate the evidence for the proposed facilitating effect of action 
observation on the generation of non-willed action slips, a new version of the intention 
insertion task was developed (Experiment 4, Chapter 3) which incorporated a more 
sensitive behavioural measure – finger pressure. Importantly, Experiment 4 also 
presented participants with “neutral” visual cues that comprised of the same salient flash 
of colour and deviant tone as accompanied the action cues in Experiment 3 but 
contained no movement element (i.e. the virtual fingers did not move). Together, these 
changes allow a direct comparison of the manner in which action observation, in 
combination with mental imagery, initiates non-willed motor action slips relative to a 
perceptually similar, but motorically neutral, visual cue.  
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3. Chapter 3: Do Action Cues Primarily Facilitate or Interfere with 
the Generation of Non-willed Action Slips? 
3.1. Introduction 
The purpose of Chapter 3 is to present an updated intention insertion task which 
uses a similar design to Experiment 3 (Chapter 2) with a more sensitive behavioural 
measure – finger pressure – and analysis in order to reveal how action observation 
interacts with imagery to initiate actions. In addition, Experiment 4 (present chapter) 
incorporates a novel baseline condition which is designed to test whether movement 
cues primarily facilitate or interfere with the generation of non-willed action slips 
during imagery. Furthermore, several other changes were incorporated into Experiment 
4 to address some of the limitations of the previous experiments, while taking steps to 
improve the quality and quantity of the data produced by each participant.  
The findings of Chapter 2 (Experiments 1-3) supported the assumption that the 
mechanisms of action, perception and imagery rely on a common set of internal 
representations (i.e. action effect codes) which are coded in a fundamentally perceptual 
format. Importantly, Experiments 1-3 (Chapter 2) provided evidence in favour of the 
notion that heightened activity in action effects, whether induced by endogenous 
imagery or exogenous perceptual input, can initiate the corresponding action (i.e. 
effectively inducing an intention to act). Thus far, the data have suggested that action 
effect representations (or, “mental images”) do not only shape how and when actions are 
performed but serve a generative purpose - influencing whether actions are executed at 
all. Participants were consistently more likely to execute an action they were imagining, 
but trying to withhold, if they were presented with a surprising visual image of a 
compatible action, rather than incompatible action, occurring in front of them.  
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However, it was not possible to determine precisely how the movement cues 
generated action slips and gave rise to the compatibility effect described in Chapter 2 
because Experiments 1-3 lacked an appropriate baseline condition for comparison. On 
one hand, congruent movement cues may have facilitated action slips, wherein 
perceptual input exerted an additive effect on the action effect codes already activated 
by imagery. On the other hand, incongruent cues may have simply interfered with the 
initiation of the imagined action more strongly than congruent cues. Chapter 3 describes 
a single experiment (Experiment 4) aimed at addressing this question with the addition 
of a “neutral” cue, which consists of the same salient flash of colour and surprising tone 
as the action cues used in Experiment 3 (Chapter 2), but without the movement element. 
By subtracting the responses made to neutral cues from those which involved 
movement (i.e. action cues), it is possible to control for the portion of the effect caused 
by encountering a surprising stimulus. That is, the remainder of the effect can only be 
attributed to the observed movement. This design will be used to evaluate the evidence 
for several related explanations relating to the manner in which movement observation 
and movement imagery interact to generate non-willed action slips. 
One possibility is that the action cues in Chapter 2 largely facilitated the initiation 
of action slips, albeit to a varying extent in response to compatible and incompatible 
cues. On this account, the observation of a sudden virtual hand movement exerted an 
additional bottom-up effect on action effects which overlapped with those 
simultaneously activated in a top-down manner by imagery. On this view, the effect of 
movement observation was to push the summed activation higher and make action 
initiation generally more likely than a similarly salient cue with no movement element. 
In other words, when an observed movement aligned with an imagined movement, 
perception and imagery activate a common set of action effect codes, leading to a higher 
overall activation than would follow a similarly salient, but motorically neutral stimulus 
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– enhancing the execution of action slips. When the observed movement was 
incompatible with the imagined movement, the imagined and observed actions recruited 
differing sets of action effect codes. In this condition, the common perceptual elements 
of the imagined and observed act still leads to the activation of some overlapping action 
effects (e.g. all action cues thus far have presented a downward movement of an index 
finger). However, because incompatible cues shared fewer perceptual elements with the 
imagined movement (e.g. mismatching laterality of the finger movement) the additive 
effect of activation by the observed movement was weaker, and thus action initiation 
was less likely. Experiment 3 provided some evidence of facilitation, in that 
incompatible action observation occasionally led participants to execute the visually 
primed response, even though they weren’t imaging that movement at the time. This 
demonstrates that the observed movement must facilitate action initiation to some 
extent, but competition between rival sets of action effect codes may well involve more 
than just additive effects. 
An alternative possibility is that the sudden onset of a salient visual stimulus was 
largely responsible for triggering subsequent responses and that action observation only 
interfered with the execution of these incidental responses. On this view, when an 
observed movement matches an imagined movement, the resulting interference effect 
would be minimal because a similar set of action effect codes are activated. However, 
when an observed and imagined movement differed, the two simultaneously active sets 
of action effects may have inhibited and interfered with one another (Munakata et al., 
2011). Thus, according to this account, observation of an incompatible action will exert 
a largely negative effect on the summed activation of action effects supporting the 
imagined movement and, as a result, the response crosses the threshold for execution 
less frequently. Indeed, it has been claimed in previous research that visuomotor 
priming effects on action initiation are largely the result of interference between the 
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perceived and planned actions (Ramsey et al., 2010). Ramsey et al. (2010) found that 
imagining an action that was different from the one participants were required to 
perform impaired subsequent action production. However, there was no evidence that 
imagery facilitated action production when imagery and the required response were 
identical. This provides suggestive evidence that interference may account for some of 
the reduction in the effect when the observed and imagined movements did not match in 
Experiments 1-3 (Chapter 2). However, given that in Chapter 2, non-imagined actions 
were consistently elicited at a marginally higher rate when visually primed (relative to 
when the imagined action was primed), it is unlikely that interference alone can account 
for all of the effects reported.  
In fact, the final and most plausible possibility is that the action cues in Chapter 2 
both facilitated and interfered with the generation of non-willed behaviour during 
imagery. Under this account, when participants’ mental imagery was compatible with 
the observed action, the visual input exerted an additional, facilitating effect on activity 
induced by imagery. That is, the summed activation of shared action effects brought the 
corresponding action closer to the threshold for execution. However, when mental 
imagery and the observed action were incompatible, the action effect codes activated by 
the visual movement competed and interfered with the action effect activated by 
imagery which, in turn, reduced the likelihood that either set of action effects will cross 
the threshold for execution. Certainly, it has been claimed that basal ganglia-prefrontal 
circuits can exert both an inhibitory and excitatory effect on action production (for 
review, see Calabresi, Picconi, Tozzi, Ghiglieri, & Di Filippo, 2014). Accordingly, the 
purpose of Experiment 4 is to examine the manner in which a confluence of endogenous 
(e.g. mental imagery) and exogenous (e.g. action observation) activation generates non-
willed action slips compared to a neutral baseline condition (which contains no 
movement element).  
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3.2. Experiment 4: Intention Insertion Task 2.0 – Finger Pressure as 
an Improved Behavioural Measure of Non-Willed Action Slips 
The general design of the intention insertion task used in Experiment 1-3 (Chapter 
2) provided an excellent starting point in the capture of action slips under laboratory 
conditions. However, the basic task was limited in at least two respects which are 
addressed in Experiment 4. The first limitation is that the presence/absence of a 
keypress on a given trial (i.e. a binary dependent variable) does not provide a great deal 
of detail about how the action slip occurred (e.g. the magnitude or timing of movement), 
merely that it did occur. This represented a convenient simplification because it 
operationalised what non-willed action slips represented in an intuitive way (i.e. 
whether a keypress did or did not occur, following a specific event). Nevertheless, as a 
behavioural measure in this context, not least given their relative scarcity, binary 
outcomes represent an information-poor choice of dependent variable.  
The second limitation emerges from the observation that, in Experiments 1-3 
(Chapter 2), participants were sometimes observed making small twitches at cue onset 
that were too minor to register as keypresses. The pressure required to fully depress a 
key on a computer keyboard represents an arbitrary threshold that was used to 
determine whether a movement had occurred. However, these subthreshold responses 
were essentially wasted data and are an important part of the picture. If the proposed 
summation of action effects was responsible for producing the action slips observed in 
Chapter 2, then all movement produced by participants in response to cues is relevant to 
this enquiry and should follow ideomotor principles. As a result, the intention insertion 
task was redesigned to function with a new response interface, abandoning the computer 
keyboard in favour of recording the pressure exerted by the participant’s fingers using 
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pressure sensors. The hardware served to precisely capture any and all movements made 
by each of the participant’s fingers, rather than simply record whether or not their 
movements have exceeded an arbitrary threshold (i.e. a keypress). As a consequence, in 
Experiment 4, action slips were operationalised as the magnitude of induced pressure 
following cue onset (i.e. a continuous variable). In addition, a number of significant 
improvements were made to allow for more nuanced predictions in this experiment and 
those which follow. 
In the new version of the intention insertion task, participants were again 
instructed to imagine performing imagined sequences of finger taps, one movement at a 
time. However, the pressure was recorded from both index fingers simultaneously. As a 
result, a new independent variable, Imagery-Finger Congruence, was created to identify 
the pressure values which corresponded with the finger that was congruent with the 
currently imagined movement, and which values corresponded with the alternative, 
incongruent finger. Contrasting the induced pressure recorded at the imagery-congruent 
and imagery-incongruent fingers in response to each kind of cue makes it possible to 
quantify the contribution that imagery makes to the size of the movement. 
By continuously recording finger pressure, rather than discrete keypresses, 
Experiment 4 addressed another limitation of the previous experiments. The keyboard-
based intention insertion task from Chapter 2 was unable to definitively rule out that 
participants were engaging in a covert movement strategy in which they lightly tapped 
their fingers on the keys as a non-imagery based means of rehearsing the movement 
sequence. Although the experiment recorded a very low proportion of key presses 
during non-cued beats, it was not possible to completely exclude this interpretation 
because, by definition, only responses that exceeded the keypress threshold were 
captured. Experiment 4, which relied on continuous pressure data, is much more 
effective at capturing the full range of responses produced by participants. If the action 
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slips captured by Experiment 4 arises from an interaction of imagery and movement 
observation, rather than simply a physical rehearsal strategy, then participants should 
produce much stronger presses with their imagery-congruent finger following cues than 
on non-cued beats.  
Further improvements were made to the trial structure by incorporating a phase in 
which participants were required to execute the briefly presented movement sequence. 
In Experiment 4, following the initial presentation of the finger tapping sequence, 
participants were required to perform the sequence for four beats (e.g. one complete 
repetition of the sequence), prior to the imagery phase of each trial. Instructing 
participants to physically rehearse the movement sequence, prior to imagery, was 
intended to enhance their ability to conjure a strong mental image of how these actions 
would look and feel in the subsequent imagery phase. In Chapter 2, some participants 
reported that they had struggled to build a strong mental image of the perceptual 
consequences of the required movements, so this feature provided a useful sensory 
reference for the feelings they were asked to simulate. In addition, asking participants to 
perform the sequence prior to imagery served to further emphasise task instructions, 
namely, when physical movements were permitted and when they were not (e.g. during 
imagery). Finally, unambiguous labels which explicitly highlighted the current task 
demands (e.g. “Watch”, “Perform” and “Imagine”) were added to the top of the screen 
during each phase of the experiment. Together, these changes should both enhance 
participants’ ability to engage in effective imagery and limit the extent to which they 
rely on covert movement during imagery as a means of rehearsing the sequences. 
Experiment 4 was principally concerned with dissociating facilitative and 
interference effects arising from the sudden onset of visual movement cues during 
imagery. It is possible to tease apart facilitative effects from interference effects on 
induced pressure by taking the responses that followed congruent and incongruent 
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action cues and comparing them to responses on neutral cue trials in which no 
movement occurred. Subtracting the pressure induced by a neutral cue from the pressure 
induced by an observed movement at the cue-congruent and cue-incongruent finger (i.e. 
the finger which matched/mismatched the observed movement) effectively controls for 
the effect of being confronted with a surprising visual cue. The remaining portion of the 
effect can only be attributed to the influence of the observed action. If action 
observation exerts an additional, facilitative effect on activity in action effect codes (i.e. 
beyond the effect of encountering an unexpected stimulus), then it should generate 
larger pressure spikes at the cue-congruent finger than neutral cues. In addition, if action 
observation can also interfere with the generation of action slips then smaller pressure 
spikes should be induced at the cue-incongruent finger than neutral cues. Finally, if 
endogenous activation of action effects via imagery is driving the initiation of non-
willed action slips, then the effects of action observation should be much stronger at the 




Forty participants took part in the experiment (31 female; 8 Left-handed; Age in 
years: M=20.5, SD=3.9), recruited from the Plymouth University’s paid participation 




3.2.1.2. Materials and Apparatus 
The experiment was conducted in a dark, soundproof room and was administered 
on a Windows 10 computer using custom hardware (see Figure 13), an Arduino 
Leonardo interface and displayed on a 19” LED computer monitor (Resolution: 
1900x1200; Refresh rate: 60Hz). Custom experimental software required to interface 
with the new hardware was adapted from the original E-Prime script used in the 
previous chapter by Plymouth University’s Tech Office.  
 
Figure 13. The custom hardware developed for the pressure-based version of the 
intention insertion task in Experiment 4. This interface consisted of a standard musical 
keyboard and two force-sensitive resistors, or “pressure pads” to record the pressure 
exerted by each of the participant’s fingers for the duration of the experiment. The keys 
facilitated a good range of movement and the spacing between the two active keys was 
similar to the keyboard-based intention insertion task used in Chapter 2.  
The new hardware consisted of two force-sensitive resistors, hereafter “pressure 
pads”, attached to two of the keys of a musical keyboard. The resistance of the pressure 
pads varied according to the force applied to the surface of the sensor and they were 
used to record the pressure applied by the participant’s fingers on the keys. The 
experimental software was programmed to record the pressure from each pressure pad 
at 20ms intervals (+/- 3ms due to sampling variability) for the duration of the 
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experiment. The keyboard itself was not functional, but merely facilitated a good range 
of motion and smooth action. Masking tape was placed over the unused keys to ensure 
participants were interacting with the keyboard correctly and consistently. Participants 
wore over-ear headphones and placed the tips of their left and right index fingers onto 
the pressure pads. The stimuli for this experiment corresponded exactly with those used 
in Experiment 3 (Chapter 2).  
 
3.2.1.3. Procedure 
Experiment 4 consisted of four blocks of 24 trials in which participants are 
presented with a series of finger tapping sequences which they are first asked to watch, 
then perform and finally imagine performing prior to the onset of the true imperative 
stimulus (“Go!”). Each trial had the same general structure with a slow, steady 
metronome beat (440Hz tone presented at 800ms interval) helping to guide the 
underlying pace of each trial. For the first four beats of every trial, participants were 
presented with an image of a pair of hands (egocentric perspective) with the word 
“Watch” written above them. At this stage, an arrow indicated a four-beat tapping 
sequence by pointing at the left and right index fingers of the virtual hands. During the 
watch phase, participants were merely required to observe and retain the implied 
sequence. After four beats, the instruction at the top of the screen changed to “Perform” 
and participants were instructed to press keys according to the sequence implied by the 
arrow and in time with the metronome beat. After one complete repetition of the 
sequence (i.e. four beats), the instruction changed to “Imagine”, and participants were 
required to rehearse the sequence in their minds by imagining that they were performing 
it in time with the beat, but without physically moving. This final imagery phase had a 
variable duration of 5-8 beats, after which the imperative stimulus – the word “Go!” – 
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was presented and the participant was required to execute the response they currently 
imagined. 
The crucial manipulation was that in 12 of the 24 trials in each block, unexpected 
visual cues appeared at the onset of one of the metronome beats (on either beat, 5-8). 
The visual cues consisted of a sudden yellow background change and either no 
movement (i.e. neutral cues) or an implied movement of the left or right index fingers 
moving downwards and back to a resting position (i.e. action cues). In other words, the 
action cues presented participants with what they would see if they actually carried out a 
finger tap themselves (i.e. the visual perceptual consequences). The visual cues were 
presented with a background colour change to yellow and a sharp “buzz” tone in place 
of the typical metronome beat to increase the salience of the event.  
Two sets of pressure values were recorded throughout the whole experiment 
which corresponded with the left and right index finger. The outcome variable was the 
finger pressure induced in the 800ms interval between metronome beats in each trial. 
For each observation, the two sets of pressure values were dummy coded to identify 
whether the value corresponds with the imagery-congruent and imagery-incongruent 
finger. Participants encountered 48 cues in total which were counterbalanced according 
to Cue-Finger Congruence (congruent/incongruent/neutral), Imagery-Finger 
Congruence (congruent/incongruent), trial length (5, 6, 7 and 8 beats) and cue 
placement in the sequence (1 or 2 beats prior to sequence end). 
Prior to the main task, participants were exposed to a short practice of up to 24 
control trials (e.g. no surprising visual cues) in which accuracy feedback was provided. 
Participants had to maintain at least 75% accuracy for a minimum of 8 trials in order to 
progress. Participants were given the opportunity to repeat the practice if required until 
they had become sufficiently proficient at tracking the sequences. In addition, 
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participants completed an acclimatisation task in which they had to maintain three 
different reference pressures for five seconds at a time. The pressure training task served 
to emphasise the sensitivity of the apparatus, participants’ awareness of their finger 
position and the instruction to avoid lightly tapping the keys. 
 
3.2.2. Results 
3.2.2.1. Exclusion Criteria 
As with Experiments 1-3 in Chapter 2, participant accuracy during control trials 
was used an index of task engagement. All participants successfully completed the 
practice task and understood the task requirements. In the main task, participants with 
accuracy rates below one standard deviation of the group mean (chance=50%; 
M=81.6%; SD=17.5%) were excluded from further analysis, leading to the removal of 7 
individuals (leaving N = 33).  
 
3.2.2.2. Data Preparation 
The resulting data were subjected to some pre-processing and organising steps 
which were intended to, (a) improve the signal-to-noise ratio; and (b) distil a dependent 
variable consisting of a single value for each 800ms interval which captured the 
magnitude of pressure exerted by each finger during this period. During each trial of the 
experiment, the pressure was sampled (i.e. recorded) at approximately 20ms intervals 
during each 800ms interval (equates to 40 samples per interval, +/- 3 due to sampling 
variability). Participants were instructed to rest each of their index fingers on the 
pressure pads for the duration of the experiment. However, the resting pressure of each 
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finger naturally varied slightly at the start of each 800ms interval. As a result, the 
pressure data was baselined by subtracting the mean pressure recorded at each finger in 
a 200ms window prior to beat onset (i.e. from the final 200ms of the preceding interval) 
from each sample following beat onset in the subsequent interval.  
In each of the forthcoming analyses, a pair of values were derived which 
represented the magnitude of induced pressure at each finger between the metronome 
beats of the imagery phase of every trial. Calculating the area under the curve (AUC) is 
an efficient means of capturing the magnitude of any pressure spikes that were captured. 
It was implemented using the trapezoid rule; a common numerical integration method 
which involves summing the area of a series of trapezoids of known number and width 
which fit inside the curve. 
One important consequence of simultaneously recording continuous pressure data 
from both fingers is that the coding scheme used to classify the visual cues in Chapter 2 
(Experiments 1-3) was no longer suitable. In Chapter 2, action cues were categorised 
according to their compatibility with the concurrently imagined movement, but 
Perception-Imagery Compatibility is very confusing when broken down by Imagery-
Finger Congruence. For example, compatible cues are expected to facilitate large 
movements of the imagery-congruent finger, whereas incompatible cues are expected to 
interfere and induce smaller pressure spikes. In contrast, the opposite prediction is made 
for the imagery-incongruent finger, such that incompatible cues (which visually prime 
the imagery-incongruent movement) should elicit the largest spikes in pressure. 
Furthermore, compatible cues (which visually prime the imagery-congruent movement) 
should interfere with the initiation of an imagery-incongruent response. In order to 
make inference and interpretation straightforward, participants’ fingers were classified 
as cue-congruent, cue-incongruent or neutral to the observed response following cue 
onset. This new variable is referred to as Cue-Finger Congruence. 
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3.2.2.3. Data Analysis 
In contrast to the action slips described in Chapter 2, the dependent variable 
represents a continuous measure of pressure induced at each finger, rather than a 
discrete binary outcome. These data were over-dispersed (i.e. the values occupied a 
wide numerical range) and zero-inflated (i.e. no pressure was recorded in a large 
number of intervals). As a result, these data were subjected to Bayesian Mixed Effects 
Regression using the BRMS package (Bürkner, 2017) which allowed a model to be 
specified which accurately accounted for the structure of the data. All subsequent 
models relied upon four chains of 3,500 iterations (1000 iteration burn-in) in length to 
converge on stable parameter estimates. Bayesian modelling requires the specification 
of prior knowledge about the distribution of likely values of subsequent parameter 
estimates. Weakly informative priors were specified based on recommendations of the 
package authors (Bürkner, 2017; Gelman, 2006). An additional term was added after 
inspecting model diagnostic plots to allow residual variance in the model to vary (in this 
case, increase) as the experiment progressed; this substantially improved model fit. 
Model fit was checked for convergence visually using trace plots and via the n-
effective and Rhat statistics; in all cases, convergence appeared to be satisfactory. To 
visualize and draw inferences from the results (e.g., to examine the effect of action cues 
relative on induced pressure), it is possible to make linear predictions from the posterior 
distribution of the model for each category, and across the full range of observed values 
of all other parameters. This approach provides samples from the posterior distribution 
of responses for each type of action cue and, by subtraction, the differences between cue 
types which are of interest.  
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To evaluate each prediction in the forthcoming analyses, data were simulated 
from the relevant model and used to calculate summary statistics (i.e. to indicate the 
effect size) and Bayes-p values (i.e. to indicate the strength of evidence in support of the 
predicted effect; Wagenmakers et al., 2018). The posterior mean and 95% posterior 
credible interval (PCI) for the differences of interest represents an estimate of the size of 
the effect under scrutiny (given the model and the data). Credible intervals in Bayesian 
statistics have a much more intuitive definition than confidence intervals in the 
frequentist tradition. For example, a 95% credible interval refers to the numerical range 
with a 95% probability of including the true value of a particular parameter of interest 
(e.g. the true effect size).  
The posterior predictive Bayes-p values associated with the forthcoming contrasts 
represent the probability (given the model and the data) that the effect was in the 
predicted direction (i.e. H1), as opposed to the opposite direction (i.e. H0). To aid 
interpretation, Bayes-p values are recapitulated as evidence ratios (ER; analogous with 
Bayes factors) to describe the strength of evidence in favour of the directed hypothesis, 
weighted against the alternative hypothesis. For consistency, the weight of evidence in 
support of each directed hypothesis was described using terminology regularly applied 
to Bayes factors (Wagenmakers et al., 2018); “extremely strong” (ER: >100), “very 
strong” (ER: 30-100), “strong” (ER: 10 - 30), “moderate” (ER: 3 - 10), “anecdotal” 
(ER: >1 – 3) and “no evidence” (ER: 1). Importantly, evidence ratios less than one 
indicate that the evidence supports the alternative hypothesis; even more so for values 
which are a tiny fraction of one. For example, an ER < .01 represents extremely strong 
evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis. 
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3.2.2.4. Analysis of Cued and Non-Cued Beats 
The purpose of the first analysis step was to evaluate the evidence that the 
pressure induced by the visual cues was largely driven by participants engaging in a 
physical rehearsal strategy (i.e. rather than purely imagery) in order to track the finger 
tapping sequences. The model outcome was finger pressure (AUC) in the 800ms 
interval between each metronome beat of the imagination phase of every trial. Finger 
pressure was recorded from both the left and right index fingers during both cued (i.e. 
48 cued observations) and non-cued beats (i.e. 264 non-cued observations). One 
predictor, Imagery-Finger Congruence, coded each observation according to whether 
the finger being recorded at that moment matched the participants’ imagined movement 
(i.e. imagery-congruent), according to the learned sequence, or mismatched the 
imagined movement (e.g. imagery-incongruent). A second predictor, Cue Presence, 
coded each observation according to whether a surprising visual cue was presented at 
the start of the critical interval or whether no cue was present. A third predictor, 
Experimental Block, coded each observation according to the block of trials in which it 
was made (i.e. numbered one to four). For cued and non-cued intervals finger pressure 
was analysed with a model which specified fixed effects of Imagery-Finger 
Congruence, Cue Presence, Experimental Block, and all interactions between these 
terms. In addition, Cue Presence, Imagery-Finger Congruence and the interaction 
between these variables were allowed to vary within and between participants. For 
clarity, the predictors of interest are capitalised when they are referred to in the text. 
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Figure 14. A multi-panel plot showing finger pressure in the critical 800ms interval 
following the onset of the onset of a typical metronome beat or the onset of a salient 
visual cue in Experiment 4. The top and bottom panels separate responses from fingers 
which matched (i.e. imagery-congruent) or did not match (i.e. imagery-incongruent) the 
imagined response. The coloured lines indicate whether the cue was present (i.e. red) or 
not (i.e. blue) at the start of the 800ms interval.  
Figure 14 shows the induced pressure that was recorded in the 800ms interval 
between metronome beats according to whether or not a cue was presented at beat onset 
and whether the finger being recorded matched (i.e. imagery-congruent) or mismatched 
(i.e. imagery-incongruent) the participants’ currently imagined movement. Importantly, 
the size of the finger presses captured by Experiment 4 appears to vary considerably 
with respect to Cue Presence and Imagery-Finger Congruence. When the recorded 
finger was congruent with participants’ mental imagery (Figure 14, top panel) it appears 
that finger pressure was similar for both cued and non-cued beats in the 250ms period 
post-beat-onset. However, visual inspection suggests that the onset of visual cues 
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(indicated by the red line) induced a substantial spike in finger pressure, which began at 
approximately 250ms and peaked at 400ms. In contrast, when no cues were present 
(indicated by the blue line), finger pressure showed the opposite pattern and steadily 
decreased in the same time period. When the recorded finger was incongruent with 
participants’ mental imagery (Figure 14, bottom panel), finger pressure following cued 
and non-cued beats showed a similar pattern to the imagery-congruent responses, 
although the absolute size of the press appeared to be much smaller. 
In order to gauge the strength of evidence for these observations, data were 
simulated from the model and summary statistics, Bayes-p values and evidence ratios 
regarding the differences of interest were calculated. It was predicted that if the visual 
cues were responsible for driving the action slips captured by Experiment 4, rather than 
a more trivial covert movement account, then participants should have produced much 
larger responses when cues were present than when they were absent. It was anticipated 
that participants should press much harder with their imagery-congruent, than the 
imagery-incongruent finger and, importantly, this difference should be greater following 
cues than on non-cued beats (i.e. Cue Presence and Imagery-Finger Congruence should 
interact). Importantly, for brevity and to safeguard against false positives due to 
multiple testing (Cramer et al., 2016), this analysis focused only on the comparisons 
that capture this latter prediction, namely the two-way interaction of Cue Presence and 
Imagery-Finger Congruence. A test of this interaction revealed that there is extremely 
strong evidence (ER < 999) in favour of the prediction that imagery-congruent 
responses were much stronger than imagery-incongruent responses following cued beats 
relative to non-cued beats (Posterior Mean = 6.5, 95% PCI [4.26, 8.79], Bayes-p > 
.999). In other words, this finding indicates that the presence of visual cues was 
associated with much more substantial presses at the participants imagined finger, than 
their non-imagined finger, relative to when no cues were present. This finding argues 
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against covert movement as a viable explanation for the action slips captured by 
Experiment 4, replicating the findings of Experiments 1-3 (Chapter 2) 
 
3.2.2.5. Analysis of Cued Beats 
This analysis modelled the pressure induced with each finger when participants 
were presented with different types of action cues during imagery. In addition, pressure 
induced following action cues was contrasted with responses to neutral cues (i.e. no 
movement element) to control for the effects of encountering salient visual stimuli 
during imagery. Following the findings of Chapter 2 (Experiments 1-3), it was 
anticipated that induced pressure would be greater when the recorded finger (e.g. left 
index) matched the observed movement (e.g. virtual left movement) than when it 
mismatched (e.g. virtual right movement). This is the intention insertion effect. Further, 
if pressure is caused by the summation of action effect codes activated by perception 
and imagery, the difference in induced pressure between by congruent and incongruent 
observation should be greater on the finger (e.g. left index) that is currently imagined 
moving (e.g. imagined left index press) than on the finger that is imagined not moving 
(e.g. imagined right index press).  
The model outcome was finger pressure (AUC) in the 800ms critical intervals 
after visual cues were presented. Finger pressure was recorded from both the left and 
right index fingers in each of the 48 cued intervals. One predictor encoded each 
observation according to whether the finger being recorded at that moment was 
congruent or incongruent with the finger the participant was imagining moving 
(Imagery-Finger Congruence). A second predictor encoded whether the visual cue was 
congruent with the currently recorded finger, whether it was incongruent with the 
currently recorded finger, or whether a neutral, no-movement cue was presented (Cue-
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Finger Congruence). The model also included Experimental Block (1 to 4) and Cue 
Order (1 to 48), along with a full set of interactions between these predictors. In 
addition, Imagery-Finger Congruence, Cue-Finger Congruence, Cue Order and all 
interactions were allowed to vary within-participants.  
 
Figure 15. A multi-panel plot showing finger pressure in the critical 800ms interval 
following the onset of the onset of each type of visual cue in Experiment 4. The top and 
bottom panels separate responses from fingers which did or did not match the imagined 
response. The coloured lines indicate whether the cue contained no movement (i.e. 
neutral – blue), or if it included an animation of the same (i.e. congruent – red)/other 
finger (i.e. incongruent – green) from that being recorded. 
Figure 15 shows the pressure induced in the critical 800ms period which followed 
the onset of visual cues with respect to Cue-Finger Congruence and Imagery-Finger 
Congruence. Visual inspection suggests that the pressure induced following visual cues 
was much higher if participants already imagined a movement of the recorded finger. 
Furthermore, the pressure induced by the visual stimuli appears to vary substantially 
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according to whether the cue was neutral (i.e. no movement, blue line) or contained a 
movement which was congruent (red line) or incongruent (green line) with the finger 
producing the response. 
 
Figure 16. A multi-panel plot showing differences in pressure (AUC) during intervals 
when the recorded finger was either congruent or incongruent with respect to the 
observed movement vs. a neutral cue in Experiment 4. Positive scores indicate 
participants pressed harder than in equivalent trials where a neutral cue was presented 
(i.e. implying facilitation). Negative scores indicate that participants pressed less hard 
than following neutral cues (i.e. implying interference). The top and bottom panels 
distinguish responses where the participant was/was not also required to imagine a 
movement in the recorded finger. Error bars are the 95% PCI. 
In order to derive a summary measure of induced pressure, the area under the 
curve (AUC) was calculated for individual observations within each condition and fitted 
values from the model were plotted in Figure 16. Figure 16 shows how much pressure 
was induced when the recorded finger was either congruent or incongruent with an 
observed movement, as compared with pressure after a neutral cue (i.e. no movement, 
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baseline condition). In this model, the magnitude of the intention insertion effect was 
indexed by contrasting the baseline pressure (i.e. after subtracting neutral responses) 
induced when the participant’s finger matched the observed movement (i.e. cue-
congruent) with the pressure induced when the finger mismatched the observed 
movement (i.e. cue-incongruent). Furthermore, the intention insertion effect was 
derived separately for instances in which the recorded finger corresponded with the 
participant’s currently imagined movement (i.e. imagery-congruent) and when it 
corresponded with the alternative, non-imagined movement (i.e. imagery-incongruent). 
Importantly, the magnitude of the difference between cue-congruent and cue-
incongruent responses corresponds with the magnitude of the intention insertion effect. 
For example, Figure 16 (top panel) indicates that action cues induced much stronger 
presses at the cue-congruent finger than the cue-incongruent finger when participants 
also imagined a movement of the currently recorded finger. In contrast, Figure 16 
(bottom panel) indicates that when the recorded finger was incongruent with 
participants’ mental imagery, the action cues did not strongly influence the magnitude 
of cue-congruent or cue-incongruent responses. That is, there does not appear to be a 
strong intention insertion effect with incongruent mental imagery. 
As in the previous analysis, to gauge the strength of evidence for these 
observations, data were simulated from the model and summary statistics, Bayes-p 
values and evidence ratios regarding the differences of interest were calculated. 
Following the findings of Chapter 2 (Experiments 1-3), it was predicted that the 
intention insertion effect should be greater when the recorded finger matched the 
participant’s imagined movement (i.e. imagery-congruent) than when it mismatched 
(i.e. imagery-incongruent). As before, this analysis focused only on the comparisons 
that capture these predictions, namely the two-way interaction of Cue-Finger 
Congruence, Imagery-Finger Congruence and corresponding pairwise comparisons. A 
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test of the overall interaction revealed very strong evidence (ER = 65.7) that the overall 
intention insertion effect was strongest when the finger being recorded was congruent, 
rather than incongruent, with the participants currently imagined movement, as 
predicted (Posterior Mean = 4.49, 95% PCI [.48, 8.55], Bayes-p = .985).  
The next step was to evaluate the two-way interaction between Cue-Finger 
Congruence and Imagery-Finger Congruence with a series of step down tests. As 
expected, the analysis of the finger which participants currently imagined moving 
(Figure 16, top panel) revealed extremely strong evidence (ER = 499) of a substantial 
intention insertion effect (Posterior Mean = 4.1, 95% PCI [1.29, 6.97], Bayes-p = .998). 
It was anticipated that, with congruent imagery, presentation of action cues should 
induce stronger presses at the finger which matched the observed movement (i.e. cue- 
congruent) than when a similarly salient, but motorically neutral cue was presented. 
Accordingly, there was strong evidence (ER = 19.8) that action cues facilitated, rather 
than interfered with, finger presses at the participant’s corresponding finger (i.e. cue-
congruent) than when neutral (i.e. no movement) cues were presented (Posterior Mean 
= 2.38, 95% PCI [.38, 5.18], Bayes-p = .952). It was also predicted that action cues 
should induce weaker presses (i.e. interfere) with the finger which mismatched the 
observed movement (i.e. cue-incongruent), relative to neutral. Consistent with that 
hypothesis, there was moderate evidence (ER = 7.85) that action cues interfered with, 
rather than facilitated, participants responses at the non-corresponding finger (i.e. cue-
incongruent) relative to neutral stimuli (Posterior Mean = -1.73, 95% PCI [-4.53, 1.09], 
Bayes-p = .887). Taken together, these results suggest that, on the finger that 
participants currently imagined moving, action cues both facilitated and interfered with 
participant’s responses depending upon the compatibility between the observed 
movement and the recorded finger.  
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The analysis of the finger which participants were not currently imagining moving 
(Figure 16, bottom panel) provided only anecdotal evidence (ER = .66) that action cues 
modulated finger pressure induced at the participants corresponding and non-
corresponding finger (Posterior Mean = .39, 95% PCI [-3.31, 2.48], Bayes-p = .399). 
Interestingly, the evidence ratio (i.e. less than one) implies that there is slightly more 
evidence for the alternative hypothesis, that cue-incompatible responses were stronger 
than cue-compatible responses. However, it must be emphasised that both the strength 
of evidence (i.e. evidence ratio) and effect size (i.e. posterior mean) of this apparent 
“reversal” of the intention insertion effect, are very small. Indeed, tests of the individual 
components of the intention insertion effect revealed anecdotal evidence (ER = 3) that 
action cues facilitated larger presses with the participants corresponding (i.e. cue-
compatible) finger than neutral (Posterior Mean = .97, 95% PCI [-1.81, 3.82], Bayes-p = 
.75). Furthermore, there was moderate evidence (ER = .21) in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis, that action cues facilitated stronger presses with the participants non-
corresponding (i.e. cue-compatible) finger than neutral (Posterior Mean = 1.36, 95% 
PCI [-1.49, 4.18], Bayes-p = .172). In other words, these results suggest that finger 
pressure did not vary substantially according to the compatibility of the observed 
movement and the finger of response when it was also incompatible with the 
participant’s mental imagery. Instead, action cues had a small and broadly facilitating 
effect on responses which were incompatible with participants’ imagined movement. 
 
3.2.3. Discussion 
The purpose of Chapter 3 was to develop a more sensitive behavioural measure of 
participants’ movements which captured how participants responded, not simply 
whether or not they did, as in the keyboard-based intention insertion task (Chapter 2, 
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Experiments 1-3). Chapter 2 provided evidence that the presentation of action cues 
during a mental imagery task caused participants to produce action slips at a rate 
determined by the similarity of the observed and imagined acts. However, the keyboard-
based intention insertion task (Chapter 2, Experiments 1-3) relied on a rather coarse 
behavioural measure (i.e. binary keypress) and lacked an appropriate baseline condition. 
Therefore, the previous design was insufficient to determine whether action observation 
primarily supports or detracts from the generation of non-willed action slips following 
the onset of an unexpected, salient stimulus.  
Experiment 4 aimed to both replicate the findings of the earlier experiments 
(Chapter 2) using a continuous behavioural measure (i.e. finger pressure) and to 
incorporate a neutral, no-movement condition. More specifically, the neutral condition 
aimed to distinguish between facilitative and interference effects in the interaction of 
movement observation and mental imagery on participants behaviour (i.e. the intention 
insertion effect). Importantly, Experiment 4 successfully captured action slips and 
replicated the compatibility effect reported in Chapter 2 (Experiments 1-3), despite 
using a very different and more sensitive procedure. At a basic level, the presentation of 
action cues during imagery induced larger finger presses than when no cues were 
present. In addition, the magnitude of the pressure spikes reflected the similarity 
between the observed and imagined movements, replicating the findings of Experiments 
1-3 (Chapter 2). Extending the findings of Chapter 2, Experiment 4 also provided 
evidence that, with compatible imagery, the action cues induced additional activity in 
the action effect codes supporting the corresponding behaviour. Action cues enhanced 
motor activation when compatible with imagery (i.e. summation of the two sources of 
activation) and detracted from motor activation when incompatible with imagery (i.e. 
competition between the two sources of activation). 
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Experiment 4 was principally concerned with testing whether the action cues in 
the intention insertion task primarily facilitate, or interfere with, the action slips 
generated by the intention insertion task. The data revealed that that the overall 
difference between the induced pressure at the cue-congruent and cue-incongruent 
fingers (i.e. the intention insertion effect) was strongest when the finger being recorded 
matched the participants’ imagined movement, as predicted. Importantly, Experiment 4 
demonstrated that, with respect to the finger that participants currently imagined 
moving, action cues (e.g. a left movement) induced larger presses at the corresponding 
finger (e.g. left index finger) than responses to neutral cues. The suggests that the 
movement component of the action cues elicited additional activity in the action effects 
shared with the corresponding behaviour, over and above activity induced by merely 
encountering a surprising stimulus when combined with congruent mental imagery. 
This finding strongly contrasts with research which claimed that all visuomotor priming 
effects are the result of interference (e.g. Ramsey et al., 2010), and clearly demonstrates 
that, with congruent imagery, action cues exerted an additive (i.e. facilitating) effect on 
the participants’ corresponding behaviour, as predicted. 
Furthermore, Experiment 4 showed that observation of a downward finger 
movement induced smaller presses with the cue-incongruent finger, relative to a neutral, 
on the finger that participants currently imagined moving. This suggests that action cues 
also interfered with the generation of non-willed action slips. This apparent interference 
effect could be taken as evidence of competition between rival sets of action effect 
codes induced in a top-down manner by imagery and a bottom-up manner by the action 
cues. On this view, the endogenous and exogenous sources of activation interfered with 
one another and caused a reduction in the summed activity of the action effects which 
corresponded with the imagery-congruent finger, resulting in a weaker overt movement 
than elicited by neutral cues. Taken together, these findings suggest that the spatial 
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component of the action cues (i.e. the laterality of the observed movement) is an 
important driver of the intention insertion effect. Moreover, these findings are consistent 
with the prediction, motivated by ideomotor theory, that an observed movement can 
elicit additional activity in the specific action effect codes which serve the 
corresponding movement (i.e. in addition to activity induced by endogenous imagery). 
Following the findings of Experiments 1-3 (Chapter 2), it was predicted that the 
action cues would have minimal effect on pressure at the finger that participants were 
currently not imagining moving. This was predicted on the basis that any activation of 
imagery-incongruent response would be strongly inhibited by imagined movement of 
the alternative finger. Consistent with this prediction, the data provided no evidence of 
an intention insertion effect when the recorded finger was also imagery-incongruent 
and, instead, showed that action cues exerted only a general and weakly facilitating 
effect induced pressure. This finding implies that the tendency for visual input (i.e. an 
observed movement) to induce the corresponding behaviour depends upon prior 
activation of the relevant action effect via endogenous (i.e. top-down) imagery.  
Two lines of evidence support this interpretation. First, when endogenous imagery 
was focussed on the alternative action (i.e. not the currently recorded finger), the 
pressure induced by action cues was only slightly stronger than the pressure induced by 
neutral cues. Second, when the recorded finger corresponded with participants imagined 
movement (i.e. imagery-congruent) but was incongruent with the observed movement 
(i.e. cue-incongruent), finger presses were only attenuated, rather than eliminated. This 
finding indicates that activity induced by imagery was able to overcome a rival set of 
action effect codes (e.g. activated via action observation) which served the alternative 
finger movement.  
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Taken together, these results suggest that imagery and perceptual input (i.e. action 
observation) do not simply have an additive effect on the activation of the 
corresponding behaviour. Instead, the effect appears to be super-additive (i.e. imagery 
and perceptual input interact). This is because finger pressure was only induced if both 
endogenous imagery and exogenous perceptual input drove the activation of shared 
action effects close to (or, indeed, over) the motor threshold, as predicted by threshold 
models based on an integration-to-bounds mechanism (e.g. Churchland, Kiani, & 
Shadlen, 2008; Schurger, Mylopoulos, & Rosenthal, 2016). Importantly, the results also 
demonstrate that action observation can both facilitate and, to a slightly lesser extent, 
interfere with the generation of action slips in combination with mental imagery. They 
are therefore in line with the assumption (see Chapter 1 and 2) that the evidence 
accumulated by such a mechanism may reflect precisely the activation of the action’s 
intended consequence (i.e. action effects), as suggested by ideomotor models. 
In the introduction, it was suggested that participants may be prone to lightly 
tapping their fingers on the keys instead of using mental imagery as a means of 
rehearsing the movement sequence. With the previous design (Chapter 2, Experiments 
1-3), the binary keypress variable gave the impression that when no response was 
registered the participant had not moved. In fact, at the onset of a surprising cue, 
participants may have already been exerting significant pressure on the key under the 
imagery-congruent finger. As a result, it was predicted that if the action cues, rather 
than a physical rehearsal strategy, were driving the effect, the participants should press 
much harder with their imagined finger than their non-imagined finger following cued 
than non-cued beats. The data were entirely consistent with this prediction and provided 
extremely strong evidence that participants imagined responses were more than six 
times larger than presses captured following cued than non-cued beats. This finding 
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argues against participants’ use of a physical rehearsal strategy as a viable explanation 
for the intention insertion effect observed in Experiment 4.  
 
3.3. Conclusion 
In conclusion, Experiment 4 replicated and extended the findings of Chapter 2 
(Experiments 1-3) by demonstrating a robust compatibility effect with a more sensitive 
continuous behavioural measure. Importantly, Experiment 4 demonstrated that action 
cues presented during imagery can elicit additional activity in action effect 
representations, facilitating the activation of the corresponding behaviour (i.e. when 
imagery and perception converge on a common set of action effect codes) and 
interfering with the activation of the non-corresponding behaviour (i.e. when imagery 
and perception activate different action effect codes). In other words, the findings 
provide direct evidence that perceptual input can induce additional activity in action 
effect codes and drive the corresponding overt behaviour, rather than simply detracting 
from action effects evoked by endogenous processes. In addition, they provide evidence 
for a super-additive effect of imagery and observation on motor output: actions are only 
initiated when both endogenous imagery and exogenous perceptual input activate the 
corresponding action effect representation. 
More broadly, the findings provide a useful insight into how people manage to 
interact with the world around them with considerable automaticity. Bottom-up 
perceptual input can trigger specific, strongly associated responses by driving activity in 
action effects, but only if these are simultaneously activated by endogenous processes. 
This also explains why sometimes, salient cues in the environment are able to elicit 
behaviour which might be contextually inappropriate, but that is broadly compatible 
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with one’s goals. For example, a loud whistle of a boiling kettle might compel a person 
to pour its contents into a waiting mug, even if they had planned to wash it first. 
At this stage, one interesting observation is that Experiments 1-4 have relied on 
the same basic stimuli; a set of white, male hands presented from an egocentric point of 
view. The stimuli were designed to closely correspond with how participants would 
visualise their fingers moving. The rationale was that when a participant imagined and 
observed an action from the same visual perspective, the confluence of activity would 
be focussed on a very similar set of action effects. However, the implicit assumption 
that increasing the correspondence between the participant’s own hands and the virtual 
hands should enhance the intention insertion effect presents a problem for a 
straightforward interpretation of these data. If action observation and imagery rely on 
the same set of action effects, why doesn’t the observation of one’s own movements 
automatically trigger the corresponding behaviour, as implied by the intention insertion 
task? One possibility is that visual input which corresponds with our own actions is 
treated very differently to visual input which corresponds with another’s actions and 
does not have the same capacity to engage the motor system. In order to test address this 
question, Chapter 4 (Experiments 5 and 6) combined a virtual hand illusion (related to 
the classical rubber hand illusion; Ma & Hommel, 2015) with the same pressure-based 







4. Chapter 4: Why don’t we self-imitate? Current and Goal States 
in Sensorimotor Processing 
4.1. Introduction 
Chapter 3 replicated and extended the findings of Chapter 2 by demonstrating that 
observation of a finger movement elicits stronger presses with one’s corresponding, 
rather than the non-corresponding finger. Importantly, this compatibility effect (or 
“intention insertion effect”) was strongest – or was only observed – when the visually 
depicted movement also matched the participant’s imagined response. Experiments 1-4 
therefore provided strong evidence that the activation of an action’s perceptual 
consequences, by endogenous (e.g. mental imagery) and exogenous means (e.g. an 
observed action), induces activity in the motor system in accordance with ideomotor 
principles.  
It has been argued that observed and imagined actions can drive behaviour 
because direct associations between visual (i.e. sensory) representations and the 
corresponding motor representations are formed through the repeated, correlated 
experience of observing and executing one’s own actions (Heyes, Bird, Johnson, & 
Haggard, 2005; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Prinz, 1990; for 
review, see Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010). In this way, both observed and imagined 
actions can effectively act as goal states for the motor system, triggering behaviour 
directly given a sufficiently strong association. However, if action observation and 
action initiation involve the same sensorimotor representation then why, when we 
observe our own behaviour, doesn’t this process continue to drive the motor system, 
resulting in an endless positive feedback loop of repetitive imitative behaviour? The 
purpose of Chapter 4 is to combine the intention insertion task with a body ownership 
illusion (Experiments 5 and 6) in order to address this question. 
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In order to account for the distinct lack of self-imitation in everyday life, it is 
useful to consider how this observation could be accommodated by modern extensions 
of ideomotor theory with a specific focus on the computational principles that support 
voluntary action control (e.g. Theory of Event Coding, Hommel, 2009; Inverse/Forward 
Models, Wolpert, 1997; Active Inference, Adams et al., 2013). These models (hereafter, 
collectively referred to as “ideomotor models”) make two related, but often implicit, 
assumptions which could explain why observation of one’s own behaviour does not 
appear to engage the motor system in the same way as observation of another person’s 
actions. First, these models assume that sensorimotor processes make use of two, 
relatively independent, types of representation. One type of representation captures the 
current state of the sensorimotor system, and another describes a predicted – or 
intended – future goal state of the sensorimotor system. Second, goals are translated 
into action when the comparison between one’s current state and an activated goal state 
representation reveals a strong discrepancy which can be resolved by engaging the 
motor system (Hommel, 2009). In this conceptualisation, the role of the motor system is 
to resolve discrepancies between sensorimotor representations by affecting bodily 
transitions from the estimated current state towards target goal states.  
Intuitively, the notion that actions are triggered when sensorimotor processes 
signal a discrepancy between the current state and an activated goal state corresponds 
nicely with the findings of the intention insertion task (Chapter 3, Experiment 4). 
Participants were instructed to imagine a sequence of finger movements while 
refraining from physical movement. In ideomotor terms, the imagery phase of each trial 
required participants to activate the relevant sets of action effect codes in order to build 
a vivid mental image (i.e. sensorimotor goal state) of the simulated sensory effects one 
would anticipate if each action in the sequence was actually executed. At the same time, 
participants were required to monitor their current state representation (informed by 
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visual and proprioceptive feedback) in order to ensure that the goal (i.e. the imagined 
finger movement) was not inadvertently triggered. At the moment of cue onset, the 
visual stimulus (i.e. observed finger movement) induced additional activity in the action 
effect codes that were shared with the goal state representation (already activated via 
imagery). As a result, the heightened activation of the goal state representation signalled 
a strong discrepancy with the current state, which was resolved by executing a 
downward finger movement in accordance with the observed movement. In other 
words, the sensorimotor system resolved the discrepancy between the two sensorimotor 
representations by initiating a transition from the current state towards the target goal 
state.  
Ideomotor models suggest that people are not prone to self-imitation because the 
visual input that corresponds with the observation of one’s own behaviour, by 
definition, describes the current state of the sensorimotor system (e.g. limb position). 
Visual information which corresponds with one’s own body will, therefore, be 
integrated with the current state representation, rather than treated as a potential goal 
state. As a result, the comparator mechanism will no longer need to resolve any 
discrepancy between sensorimotor representations (i.e. there will be no sufficiently 
activated goal state) and the motor system will not be engaged. In contrast, when one 
voluntarily evokes (i.e. imagines) a goal state or when one observes the actions of 
another person, the same visual representation will not provide information relevant to 
the current state representation and instead will be treated as a candidate goal state with 
the capacity to engage the motor system because it differs from the current state.  
Taken together, these assumptions predict that observing one’s own actions will 
not engage the motor system in the same way as observing another’s actions, even if the 
visual input is identical. Experiments 5 and 6 of the present chapter aim to test this 
prediction by incorporating a body ownership illusion into a new version of the 
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intention insertion task (Chapter 3, Experiment 4) and examining the performance of 
participants relative to a control group without the illusion.  
Experiment 5 directly tests the hypothesis that, if an unexpected virtual movement 
in the intention insertion task is perceived (due to an illusion of ownership) to have been 
caused by oneself then the intention insertion effect should be reduced, relative to a 
control group without the illusion. Suggestive evidence in support of this prediction 
comes from a study by Schütz-Bosbach, Mancini, Aglioti, and Haggard (2006) which 
combined a classical rubber hand illusion with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) 
to measure corticospinal excitability (an indicator of motor activation) during action 
observation. The study found that observing the actions of a rubber hand that was not 
attributed to one’s body increased corticospinal excitability, suggesting an increase in 
motor activity and mirroring of the observed action. In contrast, this effect disappeared 
when the movements of the artificial limb were illusorily attributed to oneself. While 
the authors linked this effect to the motor system being able to distinguish self from 
other, it is also entirely consistent with the current state/goal state comparison implicitly 
assumed by ideomotor models. When the visual representation of the observed rubber 
hand movement was integrated with the current state, rather than activating the 
corresponding goal state, sensorimotor processes no longer detected conflict and the 
motor system was not engaged.  
 
4.2. Experiment 5: The Effect of a Body Ownership Illusion on the 
Generation of Non-willed Action Slips 
In order to test the predictions motivated by the ideomotor model, the intention 
insertion task developed in Chapter 3 (Experiment 4) was modified to incorporate a 
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body ownership illusion with respect to the virtual hands. The classical rubber hand 
illusion (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) demonstrates that one’s current state representation 
shows a considerable degree of plasticity and can be readily disrupted. In a typical 
experimental setup, participants observe a brush stroke a rubber hand while receiving 
identical tactile stimulation to their own unseen hand. When the experimenter strokes 
both the rubber hand and the participant's hand at the same time (i.e. in synchrony) it 
can result in the illusory perception that the artificial limb is part of the body. In 
contrast, asynchronous tactile stimulation does not cause an illusory feeling of 
ownership over the rubber hand. It was suggested that the illusion occurs because the 
sensory feedback driven by visual stimulation is tightly correlated with tactile and 
proprioceptive signals. This process is commonly referred to as intermodal matching 
and it has been proposed to reflect the mechanism by which people are able to generate 
a coherent representation of the current state of their sensorimotor system (Armel & 
Ramachandran, 2003; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). Recently, the classical paradigm has 
been extended to demonstrate that people develop similar illusory feelings of ownership 
with respect to a virtual hand that moves in synchrony with their own (Ma & Hommel, 
2015b) and even controllable non-corporeal objects such as a balloon which changes in 
size or a geometric shape which changes in colour (Ma & Hommel, 2015a). For the 
present purposes, a virtual hand illusion provided a convenient means to enhance 
participant’s feelings of ownership with respect to the virtual hands in Experiment 5.  
To illustrate how the illusion was incorporated, recall two important elements of 
Experiment 4 (Chapter 3). First, participants completed a brief “pressure training task” 
prior to beginning the intention insertion task. The pressure training task required 
participants to press the keys and maintain a series of reference pressures for five 
seconds at a time in order to become acquainted with the equipment. Second, following 
the initial presentation of the finger tapping sequence (e.g. “watch phase”), participants 
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were required to perform the sequence for four beats (e.g. one complete repetition of the 
sequence), prior to the imagery phase of each trial. In Experiment 5, the pressure 
training task and performance phase (during which movement was permitted) were 
altered so that participant’s keypresses either triggered movements of the corresponding 
virtual finger or had no effect on the virtual fingers. According to Ma and Hommel 
(2015b), repeated exposure to a set of virtual hands which move in synchrony with 
one’s own is sufficient to induce a feeling of illusory body ownership. In Experiment 5, 
participants were assigned to one of two groups; a heightened ownership group, who 
completed the intention insertion task with an ownership illusion, or a control group, 
without the illusion. Importantly, the virtual fingers only moved in response to 
participants’ own presses during an acclimatisation task at the beginning of each block 
(i.e. the pressure training exercise, as in Experiment 4, Chapter 3) and at the beginning 
of each trial when participants were asked to physically execute the sequence (i.e. the 
“Perform” phase, as in Experiment 4, Chapter 3). That is, the virtual fingers did not 
respond to participants’ movements during the imagery phase of each trial. This ensured 
that stimulus presentation (e.g. the surprising visual cues) and the conditions which 
immediately preceded it, were identical in both groups. 
There is some debate in the literature concerning body ownership illusions about 
the extent to which the effect is influenced by the perceptual similarity of the artificial 
effector and the participants’ own limbs (e.g. Tsakiris, Carpenter, James, & Fotopoulou, 
2010, or for an opposing view, Ma & Hommel, 2015b). In order to sidestep this 
problem, a new stimulus set was created in which the virtual hands wore blue gloves 
and the arms were covered with long white sleeves. These stimuli were designed to be 
neutral with respect to participants own hands by removing skin tone and gender cues. 
This change aims to minimise any unintended influence of perceptual similarity on the 
strength of the body ownership illusion. In addition, in Experiment 5, the pressure 
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training task was repeated prior to each of the four experimental blocks for two reasons. 
First, the task served to emphasise task instructions and ensured participants returned 
both fingers to a neutral resting position prior to starting each new block. Second, it 
presented more opportunities for participants in the heightened ownership condition to 
form a strong association between their keypresses and the movements of the virtual 
hands.  
If Experiment 5 demonstrates that the ownership illusion modulates whether 
combined imagery and action observation drives the motor system, then this finding 
would also help distinguish the ideomotor explanation of the effects in Chapter 3 from 
competing explanations. These competing predictions are motivated by research which 
specifically aims to account for the influence of movement observation on overt 
behaviour, Associative Sequence Learning (ASL, Heyes & Bird, 2008; Heyes & Ray, 
2000). ASL assumes that visual (i.e. sensory) representations of one’s own actions form 
direct links with the motor commands required to generate them, via Hebbian learning. 
As soon as an action is observed, it can therefore – via the established links – directly 
elicit the associated motor commands and give rise to involuntary behaviour. 
Importantly, unlike ideomotor models, the links between sensory and motor 
representations are not mediated by higher level representations, of current and goal 
states. As a result, if the translation of visual input into motor output simply relies on 
general associative mechanisms, the proposed ownership illusion should not reduce the 
intention insertion effect. 
In fact, it is conceivable that the intention insertion effect may even be enhanced 
by the ownership illusion. In ASL, associations are formed whenever our actions 
reliably cause perceptual effects (see “response-effect compatibility”; Keller & Koch, 
2006; Kunde, Koch, & Hoffmann, 2004). The ownership illusion itself creates a 
situation in which one’s own actions (a finger press) creates such a reliable consequence 
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(an observed keypress on the screen) that it should therefore strengthen the association 
between the participant's keypress (i.e. response) and the corresponding movement of 
the virtual hand (i.e. effect). If participants’ responses reflect such visuomotor 
association, then the body ownership training should, if anything, heighten the extent to 
which the visual representation activates the motor representation. As a consequence, 
the body ownership illusion should then actually enhance – not reduce - the intention 




85 participants were tested, all of whom were female (72 Right-handed; Age in 
years: M=23.6, SD=5.3). The sample was comprised of both undergraduate psychology 
students from the University of Plymouth (course requirement) and members of the 
university’s paid participation pool (remunerated £8). 
 
4.2.1.2. Materials 
The experimental hardware was identical to Experiment 4 (Chapter 3) and the 
software was lightly modified to allow participants in the heightened ownership 
condition to control the virtual fingers. A new stimulus set (Figure 17) was created in 
which the virtual hands appeared in blue gloves with long white sleeves in order to 
mitigate the influence of gender or skin tone cues. The same stimuli were used for both 




Figure 17. Three examples from the updated stimulus set used in Experiment 5. The left 
image depicts two gloved hands in a neutral position with a central fixation cross. The 
middle image depicts a downward movement of the left index finger of the virtual hand 
which was presented to participants in the heightened ownership condition when they 
pressed the corresponding key during the performance phase of each trial. The right 
image depicts a salient right index finger movement cue presented during imagery to 
participants in both the control and heightened ownership condition. 
 
4.2.1.3. Procedure 
As in Experiment 4 (Chapter 3), the trial structure was such that participants first 
watched the four beat finger tapping sequence indicated by an arrow, then “performed” 
the four beat tapping sequence once, then “imagined” performing the sequence in time 
with a metronome until they encountered the predefined “Go!” stimulus. Experiment 5 
was the same as Experiment 4 in most respects but differed in three key areas. First, 
participants were assigned to one of two ownership conditions. In the heightened 
ownership condition, keypresses triggered a downward movement of the corresponding 
virtual finger during the “perform” phase of each trial. In the control condition, the 
virtual fingers did not move in response to participants’ keypresses. Second, participants 
completed a brief pressure training task prior to the beginning of each experimental 
block. Participants were required to maintain a series of reference pressures for five 
seconds at a time before they were allowed to progress to the next block. This served to 
both encourage participants to reset their finger position prior to each block of trials and 
to highlight the sensitivity of the apparatus. Third, in the heightened ownership 
condition, participants’ keypresses also triggered movements of the virtual hands during 




4.2.2.1. Exclusion Criteria 
As with Chapter 2 and 3, participant accuracy during control trials was used as an 
index of task engagement. Eighteen participants with accuracy rates below one standard 
deviation of the group mean (chance=50%; M=85.3%; SD=12.5%) were excluded (11 
Control, 7 Heightened Ownership), leaving N = 67 to be analysed. All data were pre-
processed as described in Experiment 4 (Chapter 3), and induced finger pressure was 
calculated by deriving the area under the curve (AUC) in the 800ms interval between 
cue onset and the subsequent metronome beat. 
 
4.2.2.2. Analysis of Finger Pressure During Cued Intervals 
This analysis modelled the magnitude of pressure induced at each finger when 
participants were presented with different types of visual cues during imagery. 
Following Experiment 4 (Chapter 3), it was anticipated that induced pressure would be 
greater when the recorded finger (e.g. left index) matched the observed movement (e.g. 
virtual left movement) than when it mismatched (e.g. virtual right movement) - the 
intention insertion effect. Further, this effect should be greater when the recorded finger 
(e.g. left index) corresponds with the participant’s imagery (e.g. imagined left index 
press) than when participants are imagining a movement of the other finger (e.g. 
imagined right index press). Extending Experiment 4 (Chapter 3), this analysis 
evaluated whether the intention insertion effect would vary as a result of the ownership 
illusion. The model outcome was the magnitude of induced finger pressure in the 800ms 
critical intervals after an action cue was presented. Finger pressure was recorded from 
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both the left and right index fingers in each of the 48 cued intervals. The model was an 
identical specification to the one used in Experiment 4 (Chapter 3), with the addition of 
another predictor (Ownership) which encoded the presence/absence of the ownership 
illusion. For clarity, the predictors of interest are capitalised when they are referred to in 
the text.  
 
Figure 18. A multi-panel plot showing finger pressure in the critical 800ms interval 
following the onset of the onset of each type of visual cue in Experiment 5. The top and 
bottom panels separate responses from fingers which did or did not match the imagined 
response. The left and right portions of each panel separate responses from the control 
and heightened ownership groups. The coloured lines indicate whether the cue 
contained no movement (i.e. neutral – blue), or if it included an animation of the same 
(i.e. congruent – red)/other finger (i.e. incongruent – green) from that being recorded. 
Figure 18 shows the magnitude of pressure that was induced in the critical 800ms 
period which followed the onset of a visual cue with respect to Ownership, Cue-Finger 
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Congruence and Imagery-Finger Congruence. Visual inspection suggests that pressure 
after a cue was much higher if participants also imagined a movement of the recorded 
finger (i.e. imagery-congruent; Figure 18, top panel) than if they imagined a movement 
of the other finger (i.e. imagery-incongruent; Figure 18, bottom panel). In addition, this 
was the case for both the heightened and control ownership groups. Importantly, the 
pressure induced by the visual stimuli appears to vary substantially according to 
whether the cue was neutral (i.e. no movement), or contained a movement which was 
congruent or incongruent with the finger producing the response. 
 
Figure 19. A multi-panel plot showing differences in pressure (AUC) during intervals 
when the recorded finger was either congruent or incongruent with respect to the 
observed movement vs. a neutral cue in Experiment 5. Positive scores indicate 
participants pressed harder than in equivalent trials where a neutral cue was presented 
(i.e. implying facilitation). Negative scores indicate that participants pressed less hard 
than following neutral cues (i.e. implying interference). The top and bottom panels 
distinguish responses where the participant was/was not also required to imagine a 
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movement in the recorded finger. The left and right portions of each panel separate 
responses from the control and heightened ownership groups. Error bars are the 95% 
PCI. 
As in Experiment 4 (Chapter 3), in order to derive a summary measure of induced 
pressure, the area under the curve (AUC) was calculated for individual observations 
within each condition and fitted values from the model were plotted in Figure 19. Figure 
19 shows the magnitude of induced pressure when the recorded finger was either 
congruent or incongruent with an observed movement, as compared with pressure after 
a neutral cue. In this model, the magnitude of the intention insertion effect was indexed 
by contrasting the pressure induced when the participant’s finger matched the observed 
movement (i.e. cue-congruent) with the pressure induced when the finger mismatched 
the observed movement (i.e. cue-incongruent). Furthermore, the intention insertion 
effect was derived separately for instances in which the recorded finger corresponded 
with the participant’s currently imagined movement (i.e. imagery-congruent) and 
instances in which the participants imagined a non-corresponding movement (i.e. 
imagery-incongruent). For example, the top-left panel of Figure 19 shows the intention 
insertion effect for the finger that participants in the control group were currently 
imagining moving. For this group, participants appear to press harder when the recorded 
finger is cue-congruent than cue-incongruent. Bigger differences between the two 
scores indicate a larger intention insertion effect. Visual inspection suggests that the 
intention insertion effect was greatest when participants also imagined a movement with 
the finger being recorded. It also appears the effect was larger in the control ownership 
group than the heightened group, as predicted by the ideomotor hypothesis. Although 
there appears to be a strong intention insertion effect for the control group when the 
recorded finger was congruent with participants’ imagery, this effect is only small or 
even slightly reversed (e.g. Figure 19, bottom left panel) in the remaining three 
conditions. That is, there does not seem to be a strong intention insertion effect on the 
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imagery-incongruent finger in the control group, or on either finger in the heightened 
ownership group. 
As in Experiment 4 (Chapter 3), in order to gauge the strength of evidence for 
these observations, data were simulated from the model and summary statistics, Bayes-p 
values and evidence ratios regarding the differences of interest were calculated. To 
briefly recap, the posterior predictive Bayes-p values associated with the forthcoming 
contrasts represent the probability (given the model and the data) that the effect was in 
the predicted direction (i.e. H1), as opposed to the opposite direction (i.e. H0). To aid 
interpretation, Bayes-p values are recapitulated as evidence ratios (ER; analogous with 
Bayes factors) to describe the strength of evidence in favour of the directed hypothesis, 
weighted against the alternative hypothesis. For consistency, the weight of evidence in 
support of each directed hypothesis was described using terminology regularly applied 
to Bayes factors (Wagenmakers et al., 2018); “extremely strong” (ER: >100), “very 
strong” (ER: 30-100), “strong” (ER: 10 - 30), “moderate” (ER: 3 - 10), “anecdotal” 
(ER: >1 – 3) and “no evidence” (ER: 1). Importantly, evidence ratios less than one 
indicate that the evidence supports the alternative hypothesis; even more so for values 
which are a tiny fraction of one. For example, an ER < .01 represents extremely strong 
evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis. 
It was predicted that the intention insertion effect would be reduced for 
participants in the heightened ownership group, relative to the control group, and that 
this difference would be strongest when the recorded finger matched the participant’s 
imagined movement (i.e. imagery-congruent), relative to the mismatching finger (i.e. 
imagery-incongruent). Importantly, for brevity and to safeguard against false positives 
due to multiple testing (Cramer et al., 2016), this analysis focused only on the 
comparisons that capture this prediction, namely the three-way interaction of Cue-
Finger Congruence, Imagery-Finger Congruence and Ownership. Indeed, a test of this 
113 
interaction revealed very strong evidence (ER = 61.5) that the magnitude of the 
intention insertion effect in the presence of congruent, relative to incongruent imagery 
(see Chapter 3) was weaker (i.e. H1), rather than stronger (i.e. H0) in the heightened 
ownership group (Posterior Mean = 6.99, 95% PCI [.61, 13.31], Bayes-p = .984). The 
next step tested whether the ownership illusion had a general effect on the pressure 
induced by an observed movement, reducing the influence of the visual cues, 
independently of the participant’s imagery (i.e. Imagery-Finger Congruence). This is 
captured by the contrast of the intention insertion effect for participants in the control 
group, relative to the heightened group, which is analogous with a two-way interaction 
between Ownership and Cue-Finger Congruence. This test revealed only anecdotal 
evidence (ER = 3.31) that the body ownership illusion reduced, rather than increased, 
the intention insertion effect in general (i.e. independent of the participants’ imagined 
responses; Posterior Mean = 1.2, 95% PCI [-2.03, 4.42], Bayes-p = .768). 
The next step was to evaluate the three-way interaction between Cue-Finger 
Congruence, Ownership and Imagery-Finger Congruence with a series of step-down 
tests. As expected, the analysis of pressure at the finger that participants currently 
imagined moving (Figure 19, upper panels) revealed a strong effect of body ownership 
on the intention insertion effect. The test revealed very strong evidence (ER = 44.4) for 
a larger difference between cue-congruent and cue-incongruent responses (i.e. intention 
insertion effect) in the control group than the heightened ownership group (Posterior 
Mean = 4.7, 95% PCI [.12, 9.27], Bayes-p = .978). Accordingly, in the control group 
(Figure 19, top left panel), there was extremely strong evidence (ER = 999) that visual 
cues that matched this (imagined) finger induced stronger presses than cues that 
mismatched the participants’ imagined movements (Posterior Mean = 6.29, 95% PCI 
[2.95, 9.61], Bayes-p > .999). In contrast, in the heightened ownership group (Figure 19, 
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top right panel), there was only moderate evidence (ER = 5.94) for such an effect 
(Posterior Mean = 1.59, 95% PCI [-1.38, 4.59], Bayes-p = .856).  
Figure 19 (lower panels) indicates that the intention insertion effect was much 
weaker with respect to pressure on the finger that did not correspond with participant’s 
imagery (e.g. recording from the left finger when the participant imagined a right finger 
movement). A test of the difference between ownership groups provides moderate 
evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis (ER = .19) that the difference between 
induced pressure at the cue-congruent and cue-incongruent finger (i.e. intention 
insertion effect) was stronger in the heightened than control ownership group (Posterior 
Mean = -2.3, 95% PCI [-6.88, 2.18], Bayes-p = .157). More specifically, there was 
moderate evidence (ER = .21) in favour of the alternative hypothesis that participants 
pressed slightly harder with the cue-incongruent finger than the cue-congruent finger in 
the control ownership group (Posterior Mean = -1.59, 95% PCI [-4.98, 1.79], Bayes-p = 
.174). Furthermore, there is only anecdotal evidence (ER = 2.1) to suggest that pressure 
induced at the cue-congruent finger was stronger than the cue-incongruent finger (i.e. 
the predicted intention insertion effect) in the heightened ownership group (Posterior 
Mean = .71, 95% PCI [-2.35, 3.76], Bayes-p = .678). Taken together, these tests suggest 
that the intention insertion effect was very small, or even slightly reversed when the 
response was incompatible with participants’ imagery. However, it should be noted that 
effect sizes of these differences (i.e. the estimates of the posterior mean for the contrast) 
were much smaller than those observed with congruent mental imagery.  
 
4.2.3. Discussion 
Experiment 5 tested whether inducing an illusory sense of body ownership for a 
pair of virtual hands would influence its ability to engage the motor system with respect 
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to the finger that one currently imagines moving. Two potential outcomes were 
possible. First, ideomotor models claim that observation of one’s own behaviour does 
not engage the motor system because the observed movement (and corresponding 
sensory representation) reflects the current state of the sensorimotor system, rather than 
a potential goal state. Participants in the heightened ownership group, who experienced 
a body ownership illusion should, therefore, exhibit a weaker intention insertion effect 
than those in the control group, who did not experience the illusion. In contrast, if the 
visual representation is linked directly to the motor representation, as assumed by 
models based on general associative processes, (e.g. ASL, Heyes & Bird, 2008; Heyes 
& Ray, 2000), then the intention insertion effect in the heightened ownership group 
should be the same as control, or even enhanced (e.g. due to response-effect 
compatibility, see Keller & Koch, 2006; Kunde et al., 2004). The results favoured the 
ideomotor view. The intention insertion effect was reduced in the heightened ownership 
group compared to the control group.  
The predictions were informed by two related assumptions which are common, 
but not always explicit, in ideomotor models of action control (e.g. TEC, Hommel, 
2009) and extensions of ideomotor principles (e.g. Inverse/Forward Models, Wolpert, 
1997; Active Inference, Adams et al., 2013). The first assumption is that sensorimotor 
processes make use of two kinds of representations, one which captures the (estimated) 
current state of the sensorimotor system and another which describes predicted future 
goal states. The second assumption is that a comparator mechanism identifies 
discrepancies between the current state and goal state representations and resolves them 
by engaging the motor system and initiating a bodily transition (i.e. movement) towards 
target goal state. On this basis, it was predicted that heightening participants’ sense of 
ownership with respect to the virtual hands would mean that the observed movements 
would be taken to reflect the current state, rather than a potential goal state. If the visual 
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representation of the observed movement was integrated with the current state, rather 
than the goal state representation, the intention insertion effect should be decreased, 
relative to a control group with no ownership illusion. As predicted, Experiment 5 
revealed a much weaker intention insertion effect in the heightened ownership group, 
despite both groups being presented with identical visual stimuli, in accordance with 
predictions motivated by ideomotor models.  
In addition, the data again confirmed that imagery is an important driver of the 
intention insertion effect because the differences in induced pressure were strongest 
with compatible imagery, replicating the findings of Experiment 4 (Chapter 3). In the 
ideomotor view, imagery may serve to pre-activate a goal state representation, to a sub-
threshold level, which is then amplified by observing a movement of the corresponding 
finger on the virtual hand. This finding suggests that the sub-threshold activation of a 
goal state representation (via imagery) is a prerequisite for an externally activated visual 
representation (i.e. action observation) to trigger non-willed responses.  
One interesting observation from Experiment 5 was that, in the control ownership 
group, the intention insertion effect appeared to be slightly reversed (e.g. Figure 19, 
lower left panel). Recall that in the intention insertion task, when responses are 
considered both cue- and imagery-incongruent, by definition, the participant's other 
finger must have been both cue- and imagery-congruent (i.e. the condition which 
induced the strongest presses). With the caveat that the effect size and evidence in 
support of this apparent reversal were small, one might speculate that this apparent 
reversal in the effect may reflect participants responding so strongly that they 
inadvertently respond with both fingers in this condition. 
Although it is tempting to conclude that the elimination of the intention insertion 
effect in the heightened ownership group was caused by the observed action becoming 
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integrated with the current state, rather than the goal state representation, there is an 
alternative possibility. At cue onset, participants in the heightened ownership group may 
simply have been more inclined to visually check their own finger position when a cue 
appeared. This is because the heightened ownership group were led to believe they had 
control over the virtual hands and therefore would be more likely to believe they had 
caused the movement to occur. Given that overt movement was expressly prohibited, 
participants in the heightened ownership group may have checked to see if they had 
inadvertently responded and caused the movement they perceived on screen. This 
tendency for participants to attend to the fingers by visually monitoring their finger 
position (and thus, directing attention away from the virtual hands) may have been 
responsible for the reduction in the intention insertion effect in this group, rather than 
the predicted interaction of current and goal state representations. As a result, it was 
necessary to test a new sample of participants (Experiment 6) which used the same 
procedure as Experiment 5, but with their own hands occluded from view. If the same 
pattern of results is present – or if this pattern is enhanced – when participants are 
unable to visually monitor their own actions then it would rule out this alternative 
explanation for the reduction in the intention insertion effect in the heightened 
ownership group, relative to the control group.  
 
4.3. Experiment 6: The Effect of a Body Ownership Illusion on the 
Generation of Non-willed Action Slips without Visual Feedback 
 
In order to rule out that participants in the heightened ownership condition were 
simply more inclined to observe their own actions following cue onset, it was necessary 
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to test a new sample of participants with their hands occluded from view. By 
eliminating accurate visual feedback of participants’ own limbs, participants in both 
groups could only rely on proprioceptive information, rather than vision, to monitor and 
control their behaviour. If the reduction in intention insertion effect observed in 
Experiment 5 was caused by participants in the heightened ownership group checking 
their own fingers following cue onset, then forcing both groups to rely on 
proprioception should eliminate this difference in Experiment 6. Hence, if Experiment 6 
produces strong evidence of a difference between ownership groups when visual 
feedback is eliminated, then this will rule out the alternative explanation.  
If the between-group difference in the intention insertion effect in Experiment 5 
really did reflect a change in the contribution of visual input to current and goal state 
representations then, according to accounts based on Bayesian estimation (e.g. Active 
Inference, Adams et al., 2013), eliminating visual feedback from participants’ own 
fingers may, in fact, enhance the effect. Accounts of motor control based on Bayesian 
estimation emphasise that sensory input is inherently noisy and, at any given moment, 
one can only estimate (i.e. predict) the current position of the body in space. 
Furthermore, the precision of the estimated current state representation is strongly 
influenced by the modality of the sensory input and environmental constraints (Körding 
& Wolpert, 2004, 2006). For example, waking up on a dark morning, one faces 
considerably more uncertainty in the estimation of the current state because of the lack 
of visual feedback and the corresponding reliance upon proprioception to navigate to the 
light switch. In Experiment 5, participants were free to observe their hands at any time, 
although they were specifically instructed to direct their visual attention towards a 
central fixation cross for the duration of the experiment. Therefore, for participants in 
either ownership group, there was ready access to visual information which could be 
used to accurately estimate the current position of their hands and control their non-
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willed action slips. According to this view, visual input should retain some basic degree 
of relevance to the current state representation in both ownership groups, which might 
affect the contribution of action observation to the activation of the corresponding goal 
state representation.  
If visual input makes a dynamic contribution to both the current and goal states, 
weighted by environmental constraints, then eliminating visual feedback for one’s own 
movements may make visual information, in general, less relevant to the current state 
representation. If visual input can no longer provide information about the current state 
of one’s body, then action effects activated by visual stimulation may make a 
correspondingly larger contribution to the goal state representation. This would result in 
a general increase in the intention insertion effect in both ownership groups (Experiment 
6), relative to when participants’ hands were not occluded (Experiment 5). In order to 
rule out the alternative explanation for the reduction in the intention insertion effect and 
to test assumptions about the dynamic weighting of visual information to current and 
goal states, Experiment 6 tested a new sample of participants whose hands were 




A total of 80 participants were tested, all of whom were female (70 Right-handed; 
Age in years: M=21.5, SD=5.2). The sample was comprised of both undergraduate 
psychology students from the University of Plymouth (course requirement) and 
members of the university’s paid participation pool (remunerated £8). 
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4.3.1.2. Materials and Stimuli 
The stimulus set, hardware and software were identical in all respects to those 
used in Experiment 5, with the exception that a large box was used to cover both the 
apparatus and participants hands in order to prevent visual monitoring of their physical 
movements. In addition, a fabric shroud was attached to the top of the box and covered 
participants’ forearms to completely eliminate visual feedback of their movements. 
 
4.3.1.3. Procedure 
Participants were assigned to one of two ownership groups, as in Experiment 5, 
and were presented with an identical experiment. The only difference was that with this 
new cohort, a large box blocked the view of the participants’ own hands.  
 
4.3.2. Results 
4.3.2.1. Exclusion Criteria 
As previously, participant accuracy during control trials was used as an index of 
task engagement. Twelve participants with accuracy rates below one standard deviation 
of the group mean (chance=50%; M=82.3%; SD=17.9%) were excluded (7 Control, 5 
Heightened Ownership), leaving N = 68 to be analysed. All data were pre-processed as 
described in Experiment 5, and finger pressure was calculated by deriving the area 




4.3.2.2. Analysis of Finger Pressure During Cued Intervals 
The first analysis was concerned with modelling how hard participants pressed 
with each finger when presented with action cues. Following Experiment 4 (Chapter 3) 
and Experiment 5 (present chapter), it was anticipated that induced pressure would be 
greater when the recorded finger matched the observed movement than when it 
mismatched (i.e. the intention insertion effect). In addition, the intention insertion effect 
should be greater when the recorded finger corresponds with the participant’s imagery 
than when participants are imagining a movement of the other finger. Furthermore, it 
was predicted that the intention insertion effect would vary as a result of the body 
ownership illusion (i.e. replicating the results of Experiment 5). Importantly, it was 
predicted that the ownership illusion should have the same effect in spite of the fact that 
participants’ hands were occluded from view. This finding would rule out that the effect 
of the ownership illusion (Experiment 5) was to draw participants’ visual attention 
towards their own hands and away from the virtual hands. As in Experiment 5, the 
model outcome was finger pressure in the 800ms critical intervals after an action cue 
was presented and the model specification was identical.  
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Figure 20. A multi-panel plot showing finger pressure in the critical 800ms interval 
following the onset of the onset of each type of visual cue in Experiment 6. The top and 
bottom panels separate responses from fingers which did or did not match the imagined 
response. The left and right portions of each panel separate responses from the control 
and heightened ownership groups. The coloured lines indicate whether the cue 
contained no movement (i.e. neutral – blue), or if it included an animation of the same 
(i.e. congruent – red)/other finger (i.e. incongruent – green) from that being recorded. 
Figure 20 shows the induced pressure in the critical 800ms period which followed 
the onset of a visual cue according to Ownership, Cue-Finger Congruence and Imagery-
Finger Congruence. It appears that induced pressure following all types of visual cue 
was much higher if participants were also imagining a movement of that finger and this 
was true for both the heightened and control ownership groups. In addition, induced 
pressure appears to vary substantially according to whether the visual stimulus was 
neutral, or contained a virtual movement which was congruent or incongruent with the 
finger which produced the response. This replicates the performance pattern observed in 
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Experiment 5. Interestingly, Figure 20 indicates that, in absolute terms, participants 
whose hands were occluded exerted a higher peak pressure in all conditions, relative to 
Experiment 5 (Figure 19). 
 
Figure 21. A multi-panel plot showing differences in pressure (AUC) during intervals 
when the recorded finger was either congruent or incongruent with respect to the 
observed movement vs. a neutral cue. Positive scores indicate participants pressed 
harder than in equivalent trials where a neutral cue was presented. The top and bottom 
panels distinguish responses where the participant was/was not also required to imagine 
a movement in the recorded finger. The left and right portions of each panel separate 
responses from the control and heightened ownership groups. Error bars are the 95% 
PCI. 
Figure 21 shows the pressure induced when the recorded finger was either 
congruent or incongruent with an observed movement, as compared with pressure after 
a neutral cue. As in Experiment 5, the magnitude of the intention insertion effect was 
indexed by contrasting the pressure induced when the participant’s finger matched the 
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observed movement (i.e. cue-congruent) with the pressure induced when the finger 
mismatched the observed movement (i.e. cue-incongruent). In addition, the intention 
insertion effect was derived separately for instances in which the recorded finger 
corresponded with the participant’s currently imagined movement (i.e. imagery-
congruent) and instances in which the participants imagined a non-corresponding 
movement (i.e. imagery-incongruent). Larger differences between the cue-congruent 
and cue-incongruent finger pressure indicate a larger intention insertion effect. Visual 
inspection suggests that the intention insertion effect was greatest when the participant 
was also imagining a movement with the finger being recorded (Figure 21, top panels). 
Importantly, there appears to be a strong intention insertion effect for both the control 
group and the heightened ownership group on the imagery-congruent finger, but the 
effect is larger in the control group. In addition, when the finger of response was 
incongruent with participants’ imagery (Figure 21, bottom panels), there appears to be 
strong intention insertion effect in the control group, but not in the heightened 
ownership group.  
As in Experiment 4 (Chapter 3) and 5, in order to gauge the strength of evidence 
for these observations, data were simulated from the model and summary statistics, 
Bayes-p values and evidence ratios regarding the differences of interest were calculated. 
Following Experiment 5, it was predicted that the intention insertion effect should be 
reduced in the heightened ownership group, relative to the control group, and that this 
difference should be greater when the recorded finger matched the participants 
imagined movement (i.e. imagery-congruent), relative to the mismatching finger (i.e. 
imagery-incongruent). As before, this analysis focused only on those aspects of the data 
which are relevant to this prediction, namely the interaction of Cue-Finger Congruence, 
Imagery-Finger Congruence and Ownership. However, a test of the overall interaction 
provided only moderate evidence (ER = 4) of a slightly larger effect of Ownership on 
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the intention insertion effect with congruent, relative to incongruent imagery (Posterior 
Mean = 2.62, 95% PCI [-3.66, 8.8], Bayes-p = .799). This suggests that, in contrast to 
Experiment 5, the effect of the body ownership illusion on the intention insertion effect 
did not greatly differ when the finger being recorded matched the participants imagined 
movement (i.e. imagery-congruent), relative to when it mismatched (i.e. imagery-
incongruent). The next step was to evaluate the general effect of the body ownership 
illusion on pressure induced by visual cues, independently of Imagery-Finger 
Congruence. This test involves a contrast of the intention insertion effect for 
participants in the control group, relative to the heightened group, which corresponds 
with the two-way interaction of Ownership and Cue-Finger Congruence. In contrast to 
Experiment 5, this test revealed extremely strong evidence (ER= 999) that the body 
ownership illusion caused a reduction (rather than an increase) in the intention insertion 
effect, independently of the participants’ imagined movement (Posterior Mean = 4.88, 
95% PCI [1.79, 8.06], Bayes-p = .999). This suggests that, when participants’ hands 
were occluded, the intention insertion effect was generally stronger in the control group, 
relative to the heightened ownership group, regardless of the participant’s imagined 
movement. 
Following the same procedure as Experiment 5, participant performance was 
evaluated with planned step-down comparisons of the interaction between Ownership, 
Cue-Finger Congruence, and Imagery-Finger Congruence. As predicted, and replicating 
Experiment 5, the analysis of pressure on the finger that participants currently imagined 
moving (Figure 21, upper panels) revealed a very strong effect of body ownership on 
the intention insertion effect. A pairwise comparison between the intention insertion 
effects in the two groups provided extremely strong evidence (ER = 332) that the effect 
was much larger in the control group than the heightened ownership group (Posterior 
Mean = 6.19, 95% PCI [1.73, 10.48], Bayes-p = .997). In other words, the evidence 
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ratio suggests that there was 332 times more evidence that the intention insertion effect 
was reduced, rather than enhanced, by the ownership illusion when participant imagery 
was congruent with the recorded finger (i.e. imagery-congruent). Accordingly, in the 
control condition (Figure 21, upper panels), there was extremely strong evidence (ER > 
999) of a substantial intention insertion effect when the recorded finger matched the 
observed movement (i.e. cue-congruent) compared to the finger which mismatched (i.e. 
cue-incongruent; Posterior Mean = 11.09, 95% PCI [7.93, 14.21], Bayes-p > .999). In 
contrast to Experiment 5, there was also extremely strong evidence (ER = 999) of a 
large intention insertion effect in the heightened ownership group (Figure 21, top right 
panel; Posterior Mean = 4.9, 95% PCI [1.87, 7.98], Bayes-p = .999). This provides 
suggestive evidence that the intention insertion effect was generally enhanced for both 
groups when the participant’s hands were occluded, relative to when they were visible 
(Experiment 5).  
In support of that observation, the analysis of pressure at the finger that 
participants did not currently imagine moving (Figure 21, lower panels) also revealed an 
effect of the body ownership illusion on the intention insertion effect. The pairwise 
comparison of the intention insertion effect size in each ownership group revealed 
strong evidence (ER = 16.9) of a larger intention insertion effect for the control than 
heightened condition (Posterior Mean = 3.57, 95% PCI [.79, 8.05], Bayes-p = .944). In 
other words, the evidence ratio suggests that there was 17 times more evidence in 
favour of the hypothesis that the intention insertion was reduced, not increased, by the 
ownership illusion when the finger being recorded was incongruent with participants’ 
imagery (i.e. imagery-incongruent). Within the ownership groups, tests revealed 
extremely strong evidence (ER = 124) of a substantial intention insertion effect in the 
control condition (Figure 21, lower left panel; Posterior Mean = 3.81, 95% PCI [.65, 
6.96], Bayes-p = .992), but no evidence (ER = 1.24) of an intention insertion effect in 
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the heightened ownership condition (Figure 21, lower right panel; Posterior Mean = .24, 
95% PCI [-2.81, 3.35], Bayes-p = .564).  
 
4.3.2.3. Analysis of Experiments 5 and 6: The Effect of Visual Feedback 
The next step was to conduct a combined analysis of the data from Experiments 5 
and 6 in order to perform a between-experiments contrast to test predictions about the 
influence of eliminating visual feedback of participants’ own movements on the 
intention insertion effect. The model has an identical specification to the one used in the 
cued trials analysis, with the addition of another predictor, Visual Feedback, which 
described whether participants hands were visible (Experiment 5) or occluded 
(Experiment 6). This allows us to test whether the strength of the intention insertion 
effect was enhanced when participants’ hands were occluded from view, as predicted.  
A test of the interaction between Visual Feedback and Cue-Finger Congruence 
revealed strong evidence (ER = 332) that occluding participants’ hands, in general (i.e. 
independently of all other conditions), enhanced the intention insertion effect relative to 
when their own hands were visible (Posterior Mean = 3.2, 95% PCI [.98, 5.4], Bayes-p 
= .997). In addition, this model allows us to test whether eliminating visual feedback 
(Experiment 6) generally enhanced the intention insertion effect produced by each 
ownership group, in the presence of congruent or incongruent mental imagery (i.e. 
Imagery-Finger Congruence). A test of the interaction between Visual Feedback, Cue-
Finger Congruence and Imagery-Finger Congruence revealed moderate evidence (ER = 
.19) in favour of the alternative hypothesis. This suggests that, counter to expectations, 
when participants’ hands were occluded, the effect of body ownership on the intention 
insertion effect was stronger for the finger which mismatched the currently imagined 
movement (i.e. imagery-incongruent), relative to when it matched (i.e. imagery-
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incongruent; Posterior Mean = -4.46, 95% PCI [-13.38, 4.42], Bayes-p = .161). This 
finding corroborates the notion that the occluding participants’ hands generally 
enhanced the tendency for visual cues to engage the motor system, regardless of the 
participants imagined movement. 
The next step was to compare participant performance in Experiments 5 (hands 
visible) and 6 (hands occluded) with a series of planned step-down comparisons of the 
interaction between Visual Feedback, Cue-Finger Congruence, Imagery-Finger 
Congruence and Ownership group. It was predicted that, if occluding participants’ 
hands increased the tendency for an observed movement to activate the corresponding 
action, then the intention insertion effect should be stronger in both the heightened and 
control ownership group when the finger of response matched the participant’s imagery 
(i.e. imagery-congruent). A pairwise comparison revealed only anecdotal evidence (ER 
= 2.03) that the effect of Visual Feedback was stronger for the control than heightened 
ownership group (Posterior Mean = 1.43, 95% PCI [-4.94, 7.87], Bayes-p = .67). More 
simply, the size of the intention insertion effect at the imagery-congruent finger was 
generally increased in both the control and heightened ownership groups when 
participants’ hands were occluded, relative to when they were visible. Accordingly, the 
analysis of the responses which were congruent with participants’ imagery revealed 
very strong evidence (ER = 40.7) that the intention insertion effect was increased, rather 
than reduced, when participants hands were occluded in the control ownership group 
(Posterior Mean = 4.69, 95% PCI [.08, 9.33], Bayes-p = .976) and strong evidence (ER 
= 13.3) of an increase in the heightened ownership group (Posterior Mean = 3.26, 95% 
PCI [-1.08, 7.45], Bayes-p = .93).  
Next, the analysis of the responses which were incongruent with participants’ mental 
imagery revealed that occluding participants hands modulated the strength of the 
intention insertion effect in each ownership group. If occluding participants hands 
129 
generally enhanced the tendency for action observation to activate the corresponding 
response, then it was predicted that the intention insertion effect should also be 
increased at the finger which was incongruent with participants’ mental imagery. A 
pairwise comparison revealed very strong evidence (ER = 32.3) that the elimination of 
visual feedback caused a stronger increase in the intention insertion effect for the 
control than the heightened ownership group (Posterior Mean = 5.89, 95% PCI [.2, 
12.05], Bayes-p = .97). In other words, the evidence ratio suggests that there was 32 
times more evidence supporting the hypothesis that the change in the intention insertion 
effect (caused by occluding participants hands in Experiment 6, relative to Experiment 
5) at the imagery-incongruent finger was stronger (as opposed to weaker) in the control 
group than the heightened ownership group. As expected, there was extremely strong 
evidence (ER = 99) that occluding participants hands substantially increased, rather than 
decreased, the size of the intention insertion effect in the control ownership group 
(Posterior Mean = 5.39, 95% PCI [.8, 9.86], Bayes-p = .99), but no such evidence (ER = 
.69) of an increase in the heightened ownership group (Posterior Mean = .49, 95% PCI 
[-4.69, 3.7], Bayes-p = .41).  
 
4.3.3. Discussion 
The main purpose of Experiment 6 was to rule out an alternative explanation for 
the reduction in the intention insertion effect in the heightened ownership group, 
relative to the control group, observed in Experiment 5. In the alternative view, because 
participants in the heightened ownership group were led to believe that they were 
responsible for the virtual movements, they may have been more inclined to visually 
inspect their own hands following cue onset than participants in the control group. As a 
result, the effect of the body ownership illusion may have simply been to draw 
participants’ visual attention away from the virtual hand movement, limiting the extent 
130 
to which visual input was able to drive the motor system. In order to exclude this 
possibility, participants’ hands were occluded from view in Experiment 6.  
If the alternative explanation of the findings of Experiment 5 were valid, then 
preventing participants from visually checking their own finger position should reduce 
the difference in the magnitude of the intention insertion effect between ownership 
groups. In contrast, if the reduction in the intention insertion effect in the heightened 
ownership group was caused by the observed action being integrated with the current, 
rather than the goal state, as predicted by ideomotor models, then the pattern of results 
would be the same as Experiment 5. As expected, the data suggested that there was a 
much stronger intention insertion effect in the control than heightened ownership 
condition in Experiment 6, just as there was in Experiment 5. This finding not only rules 
out a viable alternative explanation but provides a valuable replication of the effect of 
an ownership illusion on the intention insertion effect.  
In addition, occluding participants’ view of their own hands in Experiment 6 was 
predicted to cause a general increase in the magnitude of the intention insertion effect 
relative to Experiment 5, when participants’ hands were visible, in a between-
experiment comparison. According to ideomotor models, the visual information must be 
appropriately integrated (i.e. bound) with either the current or goal state representation. 
This effect was predicted on the basis that occluding participants’ hands would 
eliminate an important source of current state-relevant information (i.e. visual feedback 
of one’s own body). Therefore, if visual input contains less current state-relevant 
information, the activated action effects may be more effectively integrated (i.e. bound) 
with goal state representation. The data indicated that, as predicted, the intention 
insertion effect was indeed substantially stronger without visual feedback of 
participants’ own movements. Interestingly, the data also suggested that there was a 
strong intention insertion effect for responses which matched the participant’s imagined 
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movement in the heightened ownership group of Experiment 6 which was absent in 
Experiment 5. That is, the occlusion of the hands overrode the impact of the ownership 
illusion, and revealed an intention insertion effect in the ownership condition in 
Experiment 6 where there wasn’t one in Experiment 5. In fact, by occluding 
participants’ hands from view, the virtual movement activated the corresponding 
response so strongly that, for the first time, there was evidence of an intention insertion 
effect at the finger which did not match the participants’ imagery in the control 
condition (but not in the heightened condition). These findings can be readily accounted 
for by ideomotor models if one assumes that by reducing the current state-relevance of 
visual input in general (i.e. by eliminating visual feedback), the visual input should 
activate the corresponding goal state more strongly. In this view, action observation 
triggered the corresponding response so substantially in the control group that the 
exogenously activated goal state representation was even able to overcome the 
endogenously activated goal (i.e. via imagery) when participants imagined the 
alternative response (i.e. the two goal states differed). 
 
4.4. General Discussion 
This chapter used the pressure-pad intention insertion task (Experiment 4, Chapter 
3) to test a commonly held, but largely theoretical, assumption about the role of the 
“self” in the translation of sensory input into motor output. Experiments 1-4 provided 
strong evidence that observing a downward finger press can effectively trigger the 
corresponding movement, when combined with congruent mental imagery, in spite of 
specific instructions to remain still. According to the ideomotor account of the intention 
insertion effect, action observation activates the same perceptually coded sensorimotor 
representations (i.e. action effects) that are responsible for executing the corresponding 
132 
action. The question that motivated this chapter was if this is the case, then why aren’t 
we driven to endlessly self-imitate when observing our own behaviour? Experiments 5 
and 6 of the present chapter suggest that we do not self-imitate because visual input 
which corresponds with one’s own actions inherently reflects the current state of the 
sensorimotor system (i.e. it corresponds with the current location of the body in space), 
not a potential goal state and, therefore, does not engage the motor system.  
Research has demonstrated that while action observation can elicit activity in the 
motor system, the effect disappears when the same observed action is illusorily 
attributed to oneself (Schütz-Bosbach et al., 2006). This suggests that body ownership 
illusions can cause people to process identical visual and proprioceptive inputs quite 
differently. Ideomotor models account for this phenomenon by assuming that, by 
definition, the visual input associated with observation of our movements reflects the 
current position of the body in space (i.e. the current state of the sensorimotor system), 
not a potential future state with the capacity to engage the motor system. Accordingly, 
Experiments 5 and 6 aimed to test whether an illusory perception of body ownership 
would reduce the extent to which observed movements drive the motor system during 
imagery (i.e. indexed by the intention insertion effect), as predicted by ideomotor 
theories of action control. To that end, Experiment 5 and 6 replicated the basic intention 
insertion effect observed in Experiment 4 (Chapter 3). Further, these experiments 
extended the effect by demonstrating that it was strongly modulated by factors such as a 
body ownership illusion induced by correlated sensory feedback (e.g. intermodal 
matching, Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) and the availability of sensory information (e.g. 
presence of visual feedback). More specifically, the intention insertion effect was 
substantially weaker for participants who received the body ownership illusion than 
participants in the control group in both Experiments 5 and 6, as predicted by ideomotor 
models. 
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The data reported in this chapter provided empirical support for the notion that 
sensorimotor processes make use of two, relatively separate, representations which 
capture either the current state of the sensorimotor system or predicted future goal 
states. It was predicted that if an observed action was taken to reflect one’s current state 
(e.g. due to a body ownership illusion) then the corresponding sensory representation 
would not be processed as a goal state and would no longer engage the motor system. 
Consistent with this prediction, the data revealed that participants in the heightened 
ownership group showed a significantly weaker intention insertion effect than those in 
the control group. Importantly, this substantial difference was evident in spite of the fact 
that there was no perceptual difference between the virtual hand movements 
encountered by participants in either group and that the conditions immediately 
preceding stimulus presentation were identical. Importantly, this finding cannot be 
accommodated by accounts of action control which assume that visual representations 
trigger motor responses directly via general associative processes (e.g. ASL, Heyes & 
Ray, 2000). If the visual representation which corresponded with the observed action 
simply activated the associated motor representation directly then the intention insertion 
effect should have, if anything, been increased by the body ownership illusion that 
would strengthen any association between observed and own finger movements. The 
strong difference in the intention insertion effect between ownership groups suggests 
that visual input (i.e. an observed action) only activates the corresponding behaviour 
(i.e. goal state) if it is not considered self-generated. This argues against a direct 
coupling of the visual (i.e. sensory) representation and the motor representation and is, 
instead, more consistent with the current state/goal state distinction described by 
ideomotor models. 
The finding that eliminating visual feedback increased the intention insertion 
effect supports the assumption that action initiation results from the interaction of 
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current and goal state representations. It was argued that occluding participants’ hands 
would mean that that visual input could no longer provide useful information about the 
current state of the participants’ fingers during the task. On this basis, it was predicted 
that this would cause the contribution of visual information to the current state 
representation to be downregulated (Körding & Wolpert, 2004, 2006). Correspondingly, 
it was predicted that the visual input that was available – the virtual hands - would make 
a larger contribution to the activation of the goal state representation which would 
heighten sensorimotor conflict and produce a larger intention insertion effect in general. 
The comparison of Experiment 5 and 6 showed that participant performance was 
entirely consistent with this conceptualisation of action control processes. The intention 
insertion effect was increased by occluding the participants’ hands. Interestingly, one 
consequence of occluding participants’ hands was that the observed movement activated 
the corresponding response so substantially that there was, for the first time, clear 
evidence of an intention insertion effect even at the finger which mismatched the 
participant’s mental imagery. This is especially important because in Experiments 4 
(Chapter 3) and 5 the virtual movements only triggered corresponding responses in the 
presence of matching mental imagery. Previously, this was taken to suggest that the pre-
activation of a given sensory goal state via imagery (i.e. the simulated perceptual effects 
corresponding with the imagined sequences) might be a prerequisite for the intention 
insertion effect to occur. Under this view, observed actions could only amplify or 
interfere with existing goal states activated by imagery but are insufficient to trigger 
behaviour alone. Instead, the findings of Experiment 6 suggest that in the right 
circumstances, action observation can insert the corresponding response even when 
participants imagine a different movement. In other words, an exogenously activated 
goal state (i.e. observed action) would appear to be able to initiate the corresponding 
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response when it is sufficiently salient, even when participant’s imagery was focussed 
on a different action. 
At this stage, one might be tempted to suggest that some of the differences in the 
intention insertion effect observed between body ownership groups could have been due 
to differences in internal monitoring of behaviour. In other words, once participants 
realised that they were producing accidental actions, they should have tried to inhibit 
these movements. Further, participants in the heightened ownership group may have 
been more likely to engage in such monitoring because they had been led to believe 
their own actions caused the virtual finger movements. As a result, the onset of a 
sudden movement cue could have been taken as evidence that a key had been 
inadvertently pressed. Indeed, Experiments 1-3 (Chapter 2) provided clear evidence that 
participants became progressively less likely to produce action slips, which clearly 
highlights the role of action monitoring processes in this task. However, it must be 
emphasised that an increase in a more specific monitoring explanation is not necessarily 
antagonistic with the proposed notion of separate current state and goal state 
sensorimotor representations. This is because internal monitoring, by definition, 
involves scrutinising any detected changes to the current state of one’s body. For 
example, in the ideomotor view, if the heightened ownership group monitored their 
actions more closely than the control group, then this enhanced scrutiny may have 
arisen because participants assumed that movements of the virtual hands represented a 
change in their current state, rather than a potential goal state. On this logic, the control 
group, who were less likely to assume that the virtual movements reflected a sudden and 
undesirable change in their current state, did not engage monitoring (i.e. scrutiny of 
current state) and the observed action was able to trigger the corresponding goal state 
representation.  
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An alternative possibility is that the experience of causing virtual finger 
movements in the heightened ownership group caused participants to limit their motor 
output in a general, non-specific manner (e.g. by raising the threshold required to 
initiate movement). Certainly, the pressure which was induced by the onset of 
unexpected visual stimuli was reduced by the ownership illusion, in both Experiments 5 
and 6. However, a general increase in monitoring would predict a consistent 
downregulation of motor output following all kinds of the cue (i.e. neutral as well as 
congruent/incongruent movement cues) in the heightened ownership group, relative to 
the control group. Therefore, a general tendency to monitor motor output does not 
readily account for the specific decrease in the pressure induced by an observed 
movement at the cue-congruent finger, relative to cue-incongruent finger (i.e. the 
intention insertion effect).  
One final point to consider the extent to which the implementation of the virtual 
hand illusion in order to manipulate ownership might complicate the interpretation of 
these data. It is possible that, by exposing participants in the heightened ownership 
group to a significantly higher number of visual finger movement stimuli, this group 
may have, to some extent, habituated to the visual stimuli. This would have the effect of 
reducing the effectiveness of the visual stimuli when they were presented during the 
subsequent imagery phase of each trial, relative to the control group who only 
encountered the finger movement cues during imagery. However, there are several 
points worth noting in this regard.  
First, participants in the heightened ownership condition had only encountered 
such visual stimuli (i.e. finger movements) as a consequence of their actions (at least 
prior to the first cue) and, if anything, they should be especially surprised by (and 
subsequently attend to) the sudden onset of a finger movement during imagery. Indeed, 
the purpose of the experiment was to heighten the correspondence between the 
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participant’s behaviour and those specific visual stimuli (i.e. virtual hand movements), 
before placing them in a situation where those same physical responses were explicitly 
prohibited in order to ensure participants avoided intentionally responding. On that 
basis, one would not expect that the finger movement stimuli should be less disruptive 
(i.e. less able to facilitate or interfere with action) simply because participants saw them 
before (albeit without the obnoxious yellow flash). In fact, the visual stimuli served as a 
potent signal that the very behaviour they were trying to avoid might have just occurred 
(i.e. a sudden and undesirable change in the current state), rather than a task-irrelevant 
stimulus made inconspicuous by prior experience. 
Second, habituation as an explanation for the effects described in Chapter 4 
cannot readily account for the increase in the intention insertion effect in Experiment 6 
(when participants’ hands were occluded) relative to Experiment 5 (when participants’ 
hands were visible). In both experiments, the visual stimuli were identical, so one would 
have expected participants in the heightened ownership to have habituated to the 
presence of finger movements to the same extent – whether their hands were occluded 
or not. However, to more explicitly rule out the effects of simple habituation it would be 
useful to use a non-motor ownership induction to allow for a simpler interpretation. In 
this way, a future study might consider repeating the task but, instead, applying an 
ownership induction that relies on synchronous/asynchronous tactile stimulation (e.g. 
Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), or synchronous/asynchronous motor movement (Ma & 
Hommel, 2015b, 2015a), rather than merely comparing absence or presence of seen 
movement in response to one’s own movements. 
4.5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the data gathered in Chapter 4 have provided empirical evidence in 
support of some of the assumed features of modern accounts of action control. 
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Experiments 5 and 6 suggest that the tendency for an observed action to activate the 
corresponding response can be modulated by a body ownership illusion induced by 
correlated visual and proprioceptive feedback (i.e. reducing the effect) and the 
availability of accurate visual feedback of one’s own movements (i.e. enhancing the 
effect). While there is a variety of research probing the mechanisms which govern 
human behaviour at various levels of abstraction, from the anatomical to the conceptual, 
there is an increasing acceptance of the notion that action control is fundamentally 
perceptual in nature (Gentsch et al., 2016). The brain is seen largely as a prediction 
engine, combining prior experience with information about the current state of the 
sensorimotor system to anticipate upcoming stimulation. However, a common criticism 
of these accounts is that they are largely theoretical and are difficult to test empirically 
(Huang, 2008). The experiments described in this chapter provide a novel approach to 
driving the motor system without relying on participants to intentionally initiate the 
response. As a result, the intention insertion task can be used to reveal important details 
about the mechanisms which translate sensory input into motor output. 
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5. Chapter 5: The Relationship Between the Generation of Action 
Slips and Ideomotor (Hypnotic) Suggestibility 
5.1. Overview 
The results from Chapter 2 and 3 have supported the assumption that 
perceptually-coded action effect representations engage the motor system when 
activated strongly enough by endogenous (e.g. mental imagery) and exogenous means 
(e.g. action observation) and can induce overt action. Moreover, Chapter 4 revealed that 
a body ownership illusion decreased the intention insertion effect; a finding consistent 
with the ideomotor view that movement occurs in case of a strong discrepancy, or 
prediction error, between one’s current self-representation and a future predicted goal 
state. In Chapter 5, these same concepts are applied to ideomotor suggestibility, a 
phenomenon that is related to intention insertion. Following testing, participants who 
took part in Experiments 5 and 6 (Chapter 4) were screened to assess individual 
differences in ideomotor suggestibility, the motor component of the multifarious trait of 
hypnotic suggestibility (Woody et al., 2005). Chapter 5 aims to evaluate how the 
tendency for observed actions to engage the motor system during imagery (i.e. the 




The research presented in this thesis was initially motivated by the bizarre 
phenomenology of hypnosis and how modern ideomotor models of action control might 
be able to explain hypnotic motor behaviour. Indeed, hypnosis and related 
parapsychological phenomena, such as the magic swinging pendulum, table turning and 
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the divining rod, have a long history in classical ideomotor research (for review, see 
Stock & Stock, 2004). Early proponents of ideomotor concepts, such as Carpenter 
(1852), Chevreul (1833) and James (1890) developed a plausible, scientific account of 
these reportedly supernatural experiences. They claimed that vivid imagery is 
responsible for generating the seemingly non-willed behaviour which commonly occurs 
following hypnotic suggestions (Carpenter, 1852), just as it is responsible for every day 
volitional action, just in an unusual setting (e.g. a “hypnotic induction”). Inspired by this 
idea, the intention insertion task was designed to test the assumption that super-
threshold activation of action effect representations (i.e. mental images) brings about 
overt action, just as with classical ideomotor phenomena.  
When subjected to hypnosis some people appear in thrall to their hypnotist’s 
suggestions as if, at that moment, they exert no control over their own behaviour. 
During a typical hand lowering suggestion, the hypnotist delivers carefully worded 
instructions (i.e. ideomotor suggestions) for their subject to hold their hand out at 
shoulder height and to imagine holding a heavy ball (Bowers, 1998). Directions are 
given to take note of the ball’s shape and to imagine the feeling of a heavy mass pulling 
on the fingers and the outstretched arm. The hypnotic subject imagines the ball getting 
heavier and heavier while an invisible and overwhelming force pulls their arm 
downwards. As this scenario unfolds, responsive subjects will begin to lower their arm, 
but will often report afterwards that the movements they made were involuntary. 
Importantly, these self-reported feelings of non-volition occur despite the fact that, 
objectively, people must produce the movement themselves. To account for this 
seemingly non-willed behaviour, recall the notion that action reflects the resolution of 
the conflict between one’s current state and anticipated sensory goal state 
representations (Chapter 4). Under this view, if one’s current state representation and a 
sensory goal state (e.g. activated via imagery) are sufficiently divergent, then the motor 
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system will be engaged and will affect a bodily transition towards the target state to 
eliminate the discrepancy. Intuitively, such a mechanism could readily account for how 
vivid mental imagery could become translated into unintentional motor output in a 
hypnotic context. 
Now that the pressure-based intention insertion paradigm has been thoroughly 
validated (Chapter 3) and the effects replicated and extended (Chapter 4), the aim is to 
come full circle and evaluate the assumed relationship between hypnotic behaviour and 
the ideomotor processes manifested in the intention insertion effect. While there is a 
vast spectrum of research related to hypnosis (for review, see Halligan & Oakley, 2014), 
there is a growing consensus that hypnotic suggestibility should not be treated as a 
unitary concept. Instead, Woody, Barnier and McConkey (2005) argue that hypnotic 
suggestibility is actually a manifestation of a constellation of sub-components which 
influence participant’s responsiveness to specific hypnotic items (e.g. ideomotor 
suggestions vs. post-hypnotic amnesia). In light of this, the present chapter is 
specifically concerned with the insights that the intention insertion effect can bring to 
the ideomotor component of hypnosis. If the intention insertion task reflects the same 
mechanisms as the involuntary behaviour exhibited during hypnosis, then individual 
differences in susceptibility to the intention insertion manipulation should be related to 
ideomotor (hypnotic) suggestibility. In order to test this prediction, participants who 
completed Experiments 5 and 6 (Chapter 4) were screened in order to determine their 
responsiveness to simple ideomotor suggestions (e.g. arm levitation) and the scores 
were incorporated into an overall analysis of the pressure data. 
Following the ideomotor account of the intention insertion effect, in order for a 
movement to occur following a specific suggestion, the goal representation (i.e. the 
simulated effects of the suggested movement) must become super activated (e.g. via 
elaborate mental imagery) which inadvertently engages the corresponding motor 
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processes. If this is the case, it suggests that individual differences in the ideomotor 
component of the general trait of hypnotic suggestibility (for review, see Lynn, 
Laurence, & Kirsch, 2015) may reflect a tendency to integrate activated perceptual 
representations with goal-related processes. Conceivably, this might arise because of a 
predisposition to focus on anticipated sensation (i.e. future-oriented), rather than current 
sensation (i.e. present-oriented). As a consequence, in the ideomotor view, a heightened 
focus on activated goal states would naturally drive conflict with the current state 
representation during vivid imagery and more readily engage the motor system. If this 
conceptualisation is valid, then more suggestible participants should exhibit a stronger 
intention insertion effect than those who are less suggestible. That is, there should be a 
positive relationship between the intention insertion effect and ideomotor suggestibility. 
First, however, it is useful to explore how such a prediction relates to existing research 
concerning the origins of hypnotic behaviour.  
  
 
5.2.1. Action Slips and Existing Perspectives on Hypnotic Responding 
The above proposal is similar to active inference-based accounts of sensory 
illusions (H. Brown, Adams, Parees, Edwards, & Friston, 2013) and hypnotic 
responding (Jamieson, 2016) which cast hypnosis as a form of sensory hypothesis 
testing which relies upon hierarchically organised generative models of the sources of 
sensory input. These accounts characterise the brain as a prediction engine with the sole 
function of anticipating future sensory input in order to minimise prediction errors (or 
“free energy”, Friston, 2010) generated by a comparison of bottom-up perceptual input 
and top-down predictions at multiple hierarchical levels. With respect to exogenous 
sensory inputs (e.g. vision), prediction errors are typically minimised by updating one’s 
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hypothesis about the causes of those inputs, based on prior knowledge, in accordance 
with the incoming sensory information. For example, when looking at an object in the 
distance (i.e. visual sensory input), one might form an initial hypothesis about the 
object’s identity based on past experience with similar looking items, which is then 
updated upon closer inspection (e.g. Is it a bird? Is it a plane?). However, when 
proprioception is involved, prediction errors are driven by proprioceptive feedback 
which corresponds with muscle activity (e.g. signals from muscle fibres) and has the 
capacity to be resolved by movement (Adams, Shipp, & Friston, 2013). That is, the 
sensory inputs can be made to conform to the predictions of the generative model by 
initiating action to resolve proprioceptive prediction errors. For example, when trying to 
avoid scratching an itch (i.e. tactile sensory input), the imagined relief (i.e. tactile goal 
state) almost reflexively drives the scratching movement rather than a change in the 
hypothesis about the causes of that input (e.g. an insect bite). This is because imagining 
scratching one’s itch naturally involves forming a proprioceptive prediction about how 
one might achieve it (i.e. proprioceptive goal state) which, in turn, drives prediction 
errors (i.e. the urge to scratch). This process will continue to drive prediction errors until 
a scratching action is initiated or the itching sensation subsides. In other words, 
movement reflects a process of bringing one’s current state into alignment with one’s 
expectations about an anticipated proprioceptive goal state.  
Jamieson (2016) proposed a similar mechanism. In this view, the hypnotist’s 
words activate high-level representations in the mind of the hypnotic subject that reflect 
the meaning of the hypnotic suggestion (i.e. the perceptual consequences of the body 
movement implied by it) which, in turn, drives activity in lower-level perceptual units. 
To illustrate, consider the arm lowering suggestion described earlier. Entertaining the 
hypothesis that a heavy ball is pulling one’s outstretched arm downwards involves 
generating a set of predictions about how such an event might look and feel. Given that 
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this sensory hypothesis, by definition, does not correspond with objective reality, it will 
naturally drive prediction errors, rather than prediction matches, in lower-level 
representational units (Jamieson, 2016). This surge of prediction errors, driven by 
proprioceptive feedback from the target limb, will either cause the generative model to 
shift back to reality (i.e. revising the prior hypothesis) or initiate a movement to bring 
sensory input in line with the prediction (i.e. validating the prior hypothesis). Following 
this logic, less suggestible individuals may be more inclined to correct or reject a given 
sensory hypothesis, perhaps due to a heightened focus on their current state 
representation (i.e. present-oriented). In contrast, highly suggestible individuals may 
focus more strongly on the anticipated goal state (i.e. future-oriented) and will, 
therefore, be more inclined to change the sensory input to conform to the expectations 
of the generative model by engaging the motor system.   
In support on this conceptualisation, an interesting line of research has cast 
hypnotic responding as a form of strategic self-deception with respect to one’s current 
mental state (i.e. a lack of awareness of, or focus on, one’s current state representation; 
Dienes et al., 2016). In this account, hypnosis is contrasted with Buddhist meditative 
practices and secular mindfulness techniques which are described as a form of strategic 
self-insight. Consistent with this idea, research has demonstrated a negative correlation 
between hypnotic suggestibility and mindfulness, such that individuals with low scores 
on measures of hypnotic suggestibility tend to score highly on mindfulness scales 
(Grover, Jensen, Patterson, Gertz, & Day, 2018). Intuitively, this conceptualisation of 
hypnotic suggestibility corresponds nicely with the ideomotor prospective. If people are 
less responsive to hypnotic suggestion because they are more mindful (i.e. stronger self-
insight) then this is consistent with the notion of a heightened focus on the current state, 
which might preclude the activation of anticipated goal states. Conversely, if people are 
highly responsive to hypnosis because they are less mindful (i.e. weaker self-insight), 
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then this could reflect a reduced focus on the current state and a correspondingly 
stronger focus on anticipated goal states, inadvertently driving action (i.e. stronger self-
deception). If individual differences in hypnotic suggestibility are related to one’s 
predisposition to focus on current states (i.e. self-insight) or future goal states (i.e. self-
deception), then hypnotic suggestibility should exhibit a generally positive relationship 
with the intention insertion effect. To evaluate this prediction, participants’ 
suggestibility scores were combined with the data from Experiments 5 and 6. 
 
5.3. Experiment 7: A Test of the Relationship Between the Intention 
Insertion Effect and Ideomotor Suggestibility 
In order to test the proposed relationship between the intention insertion effect and 
ideomotor suggestibility, participants who had completed Experiments 5 and 6 were 
subjected to a suggestibility screening procedure immediately following completion of 
the intention insertion task. Suggestibility screening was carried out with the use of a 
novel protocol which combined the ideomotor items from established scales such as the 
Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (Shor & Orne, 1962) and the Stanford 
Scale of Hypnotic Suggestibility: Form C (Weitzenhoffer, Hilgard, & Kihlstrom, 1996). 
For the present study, the simple pass/fail scoring system used in the aforementioned 
scales was rejected in favour of operationalising suggestibility in terms of the extent 
(e.g. on a 0 to 3 scale) of overt movement following each item. This suits the purpose of 
assessing the relationship between the size of the intention insertion effect and the 





All participants who completed the task in Experiments 5 and 6 and met the 
criteria for inclusion in the respective analyses (N=67 and N=68 respectively) provided 
written consent to take part in the suggestibility screening procedure. 
 
5.3.1.2. Materials 
The suggestibility protocol consisted of a four-item scale that indexes the 
magnitude of the physical response to each suggestion. Typically, hypnotic 
suggestibility is assessed using one of a range of well-established protocols, such as the 
Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (HGSHS: Form A, Shor & Orne, 1962) 
or the Stanford Scale of Hypnotic Suggestibility (SSHS: Form C, Weitzenhoffer & 
Hilgard, 1962). These scales include different classes of suggestion such as ideomotor 
(e.g. arm levitation), challenge (e.g. arm rigidity) and executive function (e.g. amnesia) 
items. However, with the present study, the scope was deliberately narrowed to focus on 
the correspondence between motor output following ideomotor suggestions and the 
intention insertion effect. Therefore, the protocol used in Experiment 7 takes the 
established scales but uses only ideomotor items. 
The screening protocol was delivered by a trained hypnotherapist via headphones 
with a pre-recorded tape. A video camera was used to capture the participant’s 
responses to each item. In addition, a splitter was used to send the audio signal to both 
the headphones and the camera in order to appropriately timestamp each video for 
subsequent coding. The procedure lasted around 15 minutes and consisted of a brief 
introduction and four ideomotor suggestions, comprising (a) an eye closing suggestion; 
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(b) a head falling suggestion; (c) a hand levitation suggestion; and (d) a combination 
hand lowering and levitation suggestion. The recording began with an introduction to 
the procedure and explained the manner in which participants should engage with the 
task and then each item was delivered in succession.  
The first item was an eye closing suggestion in which participants were asked to 
relax and imagine how heavy their eyes were beginning to feel. The suggestions 
continued until 1m 55s into the recording, at which point the phrase, “Close your 
eyes…” was repeated. Participants were scored on a scale of 0 (e.g. eyes fully open) to 
2 (e.g. eyes fully closed) at this key moment in the tape.  
The second item was a head falling suggestion in which participants were asked to 
imagine that their head was feeling heavy and starting to fall forwards. The item began 
at 3m 10s with an instruction to sit upright in a comfortable position in the chair, still 
with the eyes closed. The suggestion ended with an instruction to, “stop there” at 5m 
30s and was scored according to the magnitude of the difference between starting and 
final posture. The scale ranged from 0 (e.g. no movement, sat upright) to 3 (e.g. both 
head and body fully slumped forwards, having started in an upright posture).  
The third item began at 6m 10s and consisted of a hand levitation suggestion. 
Participants were asked to place their non-dominant hand on their thigh and raise it 
slightly, such that only their fingertips are in contact with their leg. The recording gave 
instructions to imagine how light the hand feels and to picture it floating upwards. The 
item ended at 9m 10s and was scored according to the vertical displacement of the 
imagined hand. The scale ranged from 0 (e.g. the hand is still in contact with the leg) to 
3 (e.g. hand raised above the shoulder). 
The final item began at 10m 05s and consisted of a suggestion to imagine holding 
a pile of books in one hand and a bunch of balloons in the other. Participants began with 
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the arms outstretched, palms facing upwards. In one hand they were asked to picture a 
stack of books and to attend to feelings of heaviness as well as the look, shape and smell 
of the books. With the other hand, they were simultaneously asked to imagine their 
hand being pulled upwards by some helium balloons. The item formally finished at 
13:50, but participants varied in their ability to keep their arms outstretched for the full 
duration of the suggestion, so this item was coded according to the maximum difference 
between the vertical displacements of the two hands. The scale ranged from 0 (e.g. 
hands level) to 3 (e.g. one hand well above the shoulder and one well below). 
 
5.3.1.3. Procedure 
After completion of the intention insertion task (Experiments 5 and 6, Chapter 4), 
participants gave written consent to complete a brief screening procedure in order to 
assess individual differences in ideomotor suggestibility. Participants sat in a 
comfortable chair in a small, dimly lit room with large screens which divided the room 
in half. These privacy screens were intended to minimise feelings of self-consciousness 
and allowed the experimenter to stay out of view during the entire procedure. 
Participants were given a verbal briefing prior to screening in order to emphasise some 
important elements of the procedure. In particular, participants were specifically 
instructed that they must actively engage with each suggestion by constructing a vivid 
mental image of the scenario described by the recording, rather than listening passively. 
In addition, it was highlighted that the researchers were not interested in the 
participant’s final score and that less suggestible participants were just as important as 
those who were highly suggestible. Following this verbal briefing, the experimenter set 
the camera to record and began the tape. Participants were then left in relative privacy 
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for the duration of the screening procedure. When the recording finished, the camera 
was paused and the video file downloaded for later coding.  
 
5.3.1.4. Data Analysis 
The video files recorded were coded according to the criteria reported earlier. The 
scores on each item were scaled to fit the range zero to one and an average movement 
score was derived for each participant, which was used as an index of motor 
engagement. These scores were then mean-centred (e.g. with range -.5 to .5) and added 
to the combined datasets generated by Experiments 5 and 6. The data were then 
reanalysed using a model with an identical specification as those used in Chapter 4 with 
the addition of the ideomotor suggestibility score as a continuous covariate. As a 
consequence of the scaling of the ideomotor suggestibility score, a one unit change in 
this variable corresponds to the difference between the minimum and the maximum 
theoretical score under this protocol. 
 
5.3.2. Results 
5.3.2.1. Exclusion Criteria 
In total, 4 participants were excluded for making no attempt to engage with the 
screening procedure and 5 participants were excluded due to a recording malfunction. 
As a result of these exclusions, the final sample of N=126 consisted of participants who 
had satisfactorily completed both the intention insertion task and ideomotor 
suggestibility screening. Screening revealed that, on the original scale (i.e. not mean 
centred), the average ideomotor suggestibility score across all participants was .42 (SD 
= .24). 
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5.3.2.2. The Intention Insertion Effect and Ideomotor Suggestibility 
As in Chapter 4 (Experiments 5 and 6), this analysis models the pressure that was 
induced when participants were presented with action cues at the finger which matched 
and the finger that mismatched the observed movement. The intention insertion effect 
reflects a contrast of the presses produced by the cue-compatible and cue-incompatible 
finger in the critical 800ms period following cue onset. As in Experiments 4-6, cue-
compatible and cue-incompatible responses were baselined by subtracting the pressure 
exerted by participants in response to neutral cues (i.e. no movement). Importantly, the 
analysis focused only on those aspects of the data that are relevant to this prediction, 
namely the interaction of the intention insertion effect with the participant’s current 
mental imagery (i.e. imagining the same or a different movement to the currently 




Figure 22. A multi-panel plot showing differences in finger pressure during intervals 
following neutral vs. other types of action cue against imagery and across the full range 
of ideomotor suggestibility on the original scale (i.e. from the minimum, zero, to the 
maximum, one, theoretical score). Positive scores indicate participants pressed harder 
than in equivalent trials where a neutral cue was presented. Negative scores indicate that 
participants pressed less hard than following neutral cues (i.e. implying interference). 
The upper and lower panels distinguish responses where the participant was/was not 
required to imagine a movement in the recorded finger. The lines indicate whether the 
cue contained an animation of the same (i.e. congruent – solid)/other finger (i.e. 
incongruent – dotted) from that being recorded. 
For example, the top panel of Figure 22 shows that the pressure exerted by the 
cue-congruent and cue-incongruent finger generally increased with ideomotor 
suggestibility (relative to baseline) when participants also imagined a movement with 
that finger. Furthermore, visual inspection suggests that the intention insertion effect, 
captured by the difference in pressure at the cue-congruent and cue-incongruent finger, 
appears to increase with ideomotor suggestibility (i.e. the two slopes diverge). In 
contrast, the bottom panel of Figure 22 suggests that the magnitude of both cue-
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congruent and cue-incongruent responses, relative to baseline, decreases with ideomotor 
suggestibility. In addition, it appears that the intention insertion effect is very small in 
general (i.e. the difference between the two lines is small), and does not vary according 
to ideomotor suggestibility (i.e. the two lines are almost parallel) with incongruent 
imagery. 
As in Chapter 3 and 4 (Experiments 4-6), in order to gauge the strength of 
evidence for these observations, data were simulated from the model and summary 
statistics, Bayes-p values and evidence ratios regarding the differences of interest were 
calculated. To briefly recap, the posterior predictive Bayes-p values associated with the 
forthcoming contrasts represent the probability (given the model and the data) that the 
effect was in the predicted direction (i.e. H1), as opposed to the opposite direction (i.e. 
H0). To aid interpretation, Bayes-p values are recapitulated as evidence ratios (ER; 
analogous with Bayes factors) to describe the strength of evidence in favour of the 
directed hypothesis, weighted against the alternative hypothesis. For consistency, the 
weight of evidence in support of each directed hypothesis was described using 
terminology regularly applied to Bayes factors (Wagenmakers et al., 2018); “extremely 
strong” (ER: >100), “very strong” (ER: 30-100), “strong” (ER: 10 - 30), “moderate” 
(ER: 3 - 10), “anecdotal” (ER: >1 – 3) and “no evidence” (ER: 1). Importantly, 
evidence ratios less than one indicate that the evidence supports the alternative 
hypothesis; even more so for values which are a tiny fraction of one. For example, an 
ER < .01 represents extremely strong evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis. 
It was predicted that if highly suggestible participants are more prone to focusing 
on anticipated goal states, then the intention insertion effect should increase with 
ideomotor suggestibility and that the relationship should be strongest with congruent 
imagery. A test of the overall interaction provides moderate evidence (ER = 6.94) for a 
positive relationship between the intention insertion effect and hypnotic suggestibility 
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with congruent, relative to incongruent imagery (Posterior Mean = 6.07, 95% PCI [-4.3, 
16.6], Bayes-p = .874). In other words, the test suggests that it was 6.94 times more 
likely that participants who were more suggestible also tended to respond more strongly 
when viewing visual cues that match the currently imagined finger key press, as 
predicted. 
Step-down analyses confirm this interpretation. The analysis of the finger that the 
participants imaged moving (Figure 22, top panel) provides moderate evidence (ER = 
5.85) of a positive relationship between the intention insertion effect and ideomotor 
suggestibility (Figure 22, upper panel; Posterior Mean = 5.38, 95% PCI [-4.66, 15.39], 
Bayes-p = .854). Closer inspection reveals that there is strong evidence (ER = 14.4) that 
an increase in ideomotor suggestibility was associated with stronger presses at the cue-
congruent finger than baseline (Posterior Mean = 6.92, 95% PCI [-2.03, 16.13], Bayes-p 
= .935). That is, there is 14.4 times more evidence in favour of a positive relationship 
between the size of cue-compatible responses and ideomotor suggestibility than a 
negative relationship. However, counter to expectations, there is anecdotal evidence 
(ER = .57) that the interference effect caused by action cues on the cue-incongruent 
finger was weaker (i.e. the effect becomes less negative, implying less interference; 
Figure 22, upper panel, dotted line) with increasing suggestibility (Posterior Mean = 
1.53, 95% PCI [-6.93, 10.34], Bayes-p = .365).  
In contrast, the analysis of the finger that the participants did not imagine moving 
(Figure 22, bottom panel) provides anecdotal evidence (ER = .78) of a negative 
relationship between the intention insertion effect and ideomotor suggestibility 
(Posterior Mean = .68, 95% PCI [-9.28, 8.14], Bayes-p = .438). Accordingly, the tests 
revealed moderate evidence (ER = .16) that, with incongruent mental imagery, there 
was a negative relationship between ideomotor suggestibility and presses made with the 
cue-congruent finger (Figure 22Figure 22, lower panel, solid line; Posterior Mean = -
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4.86, 95% PCI [-13.52, 3.97], Bayes-p = .136). In addition, there was moderate 
evidence (ER = 6.14) that when the recorded finger was incongruent with the imagined 
movement, action cues interfered with cue-incongruent responses more strongly, 
relative to baseline, with increasing ideomotor suggestibility (Figure 22, lower panel, 
dotted line, Posterior Mean = -4.17, 95% PCI [-11.77, 3.53], Bayes-p = .86). 
 
5.3.3. Discussion 
The purpose of Chapter 5 was to test whether the non-willed action slips captured 
by the intention insertion task (Chapter 3 and 4) and the similar non-willed behaviour 
produced in simple hypnotic suggestions are linked. More specifically, the analysis 
presented here evaluated whether individual differences in ideomotor suggestibility (i.e. 
the motor component of hypnotic suggestibility) could be used to predict the magnitude 
of the intention insertion effect. In the introduction, it was proposed that highly 
suggestible individuals might be more prone to focusing on anticipated goal states (e.g. 
the simulated feelings associated with the suggestion) rather than their current state 
representation (e.g. the current position of the body in space). The findings of Chapter 4 
(Experiment 5 and 6) indicate that a heightened focus on anticipated events could 
inherently drive conflict with the current state and, by extension, predispose some 
people to produce the suggested behaviour. On this basis, it was predicted that if 
individual differences in ideomotor suggestibility reflect a predisposition to focus on 
goal states, then it should demonstrate a positive relationship with the intention insertion 
effect. As predicted, Experiment 7 suggested that, with compatible imagery, there was 
moderate evidence to suggest a positive relationship between the intention insertion 
effect and ideomotor suggestibility, particularly on the finger that participants’ 
concurrently imagined moving. 
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The prediction that the intention insertion effect should increase with ideomotor 
suggestibility implicitly assumed that both components of the effect would increase at 
the same rate (i.e. facilitation of cue-congruent responses and interference of cue-
incongruent responses would be in proportion). Indeed, the data revealed that there was 
evidence that higher suggestibility scores were associated with substantially stronger 
cue-congruent responses (i.e. which matched the observed movement) than baseline (i.e. 
the neutral, no movement condition). In contrast, there was only anecdotal evidence to 
suggest that the interference effect of action observation on the cue-incongruent 
response, relative to baseline, interacted with suggestibility. These findings appear to be 
quite consistent with the notion that those participants who score highly in ideomotor 
suggestibility may tend to focus more strongly on anticipated goal states if one assumes 
that the endogenously-driven goal state (e.g. via imagery) has primacy over an 
exogenously evoked goal state (e.g. via action observation). On this view, exogenous 
stimuli are able to evoke activity in action effect codes shared with the imagined 
movement (i.e. anticipated goal state) and enhance the generation of the corresponding 
(i.e. cue-congruent) response. In addition, one might speculate how this might have 
contributed to the absence of a strong correlation between ideomotor suggestibility and 
the interference effect typically observed at the cue-incongruent finger could occur. 
That is, a stronger focus on the endogenously driven goal state may also reduce the 
extent to which exogenous stimuli are able to activate competing (i.e. non-overlapping) 
action effect codes. 
The analysis of the individual components of the intention insertion effect at the 
finger which did not correspond with participants’ imagery provides further support for 
this interpretation. Recall that, when the recorded finger did not correspond with the 
imagined movement, both cue-congruent and cue-incongruent responses became 
steadily weaker than baseline with increasing ideomotor suggestibility. That is, visual 
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cues interfered more strongly, in general, with the initiation of the non-imagined 
response with increasing ideomotor suggestibility (i.e. a general negative relationship, 
but no overall interaction with the intention insertion effect). These findings are 
consistent with the idea that the action cues were only able to further magnify goal 
states already activated by imagery in highly suggestible participants, rather than 
activate novel, non-imagined goal states. Such an account corresponds nicely with the 
notion that highly suggestible participants focus more strongly on their endogenously 
driven active goal states, which might preclude the activation of competing goals driven 
by exogenous stimuli. Importantly, this view accounts for both the positive relationship 
between ideomotor suggestibility and the intention insertion effect with congruent 
imagery (i.e. amplifying an endogenous goal) and the lack of interaction with 
incongruent imagery (i.e. the exogenously activated goal is inhibited more strongly by 
the endogenous goal). 
 
5.3.3.1. A Brief History of Underwhelming Attempts at Predicting Hypnotic 
Suggestibility 
At this point, it is worth highlighting that hypnosis research has a long history of 
searching, often fruitlessly, for robust personality traits, cognitive constructs and 
behavioural patterns which can predict individual differences in hypnotic suggestibility 
(for review, see Lynn et al., 2015). For example, personality traits such as openness to 
experience demonstrate only weak correlations with hypnotic suggestibility (Cardeña & 
Terhune, 2014). Similarly, individual differences in cognitive constructs such as 
imagery vividness and absorption only show weak to moderate correlations with 
hypnotic suggestibility (e.g. Glisky, Tataryn, & Kihlstrom, 1995), which become 
weaker and statistically non-significant when researchers control for the hypnotic 
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context (Amanda J Barnier & McConkey, 1999). These findings have typically been 
taken as evidence that hypnosis is not a unitary concept and, instead, can be better 
characterised as a constellation of sub-components with relevance to specific classes of 
hypnotic suggestion (e.g. ideomotor, ideomotor challenge, perceptual-cognitive and 
posthypnotic amnesia, see Woody, Barnier, & McConkey, 2005). For example, highly 
suggestible participants who also scored highly on an imagery vividness scale were 
more prone to incorporating false memory suggestions (Labelle, Dixon, & Laurence, 
1989) and those high in imagery absorption were more convinced that their false 
memories were, in fact, real (Kandyba & Laurence, 1996). Indeed, the multifaceted 
nature of hypnosis research motivated the specific focus on the ideomotor aspect of the 
phenomenon under our definition of “ideomotor suggestibility”. However, given the 
apparent diversity of overlapping sub-components, it is perhaps not surprising that 
Experiment 7 only demonstrated a moderate relationship between the intention insertion 
effect and ideomotor suggestibility. It is entirely possible that there were individual 
differences in other components of hypnotic suggestibility (e.g. attention) which are not 
strictly ideomotor – and thus not well indexed by the screening procedure – but are still 
relevant to this form of hypnotic suggestion.  
 
5.3.3.2. Study Limitations 
While Experiment 7 did provide an important test of the assumption that the 
intention insertion effect arises from similar processes to those that produce hypnotic 
motor responses, the study was limited in two important respects which may account for 
the weakness of the observed relationship. First, ideomotor suggestibility was indexed 
by scoring the extent of overt movement in response to direct ideomotor suggestions 
borrowed from a range of established scales of hypnotic suggestibility (e.g. Harvard 
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Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Shor & Orne, 1962). This was a deliberate 
choice, motivated by research which suggested ideomotor suggestibility is a sub-
component of a more general trait of hypnotic suggestibility. However, ideomotor 
suggestions are considered the “easiest” to pass in the hierarchy of hypnotic suggestions 
(Amanda J Barnier, Dienes, & Mitchell, 2008) and therefore may not be sufficiently 
challenging to discriminate between participants who are moderately and highly 
suggestible. Anecdotally, a number of participants who scored in the upper range of 
ideomotor suggestibility behaved differently with respect to some of the more implicit 
suggestions in the screening procedure. For example, in between following the head 
falling and hand levitation, there was no explicit instruction to return to an upright 
seating position before the next suggestion. While most participants reset their posture, 
as instructed in previous items, a handful remained in a fully slumped position for the 
duration of the following suggestion, as if trapped in place. This suggests that ceiling 
effects may have limited the ability of the screening procedure to discriminate between 
moderately and highly suggestible participants. In future, a broader range of more 
difficult suggestions which are still relevant to the motor aspect of the phenomenon (e.g. 
ideomotor challenge suggestions, such as arm rigidity) would allow for greater 
precision for evaluating individual differences in ideomotor suggestibility. Importantly, 
this observation does not undermine the conclusions drawn from Experiment 7 and 
merely highlights that a more sensitive screening procedure would provide a better 
index of the phenomenon. 
Second, Experiment 7 was further limited in the respect that screening occurred 
after participants had completed the intention insertion task (Chapter 4, Experiments 5 
and 6). Again, this was a deliberate choice which was motivated by the need to 
complete test and screening in a single sitting in order to ensure efficient data collection 
and avoid data loss through participant non-attendance of follow-up appointments. In 
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addition, placing the screening procedure after the test was intended to limit the 
influence of any unintended demand characteristics of a hypnotic induction on the 
intention insertion task. However, it is possible that the completion of the intention 
insertion task (30-minute duration) may have fatigued some participants more than 
others with a potential to influence their performance in the subsequent screening 
procedure. In future, screening participants prior to the test in a setting that was not 
obviously connected with the subsequent experiment would ensure that equal numbers 
of low and highly suggestible participants could be tested and evaluated. This 
amendment, combined with more difficult ideomotor suggestions, would improve the 




In conclusion, Experiment 7 did indeed provide evidence in favour of a positive 
relationship between the intention insertion effect (with compatible imagery) and the 
behavioural responses to simple ideomotor suggestions, as predicted. However, while 
these data suggest that we can be fairly confident about the existence of the proposed 
conceptual relationship, several aspects of the design (e.g. the screening procedure) may 
mean that the extent of the relationship is actually underestimated. As a result, Chapter 
5 represents a starting point for future exploration of the extent of the relationship 
between these two phenomena. With an improved screening procedure which makes use 
of more difficult “challenge” suggestions, it may be possible to more thoroughly 
validate the intention insertion effect as a measure of ideomotor suggestibility, one of 





















6. Chapter 6: General Discussion 
6.1. Introduction 
The experiments presented in this thesis have examined non-willed behaviour (i.e. 
action slips) produced by participants during an imagery task. The studies tested 
fundamental assumptions about voluntary action control that are common to classical 
ideomotor theories and modern extensions of these principles (collectively, and rather 
crudely, referred to as “ideomotor models”; Adams, Shipp, & Friston, 2013; Clark, 
2013; Hommel, 2009; Prinz, 1997; Wolpert, 1997). Among these theories, there is 
broad agreement that perception and action are inextricably linked. Remarkably, 
however, there remains an enormous variety of different models which make subtly 
different claims about the manner in which perception and action interact (for a review, 
see Gentsch et al., 2016). One reason for this apparent divergence of theoretical opinion 
is the highly abstracted plain on which the discussion takes place and this obscures 
some of the natural conceptual overlap between different models. In addition, these 
accounts are largely reliant on theoretical computational models and some of their most 
fundamental claims have yet to be tested directly.  
Ideomotor models provide an intuitive framework for understanding how 
voluntary action control may be achieved simply by anticipating (i.e. imagining, 
predicting or otherwise “activating”) the perceptual consequences of desirable action 
goals. One only has to imagine a particular sensory effect one wishes to achieve (e.g. 
sipping from a glass of water) and automatic motor processes make this imagined act a 
reality (e.g. the reaching and grasping action required to reach this goal). When 
selecting an action, people voluntarily evoke (e.g. via imagery) the perceptual 
consequences of candidate actions (i.e. action effects) in order to generate the 
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appropriate behaviour. Importantly, action effects are also assumed to be activated by 
perceptual input.  
A great deal of research has demonstrated that people produce faster and more 
accurate responses if they are presented, just prior to execution, with the consequences 
of their intended action, relative to an alternative action (Shin et al., 2010). For example, 
people respond faster and more accurately when presented with a visual depiction of a 
corresponding movement (that is, “proximal” action effects; e.g. Brass, Bekkering, & 
Prinz, 2001; Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000), and when people 
encounter a tone which previously followed the to-be-executed action (“distal” action 
effects; e.g. Elsner & Hommel, 2001). Indeed, in the opening lines of their review, Shin 
et al. (2010, p. 943) explicitly stated that “Any activation of the effect image, either 
endogenously or exogenously, will trigger the corresponding action.” However, despite 
being such a fundamental assumption, the initiating function of action effect activation 
on the corresponding behaviour has only rarely (if at all) been addressed directly. 
Therefore, it is not clear whether imagery and perceptual input can really be considered 
functionally equivalent, such that perceptual inputs could accidentally trigger an 
imagined response if the shared action effect codes were activated strongly enough. 
That is, if one’s mental imagery happens to align with some strongly associated 
stimulus in the environment, would the corresponding action be automatically initiated? 
This line of thinking motivated the experiments presented in this thesis in which 
participants were presented with unexpected finger movements while they mentally 
rehearsed a finger tapping sequence in an effort to elicit action slips. If the assumptions 
of ideomotor models are taken seriously, then imagining and observing the same action 
should produce especially strong activation of shared action effects and, as a 
consequence, trigger the corresponding action – in spite of instructions to remain still. 
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6.2. Summary of Findings 
Across a number of chapters, the experiments presented in this thesis have 
provided robust evidence in favour of the idea that imagery, perception and action rely 
on a common neural infrastructure (e.g. Common Coding theory, Prinz, 1990, 1997; van 
der Wel, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2013). More specifically, these data support a long-held 
but, until now, an untested assumption of ideomotor models that action effect activation 
is translated into action when this “mental image” becomes sufficiently vivid; a core 
ideomotor concept that can be traced back to Carpenter (1852) and James (1890).  
Experiments 1-3 (Chapter 2) consistently found that observed finger movements 
triggered larger responses with the corresponding finger than the non-corresponding 
finger, particularly when the imagined and observed action were congruent. Thus, these 
experiments demonstrated, for the first time, that evoking the perceptual consequences 
of a given action (i.e. action effects), by endogenous (e.g. action imagery) and 
exogenous means (e.g. action observation), is sufficient to trigger the corresponding 
behaviour, in accordance with ideomotor principles (Shin et al., 2010).  
Experiment 4 (Chapter 3) further specified these effects by demonstrating that, 
with congruent mental imagery, observed finger movements both facilitated the 
execution of the corresponding response and interfered with the non-corresponding 
response, relative to a similarly salient, but motorically neutral stimulus. This finding 
suggests two things. First, that observing an action can selectively facilitate the 
corresponding response by further activating action effects which are shared with the 
imagined movement. Second, when the observed and imagined movements differ (e.g. 
an observed left finger tap, while imagining a right finger tap) the action effects evoked 
via perception (e.g. left) and imagery (e.g. right) interfere with one another – impairing 
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action initiation and reducing the magnitude of the subsequent action slip relative to 
baseline.  
Experiment 5 and 6 (Chapter 4) demonstrated that the tendency for an observed 
action to engage the motor system (i.e. the intention insertion effect) can be modulated 
with a body ownership illusion and by restricting visual feedback of participants’ limbs. 
That is, the effect was consistently weaker for those who were subjected to a body 
ownership illusion (i.e. virtual hand illusion) than for the control group without the 
illusion (Experiments 5 and 6). Furthermore, the intention insertion effect was enhanced 
when participants’ hands were occluded (Experiment 6) relative to when they were 
visible (Experiment 5). These findings argue against a direct coupling of visual (i.e. 
sensory) and motor representations serving the corresponding action, as assumed by 
models of motor control which seek to account for automatic imitation effects with 
general associative mechanisms (Associative Sequence Learning; Heyes & Bird, 2008; 
Heyes & Ray, 2000). For example, recall that in Experiments 5 and 6, the observed 
movements had a much weaker effect on the size of participants’ action slips in the 
heightened ownership group than the control group, even though the same set of visual 
stimuli were presented to both groups. If the visual input which corresponded with the 
observed movement activated the associated motor representation directly, then one 
would expect that heightening the correspondence between participants’ movements 
and the onscreen hands (and thus, the action effect binding) would enhance, not reduce 
the effect. Instead, this finding can be readily explained if one assumes that sensory 
information is integrated with higher-order multimodal representations, prior to 
engaging the motor system; an assumption which is common, but not necessarily 
explicit, in models based on ideomotor principles (Clark, 2013; Hommel, 2009; 
Wolpert, 1997). In this view, incoming sensory information is weighted towards either 
an internal representation which captures (i.e. estimates) the current state of one’s body 
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or, conversely, a representation which describes anticipated future goal states. 
Importantly, only goal states have the capacity to drive the motor system. To illustrate, 
consider the clapping game “Pat-a-cake”, in which people are able to coordinate 
complex sequences of individual, two-handed and crossed claps with a partner. If visual 
attention is directed toward one’s own movements, then these inputs correspond with 
the current state of the body and do not engage the motor system. Alternatively, 
observing a partner’s movement means that the visual inputs can be effectively used as 
goal states for our own motor system, allowing one to efficiently imitate the movements 
and learn new sequences. In other words, these findings support modern ideomotor 
accounts which assume that people maintain separate internal representations of the 
estimated current state of their body and potential future goal states. 
Furthermore, when participants’ hands were occluded (Experiment 6: Control 
Ownership group), there was evidence of a strong difference in the pressure induced by 
action cues at participants’ corresponding and non-corresponding fingers (i.e. a robust 
intention insertion effect) even when they were not imagining using this finger. This 
indicates that exogenous stimuli do not merely enhance (or interfere with) existing 
action plans (e.g. pushing an imagined action past the threshold for execution), but can 
also trigger even non-imagined behaviour when the corresponding action effects are 
activated strongly enough by the visual sensory input. Crucially, these data contrast 
with research which has only reported interference effects of imagery (Ramsey et al., 
2010) and action observation (Kilner, Hamilton, & Blakemore, 2007; Kilner, Paulignan, 
& Blakemore, 2003) on action execution. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, promising evidence of the assumed positive relationship 
between the magnitude of the intention insertion effect and ideomotor suggestibility was 
presented (i.e. the motor component of the broader trait of hypnotic suggestibility; 
Woody, Barnier, & McConkey, 2005). As predicted, participants who were more 
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responsive to simple ideomotor suggestions during a standardized hypnotic induction 
exhibited a stronger intention insertion effect (with compatible mental imagery) than 
those who were less responsive to the suggestions. This prediction was motivated by 
theoretical accounts of hypnotic responding (Jamieson, 2016) and sensory illusions (H. 
Brown et al., 2013) based on Active Inference (Adams et al., 2013). The findings of 
Experiment 7 were consistent with the notion that ideomotor suggestibility (and 
perhaps, hypnotic suggestibility more broadly) may reflect a tendency to focus on 
anticipated future goal states, rather than the current state of one’s body and the wider 
world. In this view, if highly suggestible individuals have a natural tendency to focus on 
anticipated (i.e. predicted) sensation, then they may naturally weight incoming sensory 
information towards integration with active goal states and are, therefore, more prone to 
inadvertently engaging the motor system (i.e. producing action slips). This 
conceptualisation draws parallels with modern accounts which cast the highly hypnotic 
subject as one who is prone to self-delusion (i.e. a tendency to focus on anticipated 
sensation), rather than self-insight (i.e. a tendency to focus on current sensation, or, 
one's current state; Dienes et al., 2016). Taken together, these experiments provide 
novel insights into the process by which we come to engage with the world. The 
findings have implications, not just for ideomotor models and the information 
processing steps involved in motor control, but our understanding of volition more 
generally. 
 
6.3. The Perceptual Format of Action Intentions 
The introductory paragraphs of this thesis (Chapter 1) raised the prospect that 
instances of accidental behaviour in everyday life (i.e. action slips; Freud, 1914; 
Reason, 1984) and responses to classical ideomotor phenomena (e.g. Chevreul’s 
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Pendulum; Easton & Shor, 1975, 1976, 1977) are not random but, instead, are borne of 
the same processes which govern willed action. For example, one might find oneself 
absentmindedly reaching for a jug of milk rather than a freshly boiled kettle and pouring 
a full cup of cold milk rather than hot water onto the waiting teabag. In this case, both 
the milk jug and kettle are of similar size, have a handle and afford a similar grasping 
action and, indeed, both are required to make tea – just not in that order or in those 
quantities! Crucially, such action slips are often explained away after the fact by 
suggesting that these obviously erroneous actions were somehow “unintentional”. The 
question that motivated this thesis was, how is it that people can produce behaviour if it 
is not, in some sense, willed? To that end, Experiments 1-7 of the present thesis 
produced several findings which have provided novel insights into the role of imagery 
and perception in the generation of non-willed action slips. 
Action in the real world has been conceptualised as an interaction of higher-level 
goals with lower-level cues from the environment: actions are executed if they match 
both the individual’s goals and are afforded by the environment (Cisek, 2007; Guérard 
& Brodeur, 2015; Kunde et al., 2007; Ondobaka & Bekkering, 2012). The keyboard-
based (Experiment 1-3) and pressure-based (Experiments 4-6) intention insertion tasks 
can be considered as a model for these interactions. In ideomotor frameworks, higher-
level goals are nothing more than the imagined action effects one wants to achieve 
(Hommel et al., 2001), similar to the imagined actions in the intention insertion task. 
The findings of Experiments 1-6 suggest that bottom-up activity induced by perceptual 
cues in the environment – in this case, the observed actions – activate the same action 
effect representations as top-down mental imagery and, when congruent, can combine 
to trigger overt action. In essence, this view implies that forming an intention to act is 
merely a case of strongly activating the action effects that are shared with the desired 
movement to the extent that they engage the motor system. Importantly, provided that 
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the resulting activation surpasses the response threshold, action can be driven by 
endogenous (e.g. imagery) and/or exogenous (e.g. action observation) sources of 
activation.  
It has been argued that there are two classes of action which rely on separate 
neural substrates; “stimulus-based” actions that function as prepared reflexes to 
environmental stimuli (i.e. simple sensorimotor contingencies) and “intention-based” 
actions which aim to produce some endogenously specified effect (Herwig et al., 2007). 
In this view, stimulus-based actions are driven by exogenous processes and are assumed 
to be mediated by simple stimulus-response associations which bind a motor 
representation of the desired action with the conditions (i.e. specific exogenous sensory 
input) under which it must be executed (e.g. “red light – brake” when driving a car). In 
contrast, intention-based actions are assumed to be driven by endogenous processes and 
mediated by action effect associations which bind a motor representation and its typical 
perceptual effects. That is, the mere anticipation of the perceptual consequences of the 
action one wishes to achieve will automatically evoke the corresponding motor 
program. Inherent in this conceptualisation is the assumption that a given action will be 
either stimulus-driven or intentional (goal/effect-driven). However, action slips captured 
by the intention insertion tasks (Experiments 1-6) appear to provide an intermediate 
example of a behaviour which is neither wholly stimulus-driven nor intention-driven. 
Indeed, a natural consequence of the way ideomotor models conceive of voluntary 
action control is that it is precisely this combination of endogenous imagery and 
exogenous perceptual input which allows people to interact so effortlessly with the 
world. In other words, in such views, the vast majority of actions (excluding classical 
reflexes, e.g. the knee jerk response) are, to some extent, the product of endogenous and 
exogenous processes.  
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In Chapter 1, it was proposed that the purpose of an action goal (i.e. the intention-
driven component) is to broadly specify a range of behaviours that might be appropriate 
in a given context. In the ideomotor view, this is achieved by anticipating (i.e. 
predicting, imagining or otherwise “activating”) relevant action effects, to a 
subthreshold level, in order to allow for the efficient translation of sensory input into 
motor output. Importantly, this “pre-activation” of candidate actions (or potential goal 
states) allows stimuli in the environment to trigger responses automatically when action 
effects activated by exogenous perceptual input correspond with those activated by 
one’s endogenously formed goals. The findings of Experiments 1-6 were entirely 
consistent with this claim. To illustrate, all experiments consistently showed that 
participants were more likely to produce action slips with the finger they currently 
imagined using than the non-imagined finger, independently of the observed action. 
This finding implies that action slips may be more similar to intention-driven than 
stimulus-driven actions because endogenously driven activation of action effect codes 
(i.e. via imagery) appeared to make a stronger contribution to the initiation of the 
corresponding action than perceptual input. Indeed, taken in isolation, this finding could 
be interpreted as evidence that a strong mental image is some kind of prerequisite for 
action slips to occur. This proposal is similar to the notion that a broad prospective 
intention to produce the imagined movement when appropriately cued (i.e. as per task 
instructions) provides the preconditions for the environment to subsequently trigger the 
immediate intention to act - initiating the imagined response (Pacherie, 2008; Pacherie 
& Haggard, 2010). However, the findings of Experiment 6 demonstrated that external 
stimuli (e.g. observed actions) can elicit the corresponding action, even in the absence 
of any specific endogenous activation of the goal. Recall that in Experiment 6, when 
participants’ hand were occluded (in the control ownership condition), visual action 
cues enhanced the execution of the corresponding action, even when it did not match 
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the participants imagined movement. These enhanced movements of the non-imagined 
finger are more evocative of stimulus-driven actions, in which an observed movement 
reflexively triggered the corresponding response so substantially that it was able to 
overcome competition with the imagined (i.e. intention-driven) movement. 
Considering the role of both stimulus- and intention-driven activation of action 
effects, two aspects of these findings are of note. First, the interactions observed in all 
experiments showed that action slips were most likely when the visual stimulus 
matched the imagined (i.e. intended) movement, to an extent that did not simply reflect 
a simple addition of the main effects of imagery- and cue-congruence (i.e. 
independently of one another). In fact, the effect was super-additive. That is, the same 
visual cue made action slips both much more likely (Experiments 1-3) and of 
significantly greater magnitude (Experiments 4-5, but not Experiment 6) when it 
corresponded with the currently imagined finger than the non-imagined finger. This 
finding can readily be explained if one assumes that the endogenous (i.e. intention-
driven) activation of a set of action effect codes brings the corresponding response 
closer to the threshold for execution, such that the additional influence of observing a 
compatible movement readily pushes the action super-threshold. In contrast, the finger 
which is not currently imagined is much further from the threshold for execution and 
the same visual cue does nothing (unless participants hands were occluded, as in 
Experiment 6). This conceptualisation parallels with threshold models of voluntary 
action which describe the moment of action initiation in terms of an integration-to-
bounds mechanism (Churchland et al., 2008; Murakami et al., 2014; Schurger et al., 
2016). In such models, the evidence in favour of candidate actions accumulates until the 
motor threshold is reached and the most suitable action is initiated. Experiments 1-6 
indicate that this proposed process of “evidence accumulation” may correspond with the 
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activity in multimodal action effect codes. Actions are initiated when an internal 
representation of an action’s perceptual consequences becomes sufficiently active. 
Second, it is important to emphasise that both Experiments 5 and 6 (Chapter 4) 
revealed the effect of observing movements during imagery was reduced when 
participants experienced a body ownership illusion, relative to a control group without 
the illusion. This evidence runs counter to the Associative Sequence Learning theory of 
imitation, in which visual stimulation activates the corresponding action plan directly 
via associations acquired through repeated correlated experience of initiating actions 
and then perceiving movement contingent effects (e.g. Heyes, Bird, Johnson, & 
Haggard, 2005; Heyes & Ray, 2000). Indeed, according to this approach, one might 
have expected that the ownership illusion would have had no effect or, if anything, 
enhance the effect as a result of strengthening the correspondence between participants’ 
movements and the movements of the virtual hand. Accordingly, the opposite results of 
the manipulation of ownership (Experiment 6) require a quite different explanation. In 
line with ideomotor views, it was suggested that this finding provides evidence that 
sensorimotor processes make use of two, relatively independent, types of 
representation; one which captures the estimated current state of the body and one 
which refers to anticipated future goal states. Under this view, visual inputs (e.g. an 
observed action) can only engage the motor system if they are integrated with one’s 
goal state and, importantly, not if they are integrated with one’s current state (i.e. the 
observed movements are not considered self-generated). That is, the ownership illusion 
promotes the integration of visual sensory input with the current state (correspondingly 
decreasing the contribution to the goal state) and, as a result, reduces the magnitude of 
the intention insertion effect. 
The notion of separate representations of current and goal states becomes 
especially important in light of the results of Experiment 7 (Chapter 5). Experiment 7 
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revealed a positive relationship between individual differences in ideomotor 
suggestibility and the magnitude of the intention insertion effect (i.e. the extent to which 
perceptual cues modulated the imagined response). This positive relationship could 
suggest that some people are more prone to producing action slips because of a natural 
tendency to focus on anticipated future goal states, rather than their current state. In this 
view, a tendency to focus on anticipated, rather than actual sensations may be the 
driving force behind responsiveness to all kinds of hypnotic suggestion, not just 
ideomotor suggestions. For example, visual hallucinations are considered to be some of 
the most difficult hypnotic suggestions to experience and are, typically, the preserve of 
so-called “virtuoso” hypnotic subjects (Woody & Sadler, 2005). This may reflect the 
fact that visual input, as the dominant sense, is very precise and, therefore, requires an 
especially strong focus on the anticipated (i.e. imagined) visual stimulation to 
experience. These “virtuoso” subjects may so inclined to attend to anticipated visual 
stimulation meaning that it more readily obscures the true visual input – creating the 
visual illusion.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that non-willed behaviour really is a 
curious by-product of the processes which are implicated in volitional action control. 
Actions are initiated when an internal representation of the associated perceptual 
consequences becomes sufficiently active. This may, therefore, explain why many 
everyday actions are executed seemingly automatically, simply because they match the 
goals one has previously committed to and the structure of the environment (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1999; Kunde et al., 2007). Further, these findings may account for why one’s 
longer-term action plans (e.g. healthy eating) are followed more easily when one has 
visualised one’s behaviour in the relevant situation (Brandstatter, Lengfelder, & 
Gollwitzer, 2001). They may also explain the wide range of action slips that people 
make, where they sometimes perform unintended actions (e.g., picking one’s nose in 
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public, taking a wrong turn in the car), find themselves copying the postures and 
mannerisms of others (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), or respond, in a seemingly 
unintentional way, to ideomotor hypnotic suggestions. This view suggests that the 
purpose of a broader action goal (e.g. commute to work) is to specify light constraints 
(e.g. maintaining speed) and sensorimotor contingencies (e.g. green light means go) 
which allow for the smooth translation of sensory input into motor output. Furthermore, 
these findings potentially link the generation of non-willed action slips, not just to 
mechanisms involved in volitional action control, but to illusions of predictive 
processing found in other, non-motor, domains (e.g. visual hallucination). 
 
6.4. Volition in Action 
At this stage, it is important to consider the implications that this research has for 
the broader concept of volition in action – a diffuse concept without a clear definition 
(Haggard, 2019). The discussion thus far has focused on the mechanisms which gave 
rise to the action slips captured by the intention insertion task. However, the findings 
clearly have relevance to the more general question of the extent to which we control 
our behaviour in everyday life – the notion of willed action. To this end, the responses 
observed in Experiments 1-6 are discussed in the context of several of the characteristic 
features of volitional actions described in a recent review by Haggard (2019). 
 
6.4.1. Volitional Acts are Endogenously Driven 
One feature which is commonly attributed to volitional actions is that of being 
endogenously generated (i.e. intention-driven), as opposed to a reaction to some 
external stimulus (i.e. stimulus-driven; Herwig, Prinz, & Waszak, 2007). On one 
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account, volitional acts are those in which endogenous processes, rather than exogenous 
perceptual input, determine whether an action should be made, what form it should take 
and when it should be executed (i.e. the WWW model of Brass & Haggard, 2008). As 
noted in the previous section, action slips appear to provide an intermediate example of 
an action that is partially driven (and specified) by internal processes (i.e. imagery) and 
partly driven by external stimulation. For example, Experiments 1-5 demonstrated that 
observed movements had a substantially larger effect if the participants also imagined a 
similar action. This suggests that endogenous processes (i.e. imagery) were largely 
responsible for determining the form (i.e. the “what” component) of the accidentally 
produced action, but the visual cues were able to override the “whether” and “when” 
attributes of the imagined action, in effect pushing the pre-activated action goal over the 
response threshold. Then again, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the data could also 
be conceptualised in light of an integration-to-bounds mechanism (Churchland et al., 
2008; Murakami et al., 2014; Schurger et al., 2016) if one assumes that activated action 
effects constitute the evidence accumulated by such a mechanism. In such a model, the 
activated action effects both specify the form of the action and - via the strength of their 
activation relative to the response threshold – whether and when it is executed.  
It is interesting to note that, in the normal condition (i.e. no ownership illusion) of 
Experiment 6, in which participants hands were occluded, visual cues primed the 
corresponding response so substantially that this action was enhanced even when 
participants did not concurrently imagine moving this finger. Similarly, even in the 
original experiments (Chapter 2), external stimuli could sometimes cause participants to 
press the alternative finger that they did not currently imagine moving. This suggests 
that external stimuli, when sufficiently salient, are able to override endogenously 
specified actions and dictate a different form (i.e. the “what”) of initiated action, in 
addition to the “whether” and “when” components. This conceptualisation is entirely 
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consistent with the assumed common medium of perceptual action effect activation that 
dictates all three of these components (e.g. Common Coding Theory, Prinz, 1990, 1997; 
van der Wel, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2013). For pragmatic reasons, it may be useful to 
conceptualise volition in action in terms of a continuum between those which are more 
strongly determined by either endogenous, intentional process or exogenous stimuli in 
the environment. In this context, the action slips observed at the participant’s non-
imagined finger, which were more strongly determined by exogenous stimulation, could 
be considered less volitional than those which corresponded with the participants’ 
imagined movements.  
 
6.4.2. Volitional Acts are Goal-directed 
Another feature typically attributed to volitional actions is that they are generated 
for a reason. That is, volitional actions can be considered a means of achieving or 
advancing towards desirable goal states (i.e. they are goal-directed). In this context, the 
responses collected by Experiments 1-6 could be considered non-willed because they 
did not advance the explicitly stated task goal of remaining still during imagery. 
However, this is not to suggest that the action slips generated by the intention insertion 
task were not goal-directed in any way. Indeed, Experiments 1-6 demonstrated how 
one’s intended goal to engage in movement imagery and to simulate the perceptual 
effects of finger movements created fertile preconditions for the environment to trigger 
responses which violated the higher-level (and explicitly stated) goal of remaining still. 
In this way, one could argue that imagery and perceptual input were each able to 
activate lower-level and more immediate goal states (with the potential to activate the 
motor system) which corresponded with the imagined and observed movements. From 
this perspective, the effect of movement observation on participants’ non-imagined 
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responses (Experiment 6, control ownership group) still advanced their behaviour 
towards an outcome that was, in a broad sense, similar to their imagined goal. For 
example, the observed and imagined actions both corresponded with a downward 
movement of an index finger, even though the movements mismatched in terms of 
laterality (e.g. observing a left finger tap while imagining a right tap). However, in 
Experiment 6, the visual input made a larger contribution to the initiation and form of 
the executed action and was sufficiently salient to overcome competition with the 
participant’s imagined goal (i.e. due to mismatching laterality of observed and imagined 
movements). That is, when visual cues elicited action slips with participants’ non-
imagined fingers, the intention to produce these movements was strongly driven by the 
environment, rather than largely driven by an endogenously evoked goal. In this 
context, one might consider the action slips produced by participants’ non-imagined 
fingers to be less volitional than those produced by the finger the participant imagined 
using because the endogenously activated goal had less of an influence over the initiated 
action.  
 
6.4.3. Volitional Acts Have a Distinctive Subjective Experience  
Another feature which is claimed to distinguish volitional actions from more 
habitual, automatic actions is the distinctive subjective experience of having caused a 
particular movement. Experiments 1-6 did not directly assess participants’ sense of 
awareness and agency, so it is beyond the scope of these data to draw conclusions about 
participants’ subjective experiences of having produced action slips. This was a 
deliberate decision made on the basis that any attempt to question participants about 
their responses (e.g. asking “did you produce a response?” following each visual cue) 
during the task itself would draw unwanted attention to the purpose of the manipulation 
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and may have influenced the subsequent responding. However, it is possible to 
indirectly infer that participants were aware of having responded due to the 
characteristic decline in responsiveness during the course of the keyboard-based 
intention insertion task reported in Experiments 1-3 (Chapter 2). It suggests that 
participants actively either inhibited their responses after they noticed responding in 
error following the first visual cue, or they increased their response threshold and, in 
effect, required greater activation (or, “evidence” in threshold models, e.g. Churchland 
et al., 2008) to execute a given movement. Anecdotally, during the experimental debrief 
of all experiments, participants commonly reported that they were aware they were 
responding in error and that it was “effortful” to avoid doing so. However, the precise 
nature of the subjective experience of producing action slips, which appear to have 
characteristics of both willed and non-willed behaviour, remains an open question for 
future research.  
 
6.4.4. The Broader Question of Volitional Control of Mental Events 
Haggard’s (2019) review deliberately focused on the notion of volition as it 
relates to action initiation and motor control, and explicitly excluded the question of 
volitional control of purely mental contents (e.g. thoughts, images, memories, and 
emotions). However, constraining the discussion in this way naturally obscures the 
dynamic nature and context sensitivity of the processes which generate overt behaviour 
(Schurger & Uithol, 2015; Uithol, Burnston, & Haselager, 2014). Indeed, while it may 
seem obvious that some thoughts (or mental images) are more strongly “motor” than 
others (e.g. imagining a ball flying through the air vs. imagining throwing it); in 
ideomotor models (e.g. TEC; Hommel, 2009), both can drive action equally. What 
matters is only whether the mental images can serve as potential action outcomes, 
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irrespective of whether they are proximally related to the motor behaviours (e.g. 
imagining the actual hand movements) or distally (e.g. the specific ball trajectory one 
intends to achieve), as long as they are reliably associated with the motor command that 
produced them.  
Note also that the extent to which an external stimulus may trigger a thought that 
closely corresponds with a specific action outcome will vary according to context. For 
example, one might encounter a pop-up advert for beer which simply consists of the 
name of the brewery. If coincidentally, there was a glass of this brand of beer within 
reach, one might feel compelled by the advert to drink from it. In this case, the initial 
visual stimulus had no obvious motor content, but the chain of events led to the 
evocation of a specific action goal (i.e. sip from the glass) which produced the 
corresponding behaviour. The specific action goal that produced the movement appears 
to be endogenously formed and, yet, the preceding stimulus (i.e. pop-up advert) can 
only be said to have caused the action in a rather indirect way. Consider then, whether it 
is useful or appropriate to attempt to trace the causal chain of events backwards in time 
and, indeed, whether such a search is likely to yield a single, focal origin for any given 
action. The same is true for the action slips investigated here. 
The intention insertion task, by design, considers only the specific conditions that 
were associated with the 800ms critical interval following the onset of a surprising 
visual cue (i.e. the identity of the imagined and observed movement). However, as 
mentioned earlier, participants may well have formed a broadly specified prospective 
intention (Pacherie, 2008; Pacherie & Haggard, 2010) to respond (in any way) to visual 
stimuli. Such a prospective intention may then have created the preconditions for the 
subsequent observed movements to elicit responses (i.e. to insert an immediate intention 
to act) and, in some sense, “caused” the subsequent action slips. That said, it must be 
emphasised that this seems antagonistic with the instruction to ignore “distracting 
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stimuli” that was explicitly and repeatedly stated in Experiments 1-6. Indeed, if a 
prospective intention to “respond to visual stimuli” exerted a greater influence on the 
generation of action slips than the interaction of the participants’ imagery and the 
observed movement, then one would have expected participants to produce highly 
stereotyped responses (e.g. only producing the imagined response to all kinds of visual 
cue). Instead, the robust compatibility effect observed in Experiments 1-6 demonstrates 
that the interaction of imagery and perceptual input had a substantial effect on both the 
form and timing of the subsequent action slips. Crucially, when participants’ hands 
were occluded (Experiment 6, control ownership group), the observed movements 
activated the corresponding response so substantially that there was clear evidence of an 
intention insertion effect, even for responses which mismatched participants’ imagery. 
This finding, and the fact it was not evident in Experiments 4-5, implies that perceptual 
inputs really can cause movements (i.e. actions that would, otherwise, not be executed). 
Together, these findings suggest that it is the moment-by-moment dynamic interaction 
of endogenous mental imagery and exogenous perceptual input makes a strong causal 
contribution to the generation of action slips. Furthermore, this dynamic interaction has 
a stronger influence on the form and timing of the action slips produced in any given 
moment than a vague prospective intention (e.g. an “early whether” decision in the 
WWW model of Brass & Haggard, 2008) to respond to visual stimuli.  
 
6.4.5. Conclusion  
According to the criteria for volitional actions discussed by Haggard (2019), the 
responses captured by Experiments 1-6 appear to share features of both willed and non- 
(or, at least, less-) willed acts. Together, therefore, the data from Experiments 1-7 
suggest that while typical motor behaviour is always goal-directed – and therefore, in 
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some sense “volitional” – people might not have full control of their goals. The data 
suggest that visual stimuli can, in effect, insert lower level goals into participants’ action 
control mechanisms. The characteristic feeling of involuntariness which tends to 
accompany accidental slips of action control might be better described as the feeling of 
transitioning towards an unexpected (or inappropriate) goal, rather than noticing that 
one has executed an incorrect action which may not have been consciously specified 
(e.g. the specific trajectory for a reaching and grasping movement).  
On the basis of these findings, one might suggest that a more useful description of 
"volition" in action may be the extent to which the internal representations that produce 
a given movement are driven by top-down imagery, rather than bottom-up perceptual 
input. However, if the internal representation responsible for the initiated action is 
evoked endogenously, but as the consequence of a longer-term train of thought evoked 
by an external stimulus (e.g. the beer advert mentioned previously), then this distinction 
obscures some of the complexity in volitional action control. Indeed, as noted by Schüür 
and Haggard (2011), the role of volition in action may be to integrate sensory inputs and 
prior knowledge over an extended time period or to direct attention towards stimuli 
which support one’s long-term goals in order to guide behaviour. As a result, when 
considering the extent to which a given action is “intentional”, it is important to 
consider all the antecedent events which might have given rise to the activation of the 
specific action effect representation which triggered the executed action.  
 
6.5. Open Questions and Future Directions 
In addition to addressing questions about the relationship between imagery and 
perception on the initiation of non-willed actions, the current thesis also motivates 
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several lines of inquiry for future research. In the following section, some interesting 
open questions are discussed, along with some potential avenues for future research 
designed to address them. 
 
6.5.1. Subjective Experience of Non-Willed Action 
Volitional actions are characteristically self-referential and are typically 
distinguished from reflex actions by both a characteristic feeling of awareness that an 
action has taken place and a higher-order feeling of one’s own role in having caused the 
behaviour to occur (i.e. a sense of agency). Indeed, one might define the subjective 
sense of volition as all that separates the feeling that “I” pressed a key with my finger, 
from the fact that my index finger moved downwards (Patrick Haggard, 2019). In the 
previous section, it was noted that Experiments 1-6 were not designed to assess 
participants’ subjective experience of producing non-willed behaviour and, as a result, 
this is an obvious line of enquiry. Specifically, it was considered important to avoid 
drawing too much attention to the purpose of the visual cues (i.e. to initiate actions) by 
asking participants about any action slips that they might have produced. It was 
assumed that by asking participants to scrutinise their behaviour, the visual cues would 
have been less effective at inducing movements. However, now that the pressure-based 
intention insertion task (e.g. Chapter 3, Experiment 4) has been validated and the 
intention insertion effect has been replicated and extended (Chapter 4, Experiments 5-
6), it is important to question this assumption. 
One might begin by creating a new version of the intention insertion task in 
which, after each visual cue, participants reported, (a) whether they produced a response 
following the onset of each cue, and; (b) which response they executed, and; (c) a rating 
of their subjective sense of agency or control with respect to the reported movement 
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(e.g. on a Likert scale). Such a design would motivate four interesting questions. First, 
to what extent are people aware they are making non-willed responses? Second, are 
those individuals who are more susceptible to producing the effect (and therefore 
produce larger overt responses) more or less aware of their behaviour? Third, would 
asking people to make self-referential judgements about their own behaviour drastically 
reduce the size of the overall size of the intention insertion effect? Fourth, and finally, 
do people feel a general lack of agency with respect to the induced movements or do 
judgements of agency interact with the compatibility between participants’ imagery and 
the observed movement. This latter question is particularly interesting because 
Experiments 4-6 consistently demonstrated that participants produced the largest action 
slips when the observed movement was compatible with their imagined movement. 
However, research has revealed that priming participants, just prior to execution, with 
compatible action effect information can actually enhance explicit judgements of 
agency, compared to when those effects are incompatible with the executed action 
(Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005). This motivates the counterintuitive prediction that 
people might experience a greater sense of agency following trials in which they 
produced the strongest action slips (i.e. when the imagined and observed movements 
were compatible) than following trials in which participants produced the weakest 
action slips (i.e. when the imagined and observed movements were incompatible).  
 
6.5.2. Direct Assessment of Current/Goal State Proposal 
Another important avenue for future research is the proposal that sensorimotor 
processes make use of two, relatively separate internal representations which capture 
either; (1) one’s estimated current state, or; (2) anticipated goal states (Chapter 4). 
While Experiments 5 and 6 provided evidence that was consistent with this 
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conceptualisation, the use of an ownership illusion complicates the interpretation of 
these data. In order to provide a more direct test of whether action emerges from the 
conflict between one’s current state and an activated goal state, the intention insertion 
task could be slightly modified. To illustrate, participants could be presented with a 
number in place of the central fixation cross to indicate their current finger position (i.e. 
the current state) which ranged from one (i.e. resting position) to five (i.e. key fully 
depressed). This would provide the opportunity to present participants with false 
feedback about their current state immediately prior to the presentation of visual cues 
(i.e. inserted goal state) and, by extension, would allow the magnitude of the difference 
between the current state and the goal state to be manipulated. If, as proposed in 
Chapter 4, action is a consequence of a discrepancy between one's current state and an 
active goal state, then artificially reducing this discrepancy by implying that 
participants’ fingers are already partially or completely depressed should limit or 
eliminate the motor output.  
 
6.5.3. Attending to Current or Anticipated Sensation in Predictive Processing 
Experiment 7 (Chapter 5) provided evidence in support of a positive relationship 
between individual differences in the tendency to produce action slips and individual 
differences in ideomotor suggestibility (a sub-component of the broader trait of 
hypnotic suggestibility, Woody, Barnier, & McConkey, 2005). One explanation for this 
finding is that people were more prone to producing non-willed behaviour in both the 
main task and screening procedure due to a natural tendency to focus on (and integrate 
sensory information with) anticipated goal states than the estimated current state. The 
notion that there may be strong individual differences in the manner in which perceptual 
input is processed (i.e. whether sensory information weighted towards the current or 
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goal state) could, therefore, be of relevance to research regarding other forms of 
predictive processing, such as with visual perception and the representational 
momentum effect. For example, it has been demonstrated that people make a small but 
consistent error when asked to estimate the position of moving objects. The 
representational momentum effect describes how people will reliably judge the object to 
be further along its predicted trajectory than its true location – as if their percept is 
modulated by their expectations (Freyd & Finke, 1984). More recently, these findings 
have been extended to the domain of predictive social processing – how we predict and 
interpret the behaviour of others. Research suggests that one’s perception of an 
inefficient reaching motion (i.e. one that takes an indirect route from A to B) shows a 
consistent bias towards the efficient trajectory (i.e. a direct route from A to B) that one 
would expect based on prior experience of reaching and grasping movements (Hudson, 
McDonough, Edwards, & Bach, 2018). These kinds of representational momentum 
effects could be accounted for if one assumes that perceptual judgements are a product 
of both current and anticipated visual input. For example, one would expect highly 
suggestible people to show a stronger representational momentum effect because of a 
tendency to focus on anticipated goals (i.e. the efficient route), rather than the current 
state (e.g. the observed inefficient route). This is because, on this logic, the perceptual 
judgements of highly suggestible people would be more strongly informed by 
anticipated sensation than actual sensation in comparison to less suggestible people. 
Accordingly, if individual differences in the tendency to produce action slips reflect a 
predisposition to attend to current or anticipated internal representations (both within 
and without the motor domain) then the intention insertion effect (and, indeed, 
ideomotor suggestibility) should demonstrate a positive relationship with the 
representational momentum effect.  
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6.5.4. The Brain Basis of Volition in Action 
Research concerning the neural origins of voluntary action defines “volition” as 
“a state or process that leads to action” (Patrick Haggard, 2019). Under this view, it is 
argued that voluntary actions can be distinguished from more reflexive, stimulus-driven 
actions in the brain by using neuroimaging techniques to identify the unique neural 
networks recruited during the execution of each kind of action. Decades of 
neuroimaging research has implicated several cortical circuits which predominantly 
serve either internally generated “volitional” actions or stimulus-driven responses to 
environmental stimuli (for review, see Haggard, 2008). These circuits, it is claimed, 
converge on the primary motor cortex (M1) which provides a “final common path” for 
action as the signals are transmitted via the spinal cord to the relevant effector. If the 
action slips generated by the intention insertion task represent an “intermediate” 
example of behaviour, then it would be interesting to investigate whether their neural 
activation corresponded more closely with volitional actions or reflexive responses to 
external stimuli. 
Two important frontal regions which project afferent signals to M1 are the 
Supplementary Motor Area (SMA) and the Premotor Cortex (PMC; Haggard, 2019). 
While both regions are involved in the coordination of complex movements, there is 
evidence of a double dissociation in their role in generating action. For example, a study 
which applied repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) during different 
types of action suggested that the SMA is preferentially involved in the preparation of 
voluntary, rather than externally cued actions, whereas the PMC shows the opposite 
pattern (Lu, Arai, Tsai, & Ziemann, 2012). If afferent signals from the SMA reflect the 
contribution of endogenous imagery and signals from the PMC reflect the contribution 
of exogenous perceptual input, then this could suggest that action slips occur when the 
combined activity of the SMA and the PMC crosses the threshold to engage M1. This 
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proposal provides an indication of how the behaviour generated by the intention 




In conclusion, the current thesis provides direct, behavioural evidence in favour of 
some of the fundamental assumptions about the mechanisms of voluntary action first 
made by 19th century ideomotor theorists (Carpenter, 1852; James, 1890), which were 
then formalised by modern theories of ideomotor action control (e.g. Theory of Event 
Coding, Hommel, 2009; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001), extended by 
computational models (Wolpert, 1997; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000) and, most 
recently, recast in terms of Bayesian predictive processing (Adams et al., 2013; Clark, 
2013). When reviewing the diverse assortment of models of motor control, one is struck 
by the extent to which they are in broad agreement about a central feature of voluntary 
action – that action, perception and mental imagery are inextricably linked because they 
rely on a common neural infrastructure and are coded in a fundamentally perceptual 
format (e.g. Common Coding theory, Prinz, 1990, 1997; van der Wel, Sebanz, & 
Knoblich, 2013).  
The experiments presented in this thesis support the assumption that action 
intentions are fundamentally anticipatory (i.e. intentions correspond with future goal 
states). Furthermore, the data were consistent with the notion that forming an intention 
to act involves nothing more than evoking a mental image (i.e. activating action effects) 
associated with the perceptual effect one wishes to achieve (i.e. an action goal) until a 
motor threshold is reached and the corresponding action is initiated. Crucially, 
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Experiments 1-6 demonstrated that both endogenous (i.e. imagery) and exogenous 
processes (i.e. perception) can modulate the activation of action effect representations 
and, by extension, engage the motor system and cause action slips – even when physical 
responses were explicitly prohibited. Taken together, these findings provide an 
important insight into how people are able to interact so effortlessly with the world by 
specifying lightly constraining action goals (e.g. make a cup of tea) to mediate the 
translation of sensory input into motor output - allowing the environment to directly 
trigger actions which correspond with the goal (i.e. the precise set of sensorimotor 
transformations required to make tea). In addition, these findings are consistent with the 
notion that accidental slips of action control are a product of the same processes that 
guide voluntary actions – wherein perceptual input can co-opt internally generated 
action plans to trigger inappropriate actions – as proposed at the start of this thesis. 
These experiments also reveal why errors of action control can often be ironic (Wegner, 
1994; Wegner et al., 1998) such that fixating on avoiding a given behaviour can 
sometimes produce the very action one was trying to prevent (e.g. stifling a laugh at an 
inappropriate joke at a funeral). 
Extending these findings, Experiment 7 provided evidence that the tendency to 
produce action slips exhibits a positive relationship with ideomotor suggestibility. This 
finding is significant, because it may suggest that some people are more prone to 
producing action slips due to a natural tendency to focus on anticipated future goal 
states, rather than their current state. In fact, individual differences in the tendency to 
attend to anticipated, rather than actual sensations could account for curious errors of 
predictive processing found in other, non-motor domains, such as hypnotic visual 
hallucination (Woody & Sadler, 2005) and the representational momentum effect 
(Freyd & Finke, 1984; Hudson et al., 2018). 
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In part, the design of the intention insertion task was motivated by a desire to 
provide tangible, behavioural evidence for some of the common features of modern 
models of motor control, which are often discussed (and indeed, researched) in highly 
abstracted terms. For example, Friston’s (2010) concept of “free energy”, which forms 
the basis for Active Inference (Adams et al., 2013), has the potential to provide a unified 
brain theory with the power to account for all cognitive functions and, further, all self-
organising biological systems. Yet, despite the potentially groundbreaking implications 
of this theoretical framework, it is routinely derided for being unintelligible to all but 
the most devoted of minds (see, “How to Read Karl Friston (In the Original Greek)”, 
Maren, 2017). The findings produced by the intention insertion task demonstrate the 
utility of using accidental behaviour, induced by imagery and perception, as a device to 
directly test these esoteric claims about how volitional actions are generated. However, 
a natural consequence of developing a novel experimental method is that the findings it 
generated have motivated further questions about, among other things, participants’ 
subjective experience of producing non-willed action slips and the brain basis for 
volition in action. As a consequence, the experiments presented in this thesis represent a 















Aarts, H., Custers, R., & Wegner, D. M. (2005). On the inference of personal 
authorship: Enhancing experienced agency by priming effect information. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 14(3), 439–458. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2004.11.001 
Adams, R. A., Shipp, S., & Friston, K. J. (2013). Predictions not commands: Active 
inference in the motor system. Brain Structure and Function, 218(3), 611–643. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00429-012-0475-5 
Armel, K. C., & Ramachandran, V. S. (2003). Projecting sensations to external objects: 
Evidence from skin conductance response. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: 
Biological Sciences, 270(1523), 1499–1506. 
https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2003.2364 
Bach, P., Allami, B. K., Tucker, M., & Ellis, R. (2014). Planning-related motor 
processes underlie mental practice and imitation learning. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 143(3), 1277–1294. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0035604 
Bach, P., Bayliss, A., & Tipper, S. P. (2011). The predictive mirror: interactions of 
mirror and affordance processes during action observation. Psychonomic Bulletin 
& Review, 18(1), 171–176. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-010-0029-x 
Bach, P., Griffiths, D., Weigelt, M., & Tipper, S. P. (2010). Gesturing Meaning: Non-
action Words Activate the Motor System. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 
4(November), 214. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2010.00214 
Bach, P., Peatfield, N. A., & Tipper, S. P. (2007). Focusing on body sites: The role of 
spatial attention in action perception. Experimental Brain Research, 178(4), 509–
190 
517. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-006-0756-4 
Badets, A., Koch, I., & Philipp, A. M. (2016). A review of ideomotor approaches to 
perception, cognition, action, and language: advancing a cultural recycling 
hypothesis. Psychological Research, 80(1), 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-
014-0643-8 
Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999). The Unbearable Automaticity of Being. 
American Psychologist, 54(7), 462–479. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-
066X.54.7.462 
Barnier, Amanda J, Dienes, Z., & Mitchell, C. J. (2008). How hypnosis happens: New 
cognitive theories of hypnotic responding. In A. J. Barnier & M. R. Nash (Eds.), 
The Oxford handbook of hypnosis: Theory, research, and practice (pp. 141–177). 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Barnier, Amanda J, & McConkey, K. M. (1999). Absorption, hypnotizability and 
context: non-hypnotic contexts are not all the same. Contemporary Hypnosis, 
16(1), 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1002/ch.144 
Bates, D., Mächler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2015). Fitting Linear Mixed-Effects 
Models Using lme4. Journal of Statistical Software, 67(1), 1–48. 
https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v067.i01 
Berends, H. I., Wolkorte, R., Ijzerman, M. J., & Van Putten, M. J. A. M. (2013). 
Differential cortical activation during observation and observation-and-
imagination. Experimental Brain Research, 229(3), 337–345. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-013-3571-8 
Botvinick, M. M., & Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hand feels touch that eyes see. Nature, 
191 
391(February), 756. https://doi.org/10.1038/35784 
Bowers, K. S. (1998). Waterloo-stanford group scale of hypnotic susceptibility, form C: 
Manual and response booklet. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental 
Hypnosis, 46(3), 250–268. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207149808410006 
Brandstatter, V., Lengfelder, A., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (2001). Implementation Intentions 
and Efficient Action Initiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
81(5), 946–960. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-35I4.81.5.946 
Brass, M., Bekkering, H., & Prinz, W. (2001). Movement observation affects movement 
execution in a simple response task. Acta Psychologica, 106(1–2), 3–22. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0001-6918(00)00024-X 
Brass, M., Bekkering, H., Wohlschläger, A., & Prinz, W. (2000). Compatibility between 
observed and executed finger movements: Comparing symbolic, spatial, and 
imitative cues. Brain and Cognition, 44(2), 124–143. 
https://doi.org/10.1006/brcg.2000.1225 
Brass, M., & Haggard, P. (2008). The what, when, whether model of intentional action. 
Neuroscientist, 14(4), 319–325. https://doi.org/10.1177/1073858408317417 
Brown, H., Adams, R. A., Parees, I., Edwards, M., & Friston, K. (2013). Active 
inference, sensory attenuation and illusions. Cognitive Processing, 14(4), 411–427. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-013-0571-3 
Brown, P., Rothwell, J. C., Thompson, P. D., Britton, T. C., Day, B. L., & Marsden, C. 
D. (1991). New observations on the normal auditory startle reflex in man. Brain, 
114(4), 1891–1902. https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/114.4.1891 
Bürkner, P.-C. (2017). brms: An R Package for Bayesian Multilevel Models Using Stan. 
192 
Journal of Statistical Software, 80(1), 1–28. Retrieved from 
https://www.jstatsoft.org/v080/i01 
Calabresi, P., Picconi, B., Tozzi, A., Ghiglieri, V., & Di Filippo, M. (2014). Direct and 
indirect pathways of basal ganglia: a critical reappraisal. Nature Neuroscience, 
17(8), 1022. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.3743 
Cardeña, E., & Terhune, D. B. (2014). Hypnotizability, personality traits, and the 
propensity to experience alterations of consciousness. Psychology of 
Consciousness, 1(3), 292–307. https://doi.org/10.1037/cns0000026 
Carpenter, W. B. (1852). On the Influence of Suggestion in Modifying and Directing 
Muscular Movement, Independently of Volition. Proceedings of the Royal 
Institution. Retrieved from https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ajDTnAEACAAJ 
Chartrand, T. L., & Bargh, J. A. (1999). The Chameleon Effect: The Perception-
Behaviour Link and Social Interaction. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 76(6), 893–910. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.76.6.893 
Chevreul, M. E. (1833). Lettre à M. Ampère sur une classe particulière de mouvements 
musculaires. Review Des Deux Mondes, (2), 258–266. 
Churchland, A. K., Kiani, R., & Shadlen, M. N. (2008). Decision-making with multiple 
alternatives. Nature Neuroscience, 11(6), 693–702. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nn0708-851c 
Cisek, P. (2007). Cortical mechanisms of action selection: the affordance competition 
hypothesis. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, 
Biological Sciences, 362(1485), 1585–1599. 
https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2007.2054 
193 
Clark, A. (2013). Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of 
cognitive science. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(3), 181–253. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X12000477 
Colton, J., Bach, P., Whalley, B., & Mitchell, C. (2018a). Intention insertion: Activating 
an action’s perceptual consequences is sufficient to induce non-willed motor 
behavior. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 147(8), 1256–1263. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000435 
Colton, J., Bach, P., Whalley, B., & Mitchell, C. (2018b). Intention insertion: activating 
an action’s perceptual consequences is sufficient to induce non-willed motor 
behaviour (Analysis and Materials). Retrieved from https://osf.io/s9qgu/ 
Cramer, A. O. J., van Ravenzwaaij, D., Matzke, D., Steingroever, H., Wetzels, R., 
Grasman, R. P. P. P., … Wagenmakers, E. J. (2016). Hidden multiplicity in 
exploratory multiway ANOVA: Prevalence and remedies. Psychonomic Bulletin 
and Review, 23(2), 640–647. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-015-0913-5 
Dienes, Z., Lush, P., Semmens-Wheeler, R., Parkinson, J., Scott, R., & Naish, P. (2016). 
Hypnosis as self-deception; meditation as self-insight. In M. Raz, Amir and 
Lifshitz (Ed.), Hypnosis and meditation: Towards an integrative science of 
conscious planes. (pp. 107–125). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Drost, U. C., Rieger, M., Brass, M., Gunter, T. C., & Prinz, W. (2005). When hearing 
turns into playing: Movement induction by auditory stimuli in pianists. The 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, (8), 58–1376. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02724980443000610 
Dum, R. P., & Strick, P. L. (2002). Motor areas in the frontal lobe of the primate. 
Physiology & Behavior, 77(4), 677–682. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0031-
194 
9384(02)00929-0 
Easton, R. D., & Shor, R. E. (1975). Information processing analysis of the Chevreul 
pendulum illusion. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 1(3), 231–236. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.1.3.231 
Easton, R. D., & Shor, R. E. (1976). An Experimental Analysis of the Chevreul 
Pendulum Illusion. The Journal of General Psychology, 95(1), 111–125. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00221309.1976.9710871 
Easton, R. D., & Shor, R. E. (1977). Augmented and Delayed Feedback in the Chevreul 
Pendulum Illusion. The Journal of General Psychology, 97(2), 167–177. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00221309.1977.9920835 
Elsner, B., & Hommel, B. (2001). Effect anticipation and action control. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 27(1), 229–240. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.27.1.229 
Freud, S. (1914). The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. New York: The Macmillan 
Company. 
Freyd, J. J., & Finke, R. A. (1984). Representational momentum. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 10(1), 126. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.10.1.126 
Friston, K. (2010). The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory? Nature Reviews. 
Neuroscience, 11(2), 127–138. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2787 
Gelman, A. (2006). Prior distributions for variance parameters in hierarchical models 
(Comment on Article by Browne and Draper). Bayesian Analysis, 1(3), 515–534. 
https://doi.org/10.1214/06-BA117A 
195 
Gentsch, A., Weber, A., Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G., Schutz-Bosbach, S., & Schütz-
Bosbach, S. (2016). Towards a common framework of grounded action cognition: 
Relating motor control, perception and cognition. Cognition, 146(April), 81–89. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.09.010 
Glisky, M. L., Tataryn, D. J., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (1995). Hypnotizability and mental 
imagery. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 43(1), 34–
54. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207149508409374 
Greenwald, A. G. (1970). Sensory feedback mechanisms in performance control: With 
special reference to the ideo-motor mechanism. Psychological Review, 77(2), 73–
99. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0028689 
Grover, M. P., Jensen, M. P., Patterson, D. R., Gertz, K. J., & Day, M. A. (2018). The 
Association Between Mindfulness and Hypnotizability: Clinical and Theoretical 
Implications. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 61(1), 4–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00029157.2017.1419458 
Guérard, K., & Brodeur, M. (2015). Manipulability agreement as a predictor of action 
initiation latency. Behavior Research Methods, 47(2), 572–579. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-014-0495-6 
Haggard, Patrick. (2008). Human volition: Towards a neuroscience of will. Nature 
Reviews Neuroscience, 9(12), 934–946. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2497 
Haggard, Patrick. (2019). The Neurocognitive Bases of Human Volition. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 70(1), 9–28. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-
010418-103348 
Halligan, P. W., & Oakley, D. A. (2014). Hypnosis and beyond: Exploring the broader 
196 
domain of suggestion. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and 
Practice, 1(2), 105–122. https://doi.org/10.1037/cns0000019 
Herwig, A., Prinz, W., & Waszak, F. (2007). Two modes of sensorimotor integration in 
intention-based and stimulus-based actions. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 60(11), 1540–1554. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470210601119134 
Heyes, C., & Bird, G. (2008). Mirroring, association, and the correspondence problem. 
In P. Haggard, Y. Rossetti, & M. Kawato (Eds.), Sensorimotor Foundations of 
Higher Cognition (Vol. 22, pp. 460–480). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231447.003.0021 
Heyes, C., Bird, G., Johnson, H., & Haggard, P. (2005). Experience modulates 
automatic imitation, 22, 233–240. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2004.09.009 
Heyes, C., & Ray, E. (2000). What Is the Significance of Imitation in Animals? In P. J. 
B. Slater, J. S. Rosenblatt, C. T. Snowdon, & T. J. Roper (Eds.), Advances in the 
Study of Behavior (Vol. 29, pp. 215–245). Academic Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-3454(08)60106-0 
Hommel, B. (1995). Stimulus-response compatibility and the Simon effect: Toward an 
empirical clarification. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
and Performance, 21(4), 764–775. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.21.4.764 
Hommel, B. (1997). Toward an action-concept model of stimulus-response 
compatibility. In B. Hommel & W. B. Prinz (Eds.), Theoretical Issues in Stimulus-
Response Compatibility (Vol. 118, pp. 281–320). Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0166-4115(97)80041-6 
197 
Hommel, B. (2009). Action control according to TEC (theory of event coding). 
Psychological Research, 73(4), 512–526. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-009-
0234-2 
Hommel, B., Müsseler, J., Aschersleben, G., & Prinz, W. (2001). The Theory of Event 
Coding (TEC): A framework for perception and action planning. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, 24(05), 849–878. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X01000103 
How to Make a Proper Brew. (2019). Retrieved January 4, 2019, from 
https://www.yorkshiretea.co.uk/our-teas/how-to-make-a-proper-brew 
Hudson, M., McDonough, K. L., Edwards, R., & Bach, P. (2018). Perceptual teleology: 
expectations of action efficiency bias social perception. Proceedings. Biological 
Sciences, 285(1884), 20180638. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2018.0638 
Hull, C. L. (1943). Principles of behavior: an introduction to behavior theory. Oxford, 
UK: Appleton-Century. 
Jacobson, E. (1930). Electrical measurements of neuromuscular states during mental 
activities: 1. Imagination of movement involving skeletal muscle. American 
Journal of Physiology, 91, 567–608. 
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology (Vols. 1 & 2). New York, NY: Henry 
Holt and Company. https://doi.org/10.1037/10538-000 
Jamieson, G. A. (2016). A unified theory of hypnosis and meditation states: The 
interoceptive predictive coding approach. In A. Raz & M. Lifshitz (Eds.), Hypnosis 
and meditation: Towards an integrative science of conscious planes. (pp. 313–
342). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Jeannerod, M., & Decety, J. (1995). Mental motor imagery: a window into the 
198 
representational stages of action. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 5(6), 727–732. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0959-4388(95)80099-9 
Kandyba, K., & Laurence, J. R. (1996). Hypnotic age-regression, cuing and memory 
creation. In International Journal of Psychology (Vol. 31, p. 4475). Sussex, UK: 
Psychology Press. 
Keller, P. E., & Koch, I. (2006). The planning and execution of short auditory 
sequences. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 13(4), 711–716. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03193985 
Kilner, J. M., Hamilton, A. F. de C., & Blakemore, S. J. (2007). Interference effect of 
observed human movement on action is due to velocity profile of biological 
motion. Social Neuroscience, 2(3–4), 158–166. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17470910701428190 
Kilner, J. M., Paulignan, Y., & Blakemore, S. J. (2003). An interference effect of 
observed biological movement on action. Current Biology, 13(6), 522–525. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0960-9822(03)00165-9 
Knoblich, G., & Prinz, W. (2005). Linking perception and action: An ideomotor 
approach. In H.-J. Freund, J. Marc, H. Mark, & R. Leiguarda (Eds.), Higher-order 
motor disorders: From Neuroanatomy and neurobiology to clinical neurology (pp. 
79–104). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Körding, K. P., & Wolpert, D. M. (2004). Bayesian integration in sensorimotor 
learning. Nature, 427(6971), 244–247. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature02169 
Körding, K. P., & Wolpert, D. M. (2006). Bayesian decision theory in sensorimotor 
control. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(7), 319–326. 
199 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2006.05.003 
Kraeutner, S., Gionfriddo, A., Bardouille, T., & Boe, S. (2014). Motor imagery-based 
brain activity parallels that of motor execution: Evidence from magnetic source 
imaging of cortical oscillations. Brain Research, 1588, 81–91. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2014.09.001 
Kühn, S., Elsner, B., Prinz, W., & Brass, M. (2009). Busy doing nothing: Evidence for 
nonaction-effect binding. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16(3), 542–549. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/PBR.16.3.542 
Kühn, S., Keizer, A., Rombouts, S. A. R. B., & Hommel, B. (2011). The functional and 
neural mechanism of action preparation: roles of EBA and FFA in voluntary action 
control. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(1), 214. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2010.21418 
Kunde, W. (2001). Response-Effect Compatibility in Manual Choice Reaction Tasks. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 27(2), 
387–394. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.27.2.387 
Kunde, W., Elsner, K., & Kiesel, A. (2007). No anticipation-no action: The role of 
anticipation in action and perception. Cognitive Processing, 8(2), 71–78. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-007-0162-2 
Kunde, W., Koch, I., & Hoffmann, J. (2004). Anticipated action effects affect the 
selection, initiation, and execution of actions. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Part A: Human Experimental Psychology, 57(1), 87. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02724980343000143 
Labelle, L., Dixon, M., & Laurence, J.-R. (1989). Pseudomemory creation and 
200 
confidence ratings: A theory still in search of supportive data. British Journal of 
Experimental & Clinical Hypnosis, 6(3), 163–165. 
Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. (1983). Time of conscious 
intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential): The 
unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain, 106(3), 623–642. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/106.3.623 
Lu, M. K., Arai, N., Tsai, C. H., & Ziemann, U. (2012). Movement related cortical 
potentials of cued versus self-initiated movements: Double dissociated modulation 
by dorsal premotor cortex versus supplementary motor area rTMS. Human Brain 
Mapping, 33(4), 824–839. https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.21248 
Lynn, S. J., Laurence, J.-R. R., & Kirsch, I. (2015). Hypnosis, Suggestion, and 
Suggestibility: An Integrative Model. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 
57(3), 314–329. https://doi.org/10.1080/00029157.2014.976783 
Ma, K., & Hommel, B. (2015a). Body-ownership for actively operated non-corporeal 
objects. Consciousness and Cognition, 36, 75–86. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.06.003 
Ma, K., & Hommel, B. (2015b). The role of agency for perceived ownership in the 
virtual hand illusion. Consciousness and Cognition, 36, 277–288. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.07.008 
Maren, A. (2017). How to Read Karl Friston (In the Original Greek). Retrieved 
December 6, 2018, from http://www.aliannajmaren.com/2017/07/27/how-to-read-
karl-friston-in-the-original-greek/ 
Maslovat, D., Chua, R., & Hodges, N. J. (2013). When unintended movements “leak” 
201 
out: A startling acoustic stimulus can elicit a prepared response during motor 
imagery and action observation. Neuropsychologia, 51(5), 838–844. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.01.016 
McRobbie, L. R. (2013). The Strange and Mysterious History of the Ouija Board. 
Retrieved February 13, 2018, from https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-
strange-and-mysterious-history-of-the-ouija-board-5860627/ 
Munakata, Y., Herd, S. A., Chatham, C. H., Depue, B. E., Banich, M. T., & O’Reilly, R. 
C. (2011). A unified framework for inhibitory control. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 15(10), 453–459. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2011.07.011 
Murakami, M., Vicente, M. I., Costa, G. M., & Mainen, Z. F. (2014). Neural 
antecedents of self-initiated actions in secondary motor cortex. Nature 
Neuroscience, 17(11), 1574–1582. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.3826 
Ondobaka, S., & Bekkering, H. (2012). Hierarchy of idea-guided action and perception-
guided movement. Frontiers in Psychology, 3(December), 1–5. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00579 
Pacherie, E. (2008). The phenomenology of action: A conceptual framework. 
Cognition, 107(1), 179–217. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.09.003 
Pacherie, E., & Haggard, P. (2010). What are intentions? In W. Sinnott-Armstrong & N. 
Lynn (Eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility. A tribute to Benjamin Libet. (pp. 
70–84). Oxford University Press, USA. 
Picard, N., & Strick, P. L. (1996). Motor Areas of the Medial Wall: A Review of Their 
Location and Functional Activation. Cerebral Cortex, 6(3), 342–353. Retrieved 
from http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cercor/6.3.342 
202 
Prinz, W. (1990). A Common Coding Approach to Perception and Action. In O. 
Neumann & W. Prinz (Eds.), Relationships Between Perception and Action: 
Current Approaches (pp. 167–201). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75348-0_7 
Prinz, W. (1997). Perception and Action Planning. European Journal of Cognitive 
Psychology, 9(2), 129–154. https://doi.org/10.1080/713752551 
R Core team. (2017). R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing. 
Vienna, Austria.: R Foundation for Statistical Computing. Retrieved from 
https://www.r-project.org/ 
Ramsey, R., Cumming, J., Eastough, D., & Edwards, M. G. (2010). Incongruent 
imagery interferes with action initiation. Brain and Cognition, 74(3), 249–254. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2010.08.005 
Reason, J. (1984). Lapses of Attention in Everyday Life. In R. Parasuraman & D. R. 
Davies (Eds.), Varieties of Attention (pp. 515–549). New York, NY: Academic 
Press. 
Ridderinkhof, K. R., van den Wildenberg, W. P. M., & Brass, M. (2014). “Don’t” 
versus “Won’t”: Principles, mechanisms, and intention in action inhibition. 
Neuropsychologia, 65(September), 255–262. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2014.09.005 
Rieger, M., Dahm, S., & Koch, I. (2017). Inhibition in motor imagery: a novel action 
mode switching paradigm. Psychonomic Bulletin &amp; Review, 24(2), 459–466. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-016-1095-5 
Rizzolatti, G., Luppino, G., & Matelli, M. (1998). The organization of the cortical 
203 
motor system: new concepts. Electroencephalography and Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 106(4), 283–296. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0013-4694(98)00022-
4 
Sanders, A. F. (1980). Stage Analysis of Reaction Processes. In G. E. Stelmach & J. B. 
T.-A. in P. Requin (Eds.), Tutorials in Motor Behavior (Vol. 1, pp. 331–354). 
Amsterdam: North-Holland. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0166-4115(08)61955-X 
Schurger, A., Mylopoulos, M., & Rosenthal, D. (2016). Neural Antecedents of 
Spontaneous Voluntary Movement: A New Perspective. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 20(2), 77–79. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2015.11.003 
Schurger, A., Sitt, J. D., & Dehaene, S. (2012). An accumulator model for spontaneous 
neural activity prior to self-initiated movement. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 109(42), E2904–E2913. 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1210467109 
Schurger, A., & Uithol, S. (2015). Nowhere and Everywhere: The Causal Origin of 
Voluntary Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 6(4), 761–778. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0223-2 
Schütz-Bosbach, S., Mancini, B., Aglioti, S. M., & Haggard, P. (2006). Self and Other 
in the Human Motor System. Current Biology, 16(18), 1830–1834. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2006.07.048 
Schüür, F., & Haggard, P. (2011). What are self-generated actions? Consciousness and 
Cognition, 20(4), 1697–1704. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2011.09.006 
Shin, Y. K., Proctor, R. W., & Capaldi, E. J. (2010). A review of contemporary 
ideomotor theory. Psychological Bulletin, 136(6), 943–974. 
204 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0020541 
Shor, R. E., & Orne, E. C. (1962). Harvard group scale of hypnotic susceptibility. 
Consulting Psychologists Press. 
Stock, A., & Stock, C. (2004). A short history of ideo-motor action. Psychological 
Research, 68(2–3), 176–188. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-003-0154-5 
Tecuapetla, F., Jin, X., Lima, S. Q., & Costa, R. M. (2016). Complementary 
Contributions of Striatal Projection Pathways to Action Initiation and Execution. 
Cell, 166(3), 703–715. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cell.2016.06.032 
Tsakiris, M., Carpenter, L., James, D., & Fotopoulou, A. (2010). Hands only illusion: 
Multisensory integration elicits sense of ownership for body parts but not for non-
corporeal objects. Experimental Brain Research, 204(3), 343–352. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-009-2039-3 
Tucker, M., & Ellis, R. (1998). On the relations between seen objects and components 
of potential actions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 24(3), 830–846. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.24.3.830 
Turella, L., Tucciarelli, R., Oosterhof, N. N., Weisz, N., Rumiati, R., & Lingnau, A. 
(2016). Beta band modulations underlie action representations for movement 
planning. NeuroImage, 136, 197–207. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2016.05.027 
Uithol, S., Burnston, D. C., & Haselager, P. (2014). Why we may not find intentions in 
the brain. Neuropsychologia, 56(1), 129–139. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2014.01.010 
van der Wel, R. P. R. D., Sebanz, N., & Knoblich, G. (2013). Action perception from a 
205 
common coding perspective. In K. Johnson & M. Shiffrar (Eds.), People 
Watching: Social, Perceptual, and Neurophysiological Studies of Body Perception 
(pp. 101–120). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
van Steenbergen, H., Warren, C. M., Kühn, S., de Wit, S., Wiers, R. W., & Hommel, B. 
(2017). Representational precision in visual cortex reveals outcome encoding and 
reward modulation during action preparation. NeuroImage, 157, 415–428. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2017.06.012 
Vargas, C. D., Olivier, E., Craighero, L., Fadiga, L., Duhamel, J. R., & Sirigu, A. 
(2004). The Influence of Hand Posture on Corticospinal Excitability during Motor 
Imagery: A Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation Study. Cerebral Cortex, 14(11), 
1200–1206. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhh080 
Vogt, S., Di Rienzo, F., Collet, C., Collins, A., Guillot, A., Rienzo, F. Di, … Guillot, A. 
(2013). Multiple roles of motor imagery during action observation. Frontiers in 
Human Neuroscience, 7(November), 807. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00807 
Wagenmakers, E.-J., Love, J., Marsman, M., Jamil, T., Ly, A., Verhagen, J., … Morey, 
R. D. (2018). Bayesian inference for psychology. Part II: Example applications 
with JASP. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 25(1), 58–76. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-017-1323-7 
Waszak, F., Cardoso-Leite, P., & Hughes, G. (2012). Action effect anticipation: 
Neurophysiological basis and functional consequences. Neuroscience and 
Biobehavioral Reviews, 36(2), 943–959. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.11.004 
Wegner, D. M. (1994). Ironic processes of mental control. Psychological Review. 
206 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.101.1.34 
Wegner, D. M., Ansfield, M., & Pilloff, D. (1998). The Putt and the Pendulum: Ironic 
Effects of the Mental Control of Action. Psychological Science, 9(3), 196–199. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00037 
Weitzenhoffer, A. M., & Hilgard, E. R. (1962). Stanford hypnotic susceptibility scale, 
form C (Vol. 27). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. 
Weitzenhoffer, A. M., Hilgard, E. R., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (1996). Stanford hypnotic 
susceptibility scale, form C. Philosophical Psychology, 16(2), 325–340. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
Wolpert, D. M. (1997). Computational approaches to motor control. Trends in 
Cognitive Science, 1(6), 209–216. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(97)01070-X 
Wolpert, D. M., & Ghahramani, Z. (2000). Computational principles of movement 
neuroscience. Nature Neuroscience, 3(11s), 1212–1217. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/81497 
Woody, E. Z., Barnier, A. J., & McConkey, K. M. (2005). Multiple hypnotizabilities: 
differentiating the building blocks of hypnotic response. Psychological 
Assessment, 17(2), 200. https://doi.org/10.1037/1040-3590.17.2.200 
Woody, E. Z., & Sadler, P. (2005). On the virtues of virtuosos. Contemporary 
Hypnosis, 22(1), 8–13. https://doi.org/10.1002/ch.15 
Zimmermann, M., Mars, R. B., de Lange, F. P., Toni, I., Verhagen, L., Lange, F., … 
Verhagen, L. (2017). Is the Extrastriate Body Area part of the dorsal visuomotor 
stream? A study of structural and functional connectivity. Brain Structure and 
Function, 223(July), 31–46. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00429-017-1469-0 
207 
Zimmermann, M., Verhagen, L., de Lange, F. P., & Toni, I. (2016). The extrastriate 
body area computes desired goal states during action planning. ENeuro, 3(April), 
1–13. https://doi.org/10.1523/ENEURO.0020-16.2016 
 
